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Abstract

[Purpose: The aim of this dissertation is to investigate audit quality in the UAE for
small and medium sized companies, using the Framework for Audit Quality
proposed by the IAASB]. [Design/Methodology/Approach: The methodology used
was to describe the laws and regulations now in place in the GCC and to review
some of the existing authorities that are working to regulate the audit industry in the
country‟s private sector. Next, questionnaires were used to measure the perception of
audit quality in SMEs, which was analyzed by means of factor analysis. A number of
interviews were also conducted over the same variables of the framework and the
resulting data were analyzed using NVIVO. Finally, a field experiment was
conducted in the UAE]. [Findings: It was noted that the regulation over the audit
industry is under-developed. It was also noted that there are differences in the
perceptions of audit quality in the SME market. Finally, it was noted that audits are
being conducted for SMEs in the UAE without adherence to auditing standards].
[Limitations: Measuring audit quality directly by obtaining confidential audit files is
very challenging]. [Originality/Value: It was expected that the study would identify
major weaknesses affecting audit quality in the SME market in the UAE].

Keywords: audit, audit quality, small and medium size enterprises (SME‟s), UAE,
governance, GCC, regulation, private sector, social experiment, IAASB audit
framework.
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)TITLE AND ABSTRACT (IN ARABIC

استكشاف جودة المراجعت  :للشركاث الصغيرة والمتوسطت في دولت اإلماراث العربيت
المتحذة
الملخص

اٌٙذف ِٓ ٘زٖ اٌذساست ٘ ٛاسخىشاف جٛدة اٌخذل١ك اٌّاٌ ٟف ٟدٌٚت اإلِاساث اٌؼشب١ت اٌّخحذة
ٌٍششواث اٌصغ١شة ٚاٌّخٛسطت اٌحجُٚ ،رٌه باسخخذاَ إطاس ِشاجؼت اٌجٛدة اٌخ ٟالخشحٙا IAASB
.إْ إٌّٙج١ت اٌّسخخذِت ف ٟاٌذساست ٘ ٟاٌم١اَ بٛصف ٌٍمٛأٚ ٓ١اٌٍٛائح اٌّؼّٛي بٙا ف ٟدٚي ِجٍس
اٌخؼا ْٚاٌخٍ١جٚ ٟاسخؼشاض بؼط اٌسٍطاث اٌمائّت اٌخ ٟحؼًّ ػٍ ٝحٕظِٕٙ ُ١ت اٌخذل١ك ف ٟاٌمطاع
اٌخاص ف ٟدٌٚت اإلِاساث اٌؼشب١ت اٌّخحذة ٚبؼذ٘ا اسخخذاَ اسخب١أاث ٌم١اس ِف َٛٙجٛدة اٌخذل١ك ٌذٜ
اٌششواث اٌصغ١شة ٚاٌّخٛسطت اٌخ ٟحُ ححٍٍٙ١ا باسخخذاَ اٌخحٍ ً١اٌؼاٍِٚ .ٟحُ أجشاء ػذد ِٓ اٌّمابالث
أ٠ضا فٔ ٟفس إطاس اٌّخغ١شاث ٚحُ ححٍ ً١اٌب١أاث باسخخذاَ ٚ .NVIVOأخ١شا ،حُ إجشاء حجشبت
ِ١ذأ١ت ف ٟدٌٚت اإلِاساث اٌؼشب١ت اٌّخحذة.
ٌٛحظ أْ اٌخٕظ ُ١ػٍ ِٕٙ ٝت اٌخذل١ك اٌّاٌ ٟغ١ش ِىخٍّت ١ٌ ٚسج واف١ت .وّا ٌٛحظ أْ ٕ٘ان
اخخالفاث فِ ٟفا٘ ُ١جٛدة اٌخذل١ك ف ٟسٛق اٌششواث اٌصغ١شة ٚاٌّخٛسطتٚ .أخ١شاٌٛ ،حظ أْ ػٍّ١اث
اٌخذل١ك ٌٍششواث اٌصغ١شة ٚاٌّخٛسطت ف ٟدٌٚت اإلِاساث اٌؼشب١ت اٌّخحذة حجش٠ٚ ٞخُ اٌؼًّ بٙا دْٚ
اٌخم١ذ بّؼا١٠شاٌخذل١ك اٌؼاٌّ١ت  ِٓ .اٌصؼب ٌٍغا٠ت ل١اس جٛدة اٌخذل١ك ِباششة ألٔٗ ِٓ اٌصؼب اٌحصٛي
ػٍٍِ ٝفاث اٌخذل١ك اٌسش٠ت  ِٓ.اٌّخٛلغ أْ اٌذساست سخحذد ٔماط اٌضؼف اٌشئ١س١ت اٌخ ٟحؤثش ػٍ ٝجٛدة
اٌخذل١ك ف ٟسٛق اٌششواث اٌصغ١شة ٚاٌّخٛسطت ف ٟدٌٚت اإلِاساث اٌؼشب١ت اٌّخحذة.

مفاهيم البحث الرئيسيت :اٌخذل١ك ٚجٛدة اٌخذل١ك ،اٌّؤسساث اٌصغ١شة ٚاٌّخٛسطت اٌحجُ ،اإلِاساث
اٌؼشب١ت اٌّخحذةٚ ،اٌحٛوّت ،دٚي ِجٍس اٌخؼا ْٚاٌخٍ١ج ،ٟاٌخٕظٚ ،ُ١اٌمطاع اٌخاص ،اٌذساساث
االجخّاػ١ت ،إطاس اٌخذل١ك IAASB
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Preamble
Issues of audit quality and the value of audits have been of prime interest to
practitioners and researchers alike for some time now (Francis, 2011). Discussions of
quality are often revived in the wake of global financial scandals such as Enron and
WorldCom (Francis, 2011). As a result, the value of the auditing profession and
quality of audits provided are regularly questioned (Kilgore, Radich, & Harrison,
2011). The general interest in the issue of „audit quality‟ is evident in the large
volume of publications and debates by academics and professionals, as well as the
public media in general. Although such attention is vital for a continued discussion
on ways to improve the services provided by the profession, such debates rarely
extend to the audits performed for small and medium sized clients, or in the context
of emerging economies. To add to their number, this dissertation aims to focus
discussions of audit quality on an often ignored, but influential sector of SME clients
in the context of the UAE.
Financial statements audit are defined as “an examination of the quality of
a company‟s accounts to reassure shareholders that the information in them is useful
and unbiased for the purposes of deciding whether their resources are being used
efficiently and to confirm, as far as is reasonable, their freedom from fraud and
error” (Sherer & Kent 1983). Although many theories attempt to explain the value of
audits, for example, the approaches of Mautz & Sharaf (1961), Flint (1971), and
Lee (1972), and market based theories such as the information hypothesis, agency
theory and insurance hypothesis (Wallace, 1981), the divergent approaches taken by
these theories may explain the emergence of an expectations gap (Humphrey, Moizer,
& Turley 1993). In other words, if the persistence of audits even in unregulated
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markets can be explained by competing and at times conflicting theories, it is not
surprising that the expectations of the role of audits in society will be diverge and
hence the quality of the audits provided (Humphrey et al. 1993). The normative
approach followed by some of the theories outlined above has led to a new strand of
research in the field calling for field studies to “explore the socially constructed
nature of auditing and the process by which the conflicts and pressures in the
auditor‟s working environment are accommodated” (Berger, Humphrey, & Pulley
1997). With this in mind, this dissertation will explore issues of audit quality by
examining the field of SME audits in the UAE. Thus, this research takes a fieldbased research approach, whereby the practices of auditors on SME clients are
explored by means of field research.
Audit quality is a complex issue because it is not easily observable, and is
often linked only to the final output of the process of auditing, namely, the audit
report

(Colbert & Murray 1998). Adopting an economic perspective, the

independent auditor's aim is to work to make companies more efficient through
verifying their financial statements. The process of verification presupposes the
accumulation and evaluation of evidence (Balsam, Krishnan, & Yang 2003). This
evidence is used also as the basis for forming the auditor‟s professional opinion
concerning the financial statements. Therefore, the auditor's opinion is considered the
key to the credibility and quality of company‟s financial statements. Poor auditing
leads to misleading financial statements that affect stakeholders‟ economic decisions
and the perception of auditors (Sawyer, 2006). Proper auditing requires competent
individuals who use their knowledge, skills, experience and neutrality to make
professional judgments supported by the circumstances and facts.
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Audit quality has also been defined as the probability that an independent
auditor will identify a failure in the accounting system of a company and will report
it (Deangelo, 1981). This means that an auditor should be technically competent in
detecting errors during auditing and neutral in ensuring that errors are corrected or
noted in the auditor„s report. The credibility of the audit function and the perception
of its quality are core components of an effective capital market. A high level of
expertise and awareness in the tasks are vital for high audit quality.
Professional skepticism, expertise and the auditor's high degree of knowledge
are essential factors contributing to the quality of the auditor's judgment (AlThuneibat et al., 2011); (Ghosh & Moon, 2005); (Carcello, Hermanson, & McGrath
1992); (Ghosh & Moon, 2005). Moreover, economic pressures and client retention
are relevant to this list. High quality auditing ensures reliability and trust in financial
reports. In addition, it is closely related to the confidence of the market capital
(Ghosh & Moon, 2005). At the same time, market confidence, the reliability of
financial statements, and respect for the audit function are related to the perception of
audit quality. High quality auditing and the perception of audit quality have been of
serious concern in recent years because of the collapses of companies due to auditing
failures.
A different way of looking at audit quality focuses on factors such as inputs,
outputs, and context (Francis, 2011). One of the most important inputs is the personal
characteristics of the auditor, including the ethical norms and values held,
experience, skills, thinking, and attitudes. Another audit quality input is the audit
process itself. It deals with the effectiveness of the auditor's tools, the audit
methodology, the availability of proper technical support, and other factors. Audit
quality is also influenced by numerous other outputs, since they are considered by
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stakeholders in their audit quality assessment

(Colbert & Murray 1998). For

example, the report provided by an auditor may be treated as a positive contribution
to audit quality, but only if it suggests a clear audit outcome. The degree to which
their compliance with auditing standards is a way to define audit quality. In addition,
several different contextual factors can impact audit quality. For example, good
corporate governance enhances the quality of the audit by creating an environment of
transparency and sound ethical behaviors. Moreover, regulations, laws, and the
quality of the financial reporting framework may positively influence audit quality.
In general, audit quality can be influenced by additional factors which are not
linked to input or output only, such as the culture of the auditing firm; the consulting
culture of an auditing firm; the auditor‟s understanding of business and financial
report risks; the quality control of the auditing firm; the auditor‟s level of training;
his/her knowledge of the industry; reviews of auditing firm quality and expertise; and
the accountability of partners (Al-Thuneibat, Al-Issa and Baker, 2011), (Arrunada,
1999), (Jong-Hag, Kim, Jeong-Bon, & Yoonseok, 2010), and (Niemi, 2004). All
these elements highlight the complex nature of auditing and the judgment that one
can make about its quality.
Approaches to judging audit quality also vary. While some emphasize the
value of direct approaches (Colbert & Murray 1998), difficulties in the access to
audit firms, as well as problems in measuring directly the quality of auditing make
this approach difficult to apply in

practice (Balsam, Krishnan, & Yang 2003).

Indirect approaches are portrayed as alternative ways of measuring the quality of
auditing, and as a result greater emphasis falls on assessing the quality of the
components of the audit process. The main task is to set up the procedures of formal
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and informal quality monitoring through audit reviews, control reviews, compliance
reviews, training, and learning (Colbert & Murray 1998).
The limitations of the various approaches outlined above, which focus on one
single aspect of an audit as a proxy in measuring its quality, make it prudent to adopt
a more holistic approach to examining quality issues. Hence, in defining audit quality
this dissertation adopts a more holistic which includes many aspects of an audit.
According to the IAASB, high audit quality is likely when “an engagement team
exhibits appropriate values, ethics and attitude and when the team applies a rigorous
audit process and quality control procedures. It's also most likely achieved when
auditors have sufficient knowledge and experience, have sufficient time to perform
the audit work, receive valuable and timely reports and interact appropriately with a
variety of different stakeholders‖ (cited in Whitehouse, 2013).
Following the above definition, this study adopts the IAASB audit quality
frame which accommodates all the elements impacting on audit quality at the
engagement level, national level and firm level. The framework starts with the input
factors impacting on audit quality such as ethics, knowledge, attitude, etc. Second,
the framework reviews the output factors that result in the auditor‟s opinion and
financial reports. Finally, the framework considers audit quality within the contextual
factors that are specific to a country‟s laws and regulations through the interactions
that take place in the auditing process.
A strong contributing factor to the issue of audit quality is the regulatory
framework for auditing in the UAE, which can be described as unique. Although
the UAE has recently experienced considerable growth in financial activities and
investment, this has not been accompanied by concomitant development in the
regulatory and professional structure of the auditing profession, and the nature of the
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profession remains fragmented (Khalifa, 2012). One of the major areas that reflect
this is the variation in financial reporting requirements. For example, while
companies in the free zone prepare their financial statements according to
international financial reporting standards (IFRS), others outside the free zone may
choose a different framework for reporting (e.g. GAAP or the German GAAP).
Another aspect that reflects the fragmented nature of the audit industry in the UAE is
the rivalry in jurisdictional claims by various entities: while governmental entities
under the government of Abu Dhabi are audited by ADAA, free zones have different
auditing requirements. Banks also play a role, as they „informally‟ give auditors „A‟,
„B‟, or „C‟ ranking, based on their own ideas of quality. The Big 4 are always ranked
„A‟, and the remaining firms either „B‟ or „C‟.
The focus on Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in this dissertation is
justifiable as this segment can be described as the backbone of the UAE economy.
SME‟s contribute substantially to the GDP and act as the engine for the country‟s
economic development and growth. In addition, SMEs are the main source of
innovation, entrepreneurship, and the creation of employment. The government of
the UAE has placed an increased emphasis on enhancing the performance of the
SME sector because it makes these enterprises more like their counterparts in other
countries. A number of initiatives have been taken to develop SME sector and boost
its performance. SMEs in the UAE differ in their needs, capability, and willingness
to pay for auditing services.
SMEs as the basis of modern economies contribute to employment, enhance
investment, and allow countries to sustain economic growth. The Ministry of Finance
supports the growth of SMEs as a means of encouraging entrepreneurship in the
country. According to a report issued by the Department of Economic Development
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in 2014, Abu Dhabi has put strenuous effort in the past decade into supporting the
SME sector. The report identifies this sector as one of the main engines for economic
growth in the UAE. It was reported that, of the approximately 300,000 different
enterprises that exist in the UAE, 94% are SMEs. It is also reported as of 2014 that
these businesses contribute 60% to GDP and 84% to employment in the UAE.
The UAE cares about economic growth and recovery from economic
uncertainty. This is especially reflected in the performances of SMEs. The UAE local
government has encouraged the SME sector to develop by promising it a percentage
of the government entity contracts awarded. In addition, new guidelines have been
issued to assist SME growth and reduce the gap between demand and supply of SME
finance in the country. However, many SMEs still face difficulties.

1.2 Study aims, objectives and questions
The idea behind this dissertation derives from all the issues that I have faced
in my practical experience of working as an auditor in the UAE. The questions
below, based on these issues, arise in the field of audit quality in the SME market in
the UAE.
Question (1): What is the regulatory and professional context of financial
reporting and auditing in the GCC in general, and the UAE specifically?
Question (2): What are the perceptions of audit quality in the market of SME
clients?
Question (3): Do the auditors who audit SME clients in the UAE follow
auditing standards in accepting and conducting their audits?

1.3 Research justification and significance
The significance of the research focus of this dissertation stems from two
shortcomings in the academic and professional arenas. The first is theoretical, and
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the other is applied in nature. The theoretical contribution of the study was identified
after surveying the literature and identifying areas that the present research could
contribute to. Issues of audit quality on audits performed on SME clients, in
particular in the context of the UAE, arise in an unexplored area. The study also
contributes to the wider debate on audit quality by adopting the comprehensive
IAASB audit quality framework, as a way of exploring issues of quality from the
perspective of professional auditors (in firms of different sizes), as well as
professionals who are linked to the field of audit (e.g. academics, directors). The
inclusiveness of the IAASB framework enabled me to explore various useful angles
in the issue of audit quality in the UAE.
A significant contribution made by the dissertation is practical in character.
This is crucial for professional doctorates such as the DBA; the dissertation aim is to
resolve an issue that is of significance to an organization or industry. This
dissertation suggests ways of resolving the issue of audit quality in the market for
SMEs in a UAE context.
In summary, the findings from this dissertation should be useful to academics
who are interested in issues of audit quality in the SME market, in particular in
emerging economies, as well as those interested in the IAASB audit quality
framework. The dissertation is equally useful to professional groups, such as auditors
and accountants, regulators and policymakers, who have recently been calling for
reforms in the area of auditing and accounting in the UAE.

1.4 Research design and theoretical framework
This research adopts the IAASB audit quality framework not only to
investigate the norms and values of auditors but also in search of remedies to
scientifically enhance audit practices in the UAE. Since it is concerned with the
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perceptions and moral disposition of auditors, it draws on interpretivism. However,
apart from such subjective considerations, this study also looks for the
commonalities of such perceptions and moral characteristics in order to be able to
discuss their universal nature in the UAE context. This is a prerequisite for
developing regulatory recommendations. Moreover this study adopts a positivistic
stance when researching the ethics of UAE auditors through their revealed behavior
in a field experiment.

1.5 Assumptions and scope
One of the major assumptions of this research is that respondents, whether in
the survey or interviews, are professionals who will endeavor to answer truthfully
and to the best of their knowledge, having no incentive not to do so. The scope of the
study is limited to audits performed on SME clients in the UAE. The number of
interviewees is 14, and the number of survey respondents is 123. The number of
firms that responded to the experiment is 27.

1.6 Dissertation Plan
This dissertation is organized into 9 chapters; Chapter 1, the present
introduction, provides a preamble to the dissertation. Chapter 2 reviews the literature
in relation to audit quality overall, and highlights in particular the IAASB model as a
framework that is of particular relevance to addressing issues of audit quality for
SME clients in the UAE. This chapter also discusses issues of audit quality in
emerging economies.
Chapter 3, through primary sources as well as other documentary evidence,
outlines the audit industry in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. It
analyzes the GCC context in some depth and investigates the major actors in the field
of auditing. Special focus is on the context of the UAE. This chapter also describes
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the market of SMEs in the UAE and highlights a unique phenomenon in its markets,
namely, the Free Zones phenomenon.
Chapter 4 presents the research methodology identifying the research
philosophy, reasons for the choice of subject, research strategy, perspectives,
research approach and design. In addition, it proposes a theoretical framework with
research hypotheses. The chapter also analyses the nature of the research participants
and outlines the role of the researcher, as well as structure of the interviews and
surveys. Finally, it presents the method of data analysis, discusses the trustworthiness
of the chosen research methods and considers ethical questions.
Chapter 5 provides the results received from the survey. Better understanding
of the research data is ensured through the use factor analysis and statistical tools. It
is followed by Chapters 6 and 7 that provides detailed discussions on the results of
the survey and interviews, and where possible is complimented by my observations
as a researcher who has previously worked in the field. These chapters also make
links to the existing literature. Chapter 6 focuses on input factors as compared to
chapter 7 that focuses on output, interaction, and contextual factors.
Chapter 8 presents an experiment designed to demonstrate the need for audit
regulation in the UAE. In addition, it analyzes the results of its experimental
research. Chapter 9 draws conclusions about the key points of the research, and also
discusses the research limitations and challenges, and suggests topics that seem to
merit further research.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature in the area of audit
quality, in particular the literature on SMEs in the Gulf region, with the aim of
identifying a framework in which to investigate issues of quality for SMEs in the
UAE. This chapter starts with a brief discussion that links accounting and auditing,
then reviews the various definitions of audit quality in the literature and any
particular elements and factors linked to it. These elements are in general grouped in
the literature under direct or indirect approaches to audit quality. The chapter also
highlights the clear contribution of the dissertation to the wider literature on audit
quality, in particular that within the UAE. The chapter concludes by highlighting and
reviewing the framework that will be used in this dissertation.

2.1 The Need for the Function of Audit
According to Hayes et al. (2005) a number of theories explain the need for an
audit. The first theory is called the “policeman theory”; it theory states that the
auditor‟s responsibility goes beyond reasonably assuring those concerned of the
fairness of the financial statement and holds the auditor responsible for detecting and
preventing fraud. This is an old view of the auditor‟s responsibility, which spread in
the early 20th century. This theory still holds for a number of users of audited
financials, notably the shareholders of a company. The UAE is a one of the newest
economies in the world and one of the challenges that the Securities and
Commodities Authority (SCA) in the country is facing is that most investors in this
region lack proper knowledge of financial matters. The SCA receives a number of
complaints from investors in the market who claim that they were not aware of
certain facts before they invested in certain companies. It also receives complaints
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that the auditors concerned did not mention certain facts about the company which
were revealed later. Most of these cases were either reported in the financials, which
the investor could not read properly, or they were examples of fraud which were not
detected by the auditor. The investors who complain are of the view that it is an
auditor‟s responsibility, as the “policeman” theory implies, to detect and prevent
fraud. The SCA is very active in this regard and holds a number of sessions to
educate investors on ways to invest and also what to expect from auditors.
The second theory, according to Hayes et al. (2005) is the “lending credibility
theory” that focuses on the fact that the auditor‟s function is simply to add credibility
to a firm‟s financial statements. This gives more confidence to third parties in the
company‟s financial statements and would be a factor motivating investors to invest
in the company or for lenders to provide loans. This theory is very common in the
UAE, for bankers provide loans to companies only if they present an audited
financial statement. The higher the value of the loan required, the stricter the bank
becomes in forcing the company to use the Big 4 firms to audit its accounts. The
situation in the UAE economy is such that bankers can force a company to use a Big
4 firm for its audit since they believe that the financial statement is more credible if it
is audited by a Big 4 firm. A number of audit firms have suffered from losing a
number of their big clients to the Big 4 because of the pressure from bankers to
change their auditor. The same concept applies when some companies go through
private equity to raise funds and investors put the same pressure on companies to
deal with a Big 4 firm only.
The third theory is the “Theory of inspired confidence”,

introduced by

Limperg (1932): the need for audit services is derived from the requirement of third
parties. These third parties need an independent view far removed from management
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bias. This theory covers the demand for an audit service. With regard to the supply of
an audit service, Limperg (1932) suggests that auditors must maintain their
independence and integrity in order to serve public expectations.
Finally, the most commonly discussed theory in the audit industry is “Agency
Theory” as discussed by Watts & Zimmerman (1979) and Watts & Zimmerman
(1986) due to the natural conflict of interests that is inherited with the company‟s
management. A principal-agent relationship is created in which the principal is the
party that delegates the work to an agent to act on its behalf.
As explained in the various theories cited above, all financial institutes,
investors, shareholders, and bankers may need at any time to decide whether to form
a partnership with a company, invest in one or maybe grant one a loan. The decision
making process will obviously be based on information and, in order to make a
decision, proper information should be available. A bank provides a company with a
loan only after it has reviewed the company‟s audited financial statements for the
past few years and ensured that it has not misbehaved financially and has a cash flow
good enough to reassure possible lenders that their loan can be recovered and the
debt is not in doubt. A bank analyzes a firm‟s audited financial statements to see that
it has acceptable profitability margins, liquidity ratios, and a healthy debt to equity
ratio. The same can be done when an investor analyzes financials in order to pick an
entity to invest in. The same process is followed, too, when companies analyze their
customers and suppliers before they enter into contractual obligations with each
other.
For the financial analyses to be of any use, the information that is being
analyzed and the audited financial statements that are being provided should be
reliable and should always reflect the true status of the company. If this basic
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assumption of reliability fails to be true, then all subsequent decision making will be
based on unreliable information and an untrue image of the entity being analyzed and
will inevitably lead to an uninformed decision that might have very severe economic
implications. In the previous example of the bank lending decision, if a bank were to
approve a loan to a company that provided unreliable financial information, the bank
would risk losing both principal and interest. Moreover, some other entity that was
worth trusting might have been deprived of a loan.
The audit industry was created to simply reassure decision makers that an
independent third party has verified the financial statements of a given entity and has
provided a professional opinion on the accuracy of the financial information being
disclosed. Auditing has developed into a complicated industry with many regulations
and standards for all auditors to abide by for the sake of unifying the audit process. It
has the financial information to provide consistency and comparability of
information between entities and industries alike.

2.2 Defining Audit Quality
The modern world relies heavily on the accounting function as one of the
cornerstones of international economics. It was created in order to manage
businesses and developed to facilitate the fast growing pace of commerce throughout
the world. The accounting function is based on the “Double-entry” concept that was
created in 1494 by an Italian merchant called Luca Pacioli; he was a famous
mathematician and based his concepts on the Hindu-Arabic arithmetic available at
the time (Gleeson-White, 2012). The double-entry concept was developed over
subsequent centuries and based on the successive needs of the economy. By the year
1900 accounting societies were established in most of Europe and the United States
of America (Gleeson-White, 2012). The accounting function has enabled business
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owners and managers to record transactions in a way that can be translated into
financial reports and can be used for justifying the rationale of decision making.
Once the transactional process was created, it also became possible to audit it in such
a way as to avoid mistakes and/or help to detect fraud.
The concept of auditing is not new but has appeared in the course of such
ancient civilizations as the empires of Egypt, Greece and Rome. Auditing was a
practice to insure that selected public officials were performing their duties without
abusing their powers to enrich themselves. (Flesher, Previts, & Samson, 2005). The
conflict of interest for officials who are put in place to perform certain tasks for an
owner or principal has always been a factor. But it was not described in the literature
until its introduction by Adolf Augustus Berle and Gardiner Coit Means in the early
1930s. Adolf and Gardiner discussed the relationship between principal and agent
and showed how the two parties have different goals and different appetites for risk
in their decision making process. However, the concept of Agency theory was not
fully developed as a concept until the work of Michael C. Jensen and William
Meckling in the 1960s and 1970s.
The body of research discussing the issue of audit quality is varied, dealing
with numerous aspects, such as issues of audit committees, policy makers and
independence. Audit quality can be defined as ―market-assessed joint probability
that a given auditor will both (a) discover a breach in the clients accounting system
and (b) report the breach.‖ (Deangelo, 1981, p. 186). This definition is one of the
most often cited definitions relating to audit quality. However, Krishnan & Schauer
(2000a‟) criticize this definition as hard to detect and often unobservable. In a similar
vein, Francis (2011, p.127) argues that audit quality ―is achieved by the issuance of
the ―appropriate‖ audit report on the client‘s compliance with generally accepted
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accounting principles.‖ Both definitions remain broad and fail to identify particular
elements of quality that can be observed, for example, before the issuance of the
audit report.
According to the IAASB‟s Chairman Arnold Schilder ―the IAASB believes
audit quality is most likely achieved when an engagement team exhibits appropriate
values, ethics and attitude and when the team applies a rigorous audit process and
quality control procedures. It's also most likely achieved when auditors have
sufficient knowledge and experience, have sufficient time to perform the audit work,
receive valuable and timely reports and interact appropriately with a variety of
different stakeholders‖ (cited in Whitehouse, 2013). Although this take on audit
quality is more detailed and offers particular points at which quality can be observed
or measured. Research has established that a simple definition of audit quality cannot
be agreed upon, given the complexity of the concept.
An attribute is usually defined as something that is inherent in a case. The
auditor is able to conduct a quality audit when meeting the auditing standards and
requirements. These standards are as follows: 1) general standards (auditor‟s
sufficient

technical

training,

expertise,

mental

attitude,

proficiency

and

independence); 2) the standard of field work implementation (audit planning and
supervision, proof of sufficient and competent audit, as well as an adequate
understanding of the internal control structure); 3) reporting standard (financial
statements related to the generally accepted accounting principles, statements
regarding the application inconsistencies of generally accepted principles of
accounting, informative financial statement disclosures and an overall financial
statement opinion) (Buuren, 2009).
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According to Sawyer (2006), an increase in audit quality conducted by the
auditor can be measured by the increasing number of audit working requests, useful
findings and recommendations, as well as the attainment of goals and audit
objectives. Arrunada (1999) claims that the audit quality dimensions include
independence (the auditor‟s willingness to reflect all the problems and defects of the
financial statement in the audit report) and technical competence (the ability of an
auditor to detect shortcomings or errors in the financial statement).
Audit quality may be affected by a number of variables. Al-Thuneibat, AlIssa and Baker (2011) have covered two main variables namely, the length of the
auditor-client relationship and the size of the audit firm. In the context of Jordan, AlThuneibat et al. (2011) manage to provide enough evidence to validate previous
studies that assert an adverse relationship between audit tenure and audit quality.
This emphasizes the need for audit firm rotations so as to avoid jeopardizing the
objectivity of audit firms and the possibility of an increased confidence in the client‟s
business by the audit firm. Even though Carrera, Gómez-Aguilar, Humphrey and
Ruiz-Barbadillo (2007) show how a mandatory policy in Spain for audit rotation was
never applied, their work demonstrates that the effects of the audit firm-client
relationship on quality are still adverse, regardless of the audit firm size (AlThuneibat et al., 2011). Zerni, Haapamäki, Järvinen, & Niemi (2012) suggest that
joint audits might be a way to improve audit quality. They found that companies
opting to take up joint audits have a higher degree of earnings conservatism, lower
abnormal accruals, better credit ratings and lower going concern issues than other
firms. Chi, Lisic, Long, & Wang (2013) find that the law in China requiring
management to retain the same auditors for at least 2 years and 5 years at most is a
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successful formula for improving audit quality. However, this rule is applicable only
to a state-owned enterprise controlled by the central government such as China‟s.
Moreover, audit firm size shows a positive direct relationship with both audit
fees and audit quality, even when the industry expertise variable of the audit staff is
controlled (Jong-Hag, Kim, Jeong-Bon, & Yoonseok, 2010) and (Niemi, 2004). This
suggests the need for regulatory authorities to focus on the behavior of small audit
firms, because they might be inclined to compromise audit quality due to their
financial dependence on certain clients (Jong-Hag et al., 2010) and (R. M. Frankel,
2002).
Traditionally, researchers have categorized audit firms as big or small ones.
Niemi (2004) shows how small firms‟ fees might vary depending on the perceived
audit quality, which can be influenced by factors such as the level of education, years
of experience, education and certification of staff. The Big 4 audit firms were found
to issue more accurate audit reports than the smaller firms (C. Lennox, 1999).
However, Lennox‟s framework (1999) was devised in the US where, according to
Francis, (2011) auditors face a higher risk of exposure to litigation than those in
European countries.
According to Francis (2011), the main outcome of an audit is the auditor‟s
opinion or auditor‟s report and the audited financial statements. When audited
financial statements were tested for abnormal accruals. It was found that the Big 4
audit firms produced financial statements that had fewer abnormal and unexpected
accruals than those from smaller audit firms (Francis, Maydew, & Sparks, 1999).
This approach, which ties audit quality with the accruals on the financial statements
(as in Francis et al., 1999) is based on the model of Jones (1991) and is probably
suitable in the context of his research, since Jones looked at companies which were
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trying to take advantage of the import relief system by reducing their profits, hence
having higher accruals. Moreover, companies in the US and other countries which
have a tax law will probably use this notion to try to reduce their disclosed profits in
order to avoid tax. However, this model may not be the best for the UAE context,
given that it is a tax free country. On the contrary, companies are more inclined to
show higher profits in order to get access to better facilities from the banks or to be
ranked higher by the government authorities which will allow them to bid for higher
value projects.
The need for higher audit quality declines when the management ownership
in the company increases, because management self-interest aligns itself with the
interest of the stockholders at the expense of other stakeholders (Niskanen,
Karjalainen, & Niskanen, 2011).
Audit quality is highly dependent on the independence of the firm providing
the auditing services. And since auditor firms are basically for profit organizations,
they are motivated to recruit new clients and to retain the clients in hand. These
factors create a direct pressure on audit firms that might impair their independence.
Umar and Anandarajan (2004) found that the pressure to retain clients forms a more
insidious and fine pressure than the pressure to conform to a client‟s needs. They
note that if the pressure is indirect and not clear the auditor displays greater
independence than if the pressure were explicit and direct.
In the audit process, the audit committees of public companies face two types
of independence: independence in appearance and independence in fact (Arens,
Elder, & Beasley, 2006). Both types are required to consider the evidence from all
sources objectively and place the management interests behind those of stakeholders
(Boylan, 2004). Many researchers have explored the effects of independence in the
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audit committee and the auditor. Turley and Zaman (2004) found that if an
organization adopts the introduction of an audit committee this does not necessarily
mean that higher governance prevails. The main issue of concern is the future
impairment of auditor independence that results from high client fees (Ashbaugh,
LaFond, & Mayhew, 2003; R. Frankel, Johnson, & Nelson, 2002; R. A Shockley,
1981) and (Krishnan & Ye, 2005).
A highly disputed matter is whether the auditing industry gets regulated at an
international level or at a national level (Trombetta, 2003). Trombetta (2003) takes
the quality of audit firms by looking at the qualifications of its staff and questions
whether full harmonization is better than a mutual recognition approach at a global
level and finds that in some particular cases the mutual recognition approach may be
superior.
Auditors continue to face different challenges as companies start to expand
their corporate disclosures to include risks, social responsibilities and corporate
responsibilities (Fraser & Pong, 2009). In addition the accounting profession is
progressively relying on fair value based methods in building financial statements, a
reliance which challenges the current auditing model, since a more continuous
reporting method can be argued to be more representative (Fraser & Pong, 2009).
The audit industry has been criticized by various scholars in their neverending search for a model that will solve all the current deficiencies in the auditing
industry as we know it. One of the most obvious criticisms is the concept of audit
shopping. As defined by Banimahd & Beigi (2012), audit shopping “is a situation in
which a client tries to receive a favorable audit report by switching its audit firms. In
other words, the auditor assists a client to achieve its reporting objectives by
supporting the accounting practices used by the client, even though the reliability of
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reporting is affected by these practices.” Moreover, according to Martin (1989), “The
problem of opinion shopping arises out of the inherent tension of the accountant‟s
position – balancing the obligation to the client against the duty owed to the
investing public. To avoid a potentially disastrous opinion, a registrant characterizes
its financials, such that this new auditor may render an unqualified opinion.”
Banimahd & Beigi (2012) and (Krishnan & Stephens (1995) are some of the
researchers who show that opinion shopping does not take place when companies
change their auditors, as opposed to Lennox (2000) who shows that in the context of
the UK some firms do practice opinion shopping. Opinion shopping is viewed very
seriously and has major implications for an auditor‟s independence and his/her
responsibility to the public. A more dangerous phenomenon than opinion shopping is
the existence of audit firms who are not ethically bound to the profession and are not
practicing the audit as they are supposed to. This phenomenon is most probably more
widespread in the developing countries which are not regulated by a professional
body. Certain audit firms do fulfil the minimum requirements for practicing audit
and, rather than actually following proper audit procedures, they sell their services at
a very cheap price to whoever is looking for a clean, unqualified opinion. These
companies are properly registered as audit firms and are never held responsible for
their actions because they deal only with small and medium sized entities which are
not subject to monitoring by any single authority. This has extremely severe
implications for the reputation of audit firms and their importance. Companies will
start looking for these lower priced audit firms who get the job done without any
complications and will not see the need for a proper audit firm to carry out a proper
audit. If companies still believed that they needed a proper audit, a reputable audit
firm would have to reduce its fees in order to compete with the illegitimate audit
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firms. This is very widespread in the UAE, as recently discussed by the Abu Dhabi
Accountability Authority, which described the illegitimate audit firms as
“professional outsiders” and “intruders” (Jamal, 2015). It is the opposite of what was
found by Zaman & Chayasombat (2014) in a study specific to Thailand where it was
noted that SMEs pay a premium to audit firms for their services, which shows a
higher perception of and respect for CPAs in the country.

2.3 Direct and Indirect Approaches to Audit Quality
Making distinctions between direct and indirect approaches to auditing is
established in the literature. For example, Kilgore, Radich, & Harrison (2011) show
that audit quality was historically measured by means of either a direct or an indirect
method. The direct approach assumes that all breaches will be evident in the audit
outcomes in the form of audit opinion errors or financial statement errors.
Historically, quite a number of studies take this direct method approach, such as
Colbert & Murray (1998); Balsam, Krishnan, & Yang (2003) and others.
A direct perspective on audit quality, however, focuses more on analyzing the
reviews of quality control in actual audit engagements (Deis & Giroux, 1992).
Studies of audit quality focus not only on the private sector, but also extend to
include discussions of audit quality at the level of the public sector. The quality of
audits following this approach is linked to forecasts; Davidson & Neu (1993)
measured audit quality by using the errors of management forecasts, because they
were the absolute values of the differences between management forecast earnings
and reported earnings. They found that higher errors of forecast indicate higher audit
quality. At the same time, lower forecast errors result in lower audit quality. Lam &
Chang (1994) follow the same idea of audit quality measurement. These researchers
investigated the relations between audit quality and auditor size, using forecasts of
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mean errors in earnings. The indirect approach to measuring audit quality has mainly
been found empirically unsuccessful.
2.3.1 Direct Approach
Although it seems more reliable as a method of measuring audit quality, it
has been argued that direct audit quality measures pose empirical challenges because
of the difficulty of generalizing results, the proprietary nature of the data and the low
occurrence rates (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002). For instance, bankruptcies which
have no previously modified opinions can be taken as a direct indicator of audit
quality, but their occurrence is considered to be infrequent (Geiger & Raghunandan,
2002). Geiger & Raghunandan (2002) measured low quality audits, using a sample
of 117 bankruptcies. The researchers found that auditors were less likely to express
concern during the initial engagement years. Other direct audit quality measures
included reviews (O Keefe, King, & Gaver, 1994); (Colbert & O Keefe, 1995),
quality control reviews (Deis Jr & Giroux, 1996), SEC enforcement actions
(Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996) and compliance with GAAP financial reporting
in a not-for-profit environment (Krishnan & Schauer, 2000b). However, these direct
measures may be inappropriate and/or unavailable. This leads to the implementation
of indirect audit quality measures. A literature analysis has shown that direct
measures of audit quality are often used as benchmarks to test its indirect measure
performance.
2.3.2 Indirect Approach
There are two indirect approaches to audit quality. The first type measures
attributes that relate to the audit firm rather than the audit personnel. The most
common attributes that were researched independently were audit firm size; this was
studied by many researchers (Al-Thuneibat et al., 2011; G. Colbert & Murray, 1998;
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L. Deangelo, 1981; Palmrose, 1986), audit tenure (Al-Thuneibat et al., 2011; Ghosh
& Moon, 2005), non-audit services (Craswell, 1999; Patel & Prasad, 2013; Quick &
Warming-Rasmussen, 2009) and industry specialization (Hogan & Jeter, 1999). The
second type of indirect approach is a behavioral approach which focusses on audit
quality attributes in audit firms and teams. There are several examples of such an
approach (Beattie, Brandt, & Fearnley, 1999; Michael C. Knapp, 1987; Mkhael C.
Knapp, 1985; McKinley, Pany, & Reckers, 1985; Philmore Alvin Alleyne, 2006;
Randolph A. Shockley, 1981).
At the firm level, Sun and Liu (2011) study the influence of client-specific
litigation risk on audit quality. These researchers developed their hypothesis on the
basis of the potential monetary and reputational losses of auditors, studying the data
from US companies and conducting a regression analysis. It has also been suggested
that the high risk of clients‟ litigation could force big auditors to more effective
performance. According to Carcello, Hermanson, & McGrath (1992), the audit team
characteristics were usually perceived as more important for audit quality than were
the audit firm characteristics.
A link between low audit quality and the restating of financial statements is
supported (Palmrose & Scholz, 2000); (Raghunandan, Read, & Whisenant, 2003);
and (Anderson & Yohn, 2002). According to Raghunandan et al. (2003), there is a
close relationship between subsequent restatements and non-audit fees, constituting a
direct test on the association between audit quality and non-audit fees. Revenue
recognition as a frequent cause of restatement is noted (Anderson & Yohn, 2002).
Abbott & Peters (2002) provide indirect support for the link between low audit
quality and certain financial statement restatements.
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Literature analysis has shown that there are different perceptions of audit
quality, including the perceptions of auditors, shareholders, analysts, audit committee
chairperson, clients, preparers, federal inspectors and others. Thus, audit quality is
considered to be a concept that has a range of definitions. Audit reports are usually
perceived by the users of financial statements as needing to ensure that financial
company statements do not perpetrate fraud and have no material misstatements.
Audit quality is a widely investigated concept over a variety of perspectives in the
literature. It has been found that there are several gaps in the literature that suggest
future studies. The importance of high quality auditing requires more research in
areas such as customer loyalty, customer service satisfaction, auditor switching and
auditor turnover. In addition, the incorporation of the corporate characteristics of
governance may shed more light on the question. According to Carcello et al. (1992),
the audit team‟s characteristics are usually perceived to be more important for audit
quality than those of the audit firm. However, the individual characteristics of
auditors as audit team members may be the most important feature of audit quality. It
has become evident that further research is needed to investigate the influence of
different auditors on audit quality and also of the relationship between job
performance, job stresses, moral reasoning and audit quality. Moreover, future
research needs to be carried out to understand the reasons for auditors‟ behavior, if
they seem likely to threaten audit quality (Watts & Zimmerman, 1983). Other
relevant variables that can occur in the working environment of auditors should be
further examined. It is evident that the area of audit quality is fruitful for
investigation. Research in this area could help audit professionals, government,
clients and users of financial statements.
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Audit quality is indirectly measured by Teoh & Wong, (1993), who use the
coefficients of earnings response. Chow & Wong-Boren (1986) use the perception of
loan officers to show high audit quality. Schauer (1999) measures audit quality with
the help of a client bid-ask spread, indicating the difference made to the stock of a
client‟s company. Peer review results were used by Colbert & Murray (1998) to
measure audit quality. Hence, indirect measures of audit quality include the size of
the audit, auditor tenure, audit fees, industry expertise, dependence on economic
factors, as well as reputation and the cost of capital. The most commonly used
indirect measure is audit size. Ghosh & Moon (2005) argue that the auditor‟s tenure
may have a negative influence on the quality of audit. The reason is that auditors
who have served for a long time in the sphere may surrender their independence so
as to remain close to their clients. Wooten (2003) claims that firms with multiple
clients in the same industry show a deeper understanding of the risks of audit. Other
audit quality proxies used in research are the economic dependence of auditors and
the audit fee. Choi, Kim, Kim, & Zang (2010) examine whether the association
between audit quality and audit fees is asymmetric and nonlinear. They find that
audit quality proxy was related to abnormal audit fees from the client‟s firm. This
association is considered to be insufficient.
A number of researchers have tried to measure audit quality. Deangelo (1981)
demonstrates that auditor size has a positive influence on audit quality. The
researcher followed the idea that auditor size might be measured by a number of
clients and argued that auditors earned client-specific quasi-rents that were related to
the number of clients and misstatements in the financial report. The research was
taken as a basis for other studies that used auditor size (the Big 8/6/5) vs. the non-Big
8/6/5) to make a difference between the levels of audit quality (Clarkson & Simunic,
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1994); (Bauwhede, Willekens, & Gaeremynch, 2000); (Zhou & Elder, 2001);
(Krishnan & Schauer, 2000a). Other studies (Palmrose, 1986) and (Copley, 1991)
use audit fees to measure audit quality. Palmrose (1986) emphasizes the significant
association between auditor size and audit fees. However, a number of studies
suggest alternatives for measuring audit quality.
A strand of research has focused on discussing the conflict between the
commercial goals of audit firms as associated to professional goals of the audit
industry. Sweeney & McGarry, (2011) examined the perceptions of senior auditors
of the goals of audit firms as implied by audit partners to clients as compared to their
real motives and goals that are highly commercially driven. Khalifa et al. (2007)
found that in the last decade there has been more focus on audit quality rather than
business value, signifying that audit firms are more concerned with audit quality and
to de-emphasize commercialism aspects.
It is argued that the perception of audit quality differs among stakeholders. It
depends on the stakeholder‟s level of direct audit involvement and the lens through
which s/he assesses audit quality. The understanding of different views and actions is
vital because it influences the perception of audit quality. It is suggested that a
possible perception of audit quality through the lens of investors includes audit
reporting, audit reputation and audit expectations. However, a possible perception of
audit quality through the lens of the audit committee members presupposes the
assessment of the auditor‟s quality, of the audit process quality and of the auditor‟s
interactions and communication (International-Auditing-and-Assurance-StandardsBoard, 2011).
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2.4 Audit Quality Frameworks
This section discusses three of the frameworks that deal with the issue of
audit quality, combining several factors of quality, which make no explicit reference
to „direct‟ and „indirect‟ approaches to audit quality. The first framework is a model
by Francis (2011), the second is that of the PCAOB (2013) and the third is proposed
by the IAASB (2013). The advantage of looking at audit quality in this holistic
manner stems from the fact that these components are often interrelated and to isolate
the impact of each one will impair the complex nature of the issues that are often
present in the audit industry.
In 2011 the Francis model (see Figure 01 below) brings several elements to
audit quality such as audit input, processes, accounting firms, the audit industry and
audit market, institutions and the economic consequences of audit outcomes.

Figure 1 – Francis‟ Audit Quality Framework (2011)
Units of Analysis in Audit Research
Audit Inputs
Audit tests
Engagement team personnel
Audit Processes
Implementation of audit test by engagement team personnel
Accounting Firms
Engagement teams work in accounting firms
Accounting firms hire, train and compensate auditors and develop audit
guidance (testing procedures)
Audit reports are issued in the name of accounting firms
Audit Industry and Audit Markets
Accounting firms constitute and industry
Industry structure affects markets and economic behavior
Institutions
Institutions affect auditing and incentives for quality, e.g., State Boards of
Accountancy, the AICPA, FASB, SEC and PCAOB, as well as the broader legal
system
Economic Consequences of Audit Outcomes
Audit outcomes affect clients and users of audited accounting information
(Francis, 2011, p. 126)
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According to the above framework, audit input consists of two aspects: the
audit test and the engagement team. For the purpose of this research the aspect of the
engagement of the team personnel will be most closely investigated through
surveying audit professionals to verify the level of education in audit firms of
different sizes and to also link auditors‟ engagement teams to the demographics of
the UAE and to the characteristics of individuals in the team.
The above framework will provide very insightful information relating to
professionals that will give an indication of audit quality. However, the above
framework will also be linked to the demographics of the participants along with
their education level and age. This linkage will provide more insight in the context of
the UAE, due to the wide range of nationalities working in the country and the
percentage of local nationals constituting less than 12% of the population of the
country, as reported by Wam (2011). According to the National Bureau of Statistics
in 2011, expats formed 88% of the UAE population. The UAE market is also well
known for the high levels of competition in all industries, including the audit
industry. According to Francis, Michas, & Seavey (2013) the higher the competition
in the audit industry the lower the quality of audits. Other important factors of audit
quality are the existence of institutions for developing the profession and providing
guidance and the requirement that auditors should perform higher quality audits
(Francis, 2011). Some institutions of this kind are the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA), the Financial Accounting Standards Boards (FASB),
the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), International Accounting Standards
Boards (IASB) and so on. The UAE does not have any active independent body that
develops the profession locally and there is great reliance on the International
Accounting Standards Board and its accounting and auditing standards.
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Even though the Francis framework includes most of the factors discussed in
the literature, it can be argued that it looks at these different aspects of audit quality
independently from each other. However, these aspects are linked to each other:
audit inputs feed into the audit process of an accounting firm which eventually
produces the audit report and the audited financial statements which in turn feeds
back to the audit inputs and gets used by the different users who have a great impact
on the economy.
An alternative framework for exploring audit quality, which better integrates
such elements is the one introduced by the PCAOB (Public-Company-AccountingOversight-Board, 2013).

Figure 2 - Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Audit Quality Framework

(Public-Company-Accounting-Oversight-Board, 2013, p. 6)
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The framework includes such segments as audit inputs, processes and results.
These segments are viewed as conceptually aligned with most of the existing audit
quality work. Important quality elements within the framework are defined as the
audit inputs (six elements, related to competent and talented people such as essential
for audit quality), the audit processes segment (six elements) and the segment of
audit results (the deliverables that current standards require auditors to provide). The
framework supports the existence of external pressure, including rapid environmental
change and pressure for profit and growth, quality and influence. It represents the
idea that quality activities and their results occur at several levels, such as the
engagement team, affiliated firm, office or region and global firm level (PublicCompany-Accounting-Oversight-Board, 2013, pp. 4-5).
In an attempt to improve audit quality, the IAASB sought to develop its own
framework. Its main aim was to raise awareness of the audit quality elements,
facilitate effective communication between stakeholders and encourage them to
explore ways to improve audit quality.
The IAASB framework takes into consideration the various factors that have
been identified in the literature (academic or professional). To assist with the
development of its framework, the IAASB surveyed stakeholders in 9 countries as
well as its own consultative consultancy group. One of the main findings of the
survey demonstrates how perceptions of audit quality varied amongst the
stakeholders. In 2013, the IAASB proposed a model or audit quality and suggested
that audit quality can be viewed from three standpoints; inputs, outputs interaction
and contextual factors. The input factors that affect audit quality are the personal
attributes of the auditor, e.g. the auditor‟s skills, experience, mindset and ethical
values; a factor related to the soundness of the audit methodology; the availability of
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adequate technical support; the effectiveness of the audit tools used; etc. All of them
are directed towards support for quality audit execution.
Output factors also have a strong influence on audit quality since they are
often considered by stakeholders when examining their audit quality assessments.
For instance, the report of an auditor is supposed to have a positive influence on
audit quality because it clearly conveys the audit outcome. At the same time, the
auditor‟s communications with people in charge of such matters as deficiencies in
internal control and the qualitative aspects of the entity‟s practices concerning
financial reporting can also have a positive impact on audit quality. It should be
noted that academic discussions of audit quality also emphasize contextual factors
(Knapp, 1985). For instance, sound corporate governance contributes to audit quality
because it can create a climate of ethical behavior and transparency within the entity.
Regulation and law may also have a positive influence on audit quality if they create
a framework for an effectively conducted audit (International-Auditing-andAssurance-Standards-Board, 2011).
Figure 03 shows that the framework for audit quality contains the following
elements:
Figure 3 – IAASB Audit Quality Framework Elements
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(International-Auditing-and-Assurance-Standards-Board, 2011)
The key responsibility for quality audit performance is based on auditors.
Thus, audit quality is best achieved when participants support each other in the
supply chain of financial reporting. Researchers list many factors that play an
important role in maximizing the likelihood of a high quality audit. Input factors are
grouped into the following categories: knowledge and experience of the auditors and
the time provided to perform the audit; the ethics, values and attitudes of auditors
that are influenced by the audit firm culture; the effectiveness of the quality control
procedures and the audit process. In addition, the audit quality inputs tend to exert an
influence in the context of audit performance, the key stakeholder interactions and
the outputs. For example, regulation and law provide the context. This context may
need certain reports that are outputs and that influence the skills used (input).
Audit outputs are often determined by the context together with legislative
requirements. Stakeholders may have different effects on the outputs. Each separate
stakeholder in the supply chain of financial reporting is an essential factor that
supports the high quality of financial reporting and the way in which stakeholders
interact, which has a strong influence on audit quality. These interactions are
impacted by the audit performance context and enhance a dynamic relationship
between inputs and outputs.
There are many contextual factors that can facilitate the quality of financial
reporting, including corporate governance and the applicable framework of financial
reporting. The contextual factors, such as regulatory and legislative requirements,
also play a key role in the interactions and relations between the main stakeholders.
They can influence audit risk, the extent and nature of the audit evidence needed and
the efficiency of the audit process (International-Auditing-and-Assurance-Standards-
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Board, 2013). In view of the comprehensiveness of the IAASB framework and the
inclusiveness of previous frameworks and elements discussed in the literature
relating to audit quality, this dissertation will adopt this framework in exploring audit
quality in the UAE. The IAASB‟s framework is discussed in details in chapter 4.
To sum up, this chapter reviewed different meanings attached to audit quality,
as well as reviewing example of holistic frameworks for audit quality. Among these,
the IAASB framework has been identified as the most suitable to explore the quality
of SME audits in the UAE, given the factors of input, output, contextual and
interaction factors.
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CHAPTER 3: THE CONTEXT OF THE AUDIT
INDUSTRY IN THE GCC

3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the regulatory and professional
context of financial reporting and auditing in the Gulf Co-operative Council (GCC)
in general and the UAE specifically. The ultimate goal is to highlight key issues that
contribute to the quality of audits. The chapter discusses the laws and regulations that
govern financial reporting and auditing in the GCC, then it focuses on the context of
the UAE, by reviewing the role of professional groups, firms and regulatory bodies.
The chapter also discusses the state of SMEs in the UAE.
The audit industry in the GCC has similar characteristics to those in the rest
of the world as was demonstrated by Al-Ajmi (2009). He surveyed 300 credit and
financial analysts in Bahrain and found that they do perceive audit opinions to be
useful. He also showed that credit and financial analysts believe that audit quality is
linked to firm size and that non-audit services impair the auditor‟s independence.
Audit firms in Bahrain are not always able to obtain information from their
clients and to have proper accounting systems put in place (Joshi, Al-Ajmi, &
Bremser, 2009). This may indicate that limited access to information would be
forthcoming for further research. However, the importance of audit firms is now
being recognized, since most companies believe that audit must be mandatory to all
companies and concede that audit firms are doing their job in line with expectations
(Joshi et al., 2009).
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3.2 The Regulatory Context of Auditing in the GCC
The GCC aims to achieve coordination, integration and interdependence
among member states in all fields; to reach unity; and to deepen and strengthen the
links and relevant aspects of the cooperation between their peoples in various fields.
The accounting and auditing profession is one of these fields. The Supreme Council
in 1982 opened the registration and licensing for the profession, including accounting
and auditing professionals, so that they could practice subject to obtaining proper
registration and licensing requirements.
The Accounting and Auditing Organization for the Cooperation Council for
the Arab Gulf States (GCCAAO) has been established as one of the contributions to
attaining this goal. The decision of the Supreme Council for the Cooperation Council
at its nineteenth session in Abu Dhabi on December 7-9, 1998 and Article (3) of the
Statute declared that the GCCAAO has a separate legal personality and an
independent budget and enjoys the privileges and immunities in accordance with
what is observed in the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. Its
workers also enjoy the due facilities and privileges for doing the work of the
Organization.
The GCCAAO started to adopt scientific methods. Its Board of Directors put
forward a strategic plan that crystallized the work of the Board for five years. It
included the main goals and divided them into sub-goals as commonly needed in the
profession, such as an intellectual framework for financial accounting, accounting
standards, auditing standards, rules of conduct and ethics, vocational rehabilitation
for certified associates, training and continuing education, standards and monitoring
programs of professional performance and a legal system unified to practice the
profession of accounting and auditing.
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The GCCAAO has also adopted means of continuous development to ensure
the application and updating of the internal framework of the organization.
Below is a summary of local laws and regulations the govern the accounting
and auditing profession in the GCC summarized from GCCAAO auditing standards
(2014) publication. This publication details all auditing standards issued by
GCCAAO as well as explains the local laws governing the GCC audit industry.
3.2.1 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
It is well established that that Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the most advanced
in terms of developing local standards and building a profession based on these
standards. On 29 September 1989, the Ministry of Trade released rule number 6522
to adopt the review identifying the objectives, concepts and presentation and
disclosure requirements of financial statements as a guide for all chartered
accountants licensed to operate in Saudi Arabia.
Royal Decree No. 1 m / 12 was issued in 1991 to cancel royal decree No. 1 m
/ 43, issued on 22 December 1974, relating to certified public accountants and the
issuance of a new body for certified public accountants operating under the
supervision of the Ministry of Commerce to raise the awareness of the profession.
The Saudi Chartered Accountants Authority released decision No. 3/2/4 on
30 October 1993. This sets the accounting standards applicable in Saudi Arabia. Any
standards that are not detailed in the accounting standards of Saudi Arabia have to be
referred to US GAAP for appropriate treatment. On 25 December 2002 this rule was
revised and its guidelines changed from those of US GAAP to those of the
International Accounting Standards.
The GCC integrates the auditing profession through its commercial laws (AlQahtani, 2005). Saudi Arabia is the only country in the GCC where an audit and
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accountancy body has delegated authority semi-independently of the government to
regulate audit practice (Al-Qahtani, 2005). This body, currently active, is called the
Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) and was established
to develop the auditing profession by making a comparative study of the profession
in some selected countries, then preparing a conceptual framework for accounting
and auditing, and finally establishing SOCPA in 1992 (Al-Qahtani, 2005). According
to Al-Qahtani (2005) the remaining GCC countries do not have any accounting
society and the rules that govern their practice can be argued to be immature.
3.2.2 Kingdom of Bahrain
The accounting and auditing profession in Bahrain do not seem to enjoy
similar status to that of KSA. Although the country has an accountants association
which seems active on publishing laws on accounting and auditing, their presence as
a professional group in the GCC is not parallel to that of the counter parts of KSA.
The association is keen on linking with professional firms such as the Big 4. It‟s
interesting that the association still have a link to Arthur Anderson in its website
amongst other audit firms. For more details on requirements to practice auditing
please refer to this link http://www.bahaccountants.org.
Decree-Law No. (26) for the year 1996 on the auditors in Article No. (14)
states that accountants must comply with the international auditing standards, such as
following the ethics of the professions and implementing all the regulations issued
either by the Ministry of Commerce or by the Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA), or
other official bodies.
A decision was made by the Ministry of Trade No. 2 for the year 1997 on the
formation of a committee in the Ministry of Commerce to discuss auditors‟ affairs.
Article II of the Resolution specifies that the committee shall issue its opinion and
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advice to protect the auditing profession and the rules and principles of accounting
and auditing standards to be followed.
3.2.3 Oman
Although Oman is neighboring UAE, it does not enjoy the same level of
financial activities. There are local laws in Oman that stipulate who should practice
accountancy and auditing as a profession. Given other advanced discussions of
professional groups such as accountants and auditors in other context, it becomes
apparent that those laws are under developed as they do not address current
professional needs. This is evident in the legislative section in this website
www.fiu.gov.om.
Royal Decree No. 77/86 issued on October 18, 1986 was a law to regulate the
accounting and auditing profession. Paragraph 30 of this law requires accountants to
adhere to the international accounting standards approved by the International
Accounting Standards Committee when preparing financial statements until another
decision is made by the Minister of Trade and Industry to determine any other
accounting standards to apply in preparing financial statements.
3.2.4 Qatar
The status of the auditing and accounting profession in Qatar is not that
different of that of Oman. Qatar has an institute of internal auditors that seems active
in the profession. According to a report issued by Crowe Horwath, (2015) companies
in Qatar whether they are publicly listed companies, limited liability companies,
private shareholding companies, and limited partnership companies are required to
audit their financial statement and file them in the Ministry of Economy. It is also
mentioned in the report that the common practice in Qatar is simply to adopt IFRSs
and IASs.
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3.2.5 Kuwait
Kuwait has an association of accountants and auditors that is registered with
IFAC. A decision was made by the Minister of Trade and Industry No. 18 in 1990
which stipulates in its first article the need for companies and institutions of all kinds
to prepare their financial statements in accordance with international accounting
principles issued by the international accounting committee.
Thus, the GCC can be divided into three groups: the first includes Saudi
Arabia which applies national standards and resorts to international standards if a
subject arises which is not explained by the Saudi Organization for Certified Public
Accountants. In the absence of an international standard that deals with a topic, the
bodies resort to other standards approved by the Commission. The second group
comprises countries that apply international accounting and auditing standards, such
as Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. The third group includes
Qatar; it has no explicit law or indication that it should use the international
accounting and auditing standards.

3.3 The Regulatory and Professional Arena in the UAE
The following section discusses the major players in the field. It lists and
discusses the professional institutes and regulatory bodies, as well as the accounting
firms.
The audit industry in the UAE is regulated through Law No 22 of 1995 which
explains the criteria of individuals and firms performing audit in the country. It
explains things like legal capacity, education background, years of experience, and
procedures and application of process to become a registered auditor in the country.
However, even though the law describes who can practice audit in the country, the
UAE does not have a regulator of the profession and relies on international standards
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such as international auditing standards and international financial reporting
standards.
There are a number of government institutions such as State Audit Institute
(SAI), DFSA, and Abu Dhabi Accountability Authority (ADAA) that are monitoring
auditors to a certain extent. However, in the cases of SAI and ADAA these institutes
are only concerned with government entities and not the private sector. And for
DFSA, they are only concerned with entities operating in their free-zone only.
3.3.1 Accounting and Auditing Institutes
3.3.1.1 State Audit Institute (SAI)
The establishment of a professional body in the UAE that deals with auditing
issues at the level of the country as a whole is relatively recent. The Federal Law of
November 7, 1976 called for the establishment of an independent authority which
was established in 1977 under the name of the State Audit Institution (SAI). The
main responsibility of SAI is to be an oversight body that overlooks the public funds
handled by the government (Ibrahim, 2010). SAI is also responsible for auditing the
government bodies to improve their performance, eliminate corruption, restrict the
abuse of power and provide information to the public relating to government actions
(Ibrahim, 2010). SAI is responsible only to the government‟s audit bodies and
ensures that funds are spent appropriately. SAI does not enforce the use of IAS on
government bodies; hence, some government bodies are still working on cash based
accounting rather than following the accrual principle. SAI is also not a body that is
concerned with issuing appropriate standards tailored to the context of the UAE. It is
concerned only with the federal government‟s ministries and departments, the federal
national council and private companies that are 25% owned by the government or for
which the government guarantees certain levels of profits or support (H. H. S. Z. B.

42

S. Al-Nahyan, 1976). Federal Law No 8 of 2011 was issued to reorganize the Federal
Law of November 7, 1976 and to amend some of its articles. Mainly, the new law
introduced the need for performance audits and IT audits in the UAE, which had not
been applicable in the 1970s (H. H. S. K. b. Z. Al-Nahyan, 2011). Currently, the SAI
audits around 70 organizations, of which 12 are corporations which are partly owned
by the government (SAI).
Overall, it can be argued that the role of the SAI remains limited in
overseeing issues related to the profession. As a result, several other state-specific
bodies have emerged.
3.3.1.2 Abu Dhabi Accountability Authority (ADAA)
Since Abu Dhabi is the capital city of UAE and governs most of the proceeds
of oil extraction and international investments on behalf of the country, the ADAA
emerged to oversee governmental expenditure and audit practice relating to the
government and semi-government institutes concerned. On 18 December 2008 the
Abu Dhabi Accountability Authority (ADAA) was established as an independent
body in line with Federal Law No 14 of 2008. It reports to the Crown Prince,
Chairman of the Executive Council. The main goals of ADAA are to ensure that
public resources and funds are managed properly, ensure that the financial reports are
accurate and in compliance with the laws and promote accountability and
transparency (H. H. S. K. b. Z. Al-Nahyan, 2008). ADAA was established to govern
local departments, councils, authorities and companies or projects in which the Abu
Dhabi government has an interest equal to or greater than 50% (H. H. S. K. b. Z. AlNahyan, 2008). See Appendix 1 for the subject entities as defined by ADAA (2012).
ADAA issued 167 reports in 2009, 213 reports in 2010 and 212 reports in
2011 (ADAA, 2012). It seems that ADAA is a version of SAI but at the local level
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and with some minor differences. Some organizations are currently subject to the
audit of SAI, ADAA and a private external auditor.
Given the list of auditing institutes discussed above, it is clear that some
issues related to audit quality can be addressed. For example, the audit of entities in
Abu Dhabi, where audits are being duplicated by different bodies, has become
demanding and time consuming.
3.3.2 Accounting and Auditing Regulators
As discussed by Al-Qahtani (2005), the UAE is like most of the GCC where
the auditing profession is organized under commercial laws rather than an
independent body, as it is in Saudi Arabia. The UAE Federal Law No. 22 of 1995
organizes the auditing profession and clearly states the requirement of registration,
licensing, the responsibilities and duties of auditors and the penalties and disciplinary
acts (Ibrahim, 2009). The Ministry of economy of the UAE is the governing
authority that is responsible of ensuring that the audit firms and companies are in
compliance with UAE Federal Law No. 22 of 1995. Audit quality can be enhanced in
a number of ways, for example, Lennox, Xi, & Tianyu (2014) found that mandatory
audit rotations resulted in higher quality audits in the years immediately after the
rotation took place. This is aligned with the views of the government: a recent
adjustment to the commercial laws in the UAE requires audit firms to rotate staff
every four years. This new law will probably be implemented in all government
bodies and publicly listed companies. It is to be enforced in July 2015 and the market
will take some time to put it properly into action.
Under Law No. 22, no one can practice audit unless he/she is registered in the
schedule of auditors of the country and has fulfilled the due conditions and
requirements. An auditor must primarily be a national, with full legal capacity, of
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good behavior, with an accounting degree from a recognized university-level
institute and a full time practitioner. Moreover, this person must have completed the
training requirement in the audit industry according to his/her education level.
University accounting degree holders are required to have three consecutive years of
preparation, PhDs in accounting two years, and certified individuals from a
recognized society one year. Non-nationals can also register in the schedule of
auditors if they meet the above conditions. They must also be legal and constant
residents, fellows of a recognized institute or society for five years and employees or
partners of a registered audit firm. The law also explains the procedures and
application process of getting registered and explains the rights and obligations of
registered auditors as having the authority to sign financial statements for all types of
company. The law, on the basis of Law No. 9 of 1975, allows all audit practitioners
who opened their practice before Law 22 to continue without needing an accounting
degree. This possibly allows some audit firms to exist which carry out audits without
proper knowledge of IFRSs and ISAs, leading to materially misstated financial
statements. Law No. 22 does not allow auditors to have any trade activities, breach
the integrity of the audit practice, or audit a company for at least two years in which
he/she used to be an employee.
In general companies in the UAE adopt the International Accounting
Standards (IASs) since the accounting profession is not mature and does not set
accounting standards at the national level (Aljifri & Khasharmeh, 2006). Aljifri and
Khasharmeh (2006) also found that most companies adopt most of the IAS
requirements if they are relevant to the business; however, the level of adoption is
not consistent between companies, since adopting IASs is not obligatory and the
country lacks a legal framework and means of enforcement. They also note that
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most respondents believe that there is a need to modify IAS to adapt it to the needs
and requirements of the UAE accounting profession.
Khalifa (2012) shows how the accounting profession in the UAE is still
fragmented and has been governed by the state through local laws. According to her,
the big 4 accounting firms have imported their knowhow and assurance systems to
the UAE and have mainly hired individuals with foreign qualifications such as the
CPA, ACCA, ICAEW, etc.
The extent of disclosure in the financial statements from the listed companies
in the UAE is driven by regulatory institutes rather than market performance; since
the sector is the only variable where financial disclosures vary between companies
(Aljifri, 2008). It was found that the banking sector discloses more information than
the insurance, industrial and service sectors. Variables such as size, debt to equity
ratio and profitability do not affect the extent of disclosures by companies (Aljifri,
2008).
3.3.2.1 Dubai Financial Service Authority (DFSA)
Establishing a business in the UAE requires an Emirati national with a
minimum 51% shareholding in partnership with a foreign investor. This rule is one
of the major considerations among foreign investors who seek to establish businesses
in the UAE. In order to encourage investors to found businesses in the UAE, the
phenomenon of free zones was created, see appendix 2 for more information. When
this succeeded, the concept was replicated all over the UAE sometimes with
specialized industries. See Appendix 2 for a list of the most productive free zones in
the UAE.
The concept of free zones is not new, but has taken root in other forms
elsewhere. The outstanding examples are Silicon Valley and Hollywood in the USA.
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Some free zones are basically clusters of companies serving a specialized industry.
According to Porter (1998) the location of a business will not serve as a competitive
advantage if it operates in a cluster; however, as Porter (1998) explains, companies
which do so will be more productive, increase their innovations, enhance their access
to clients and improve relationships.
DFSA was created to be an independent regulator of all the financial services
related to Dubai‟s International Financial Centre (DIFC). DIFC was created to serve
as a financial hub that connects the world to UAE. The mission of the DIFC is “to
promote the growth and development of financial services and related sectors within
the UAE economy and to provide state of the art infrastructure and competitive
services to our stakeholders” (Dubai-International-Financial-Centre, 2013). DIFC
recognized the need for an independent regulator of the financial services in the
country and took the initiative to secure this extra precaution for investors by
creating the DFSA as an independent regulator to provide more transparency,
integrity and efficiency. The DFSA became an authority that authorizes those
institutions that are interested in working within the DIFC. It also supervises and
monitors the registrants‟ compliance with local laws and international best practices.
DFSA has issued its first report, covering the period from 2008-2012 relating to its
audit monitoring program. The main purpose of the program is to promote higher
quality audits which give more assurance and transparency to the DIFC as a whole.
The DFSA rulebook sets out the standards that all DIFC institutes should adhere to in
order to qualify: the International Standards on Auditing (ISAs), the International
Standard on Quality Control (ISQC) and the Code of Ethics for Professional
Accountants (Code of Ethics) issued by the International Federation of Accountants
(IFAC), the Islamic Accounting and Auditing Standards and the Code of Ethics for
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Accountants and Audit Firms of Islamic Financial Institutions as issued by the
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI).
(Dubai-Financial-Service-Authority-DFSA, 2013) The DFSA monitoring team has
completed 33 onsite assessments, assessed 56 principals and reviewed 106 audit
engagement, as shown in Appendix 3.
Analyzing the DFSA report of 2013, it is evident from the list of registered
auditors that most of them are Big 4 firms and the rest are mostly international audit
firms which are highly ranked worldwide. Even though the DFSA is dealing with the
Big 4 and other international firms, it is evident from their report that these registered
audit firms are not performing audits in accordance with the audit quality expected
from them. Not only this: it is also evident that two out of the Big 4 have withdrawn
from DFSA along with three other prestigious firms.
3.3.3 Accounting and Audit Firms in the UAE
The general structure of accounting and audit firms in the UAE is no different
to what exists in other countries. That is to say, these firms are grouped into three
tiers; the Big 4, mid-tier and small firms. More than 100 firms in the UAE are
practicing audit and most of them are local firms (please see Appendix 4 for a list of
practicing firms in the UAE).1
The small firms are not supported by international alliances that provide peer
reviews aimed at enhancing audit quality. In addition to these firms, the Big 4 firms
exist locally and capture most of the market share of major corporations, listed
companies, government bodies and banks. This reinforces the perception that the Big
4 firms provide higher audit quality as discussed in the literature review chapter. The
1

A full list of registered practicing audit firms was obtained by the researcher from
the Department of Economic Development in 2014. To update the list, it was
reconciled with other published lists available from different free zones and banks.
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remaining firms compete with the Big 4 to capture the SME industries on which this
paper focuses.
Audit firms in the UAE vary between the BIG 4 audit firms such as Price
Waterhouse Coopers, Deloitte, Ernest Young, and KPMG. Also UAE have most of
the other multinational audit firms such as Grant Thornton, BDO, MAZARS, Backer
Tally, PKF, and others. Besides these multinational firms there are quite a number of
local audit firms in the country. Some of these local firms are as small as a firm with
a one auditor and as big as firms that has more than 100 staff members. From this we
can see the variety of competition in the market is high.
Because of the existence of a big number of audit firms in the UAE market,
competition is very high and the market is very price sensitive as other audit firms
are just next door waiting to grab clients with a very competitive price biding. With
prices being very competitive, audit firms are struggling to compete with each other
and the only way for audit jobs to be profitable at the current prices is for audit firms
to spend less time on the audit jobs which impacts the audit quality and in turn the
reliability of the financial information.
It is evident from the DFSA report, 2013, that the Big 4 and international
audit firms did have certain weaknesses, as reported by the Dubai-Financial-ServiceAuthority-DFSA (2013). One would expect more deficiencies in the audit of local
firms and this research accordingly investigates whether it is necessary to set up a
governing body to monitor the audit firms dealing with SMEs.

3.4 SMEs in the UAE
The leaders of the UAE knew that the development of the SME sector plays a
vital role in the economic growth of the country as a whole. This is evident through
the establishment of the Khalifa fund by the government of Abu Dhabi which has set
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aside more than AED 1 billion to financially support local entrepreneurs and to
provide professional support to their projects. The Dubai government has a similar
initiative, named DUBAI SME, which strives to promote entrepreneurship.
According to DUBAI SME, the SMEs are the backbone of the economy of Dubai,
making up 95% of the number of companies in the city. These SMEs cater for 42%
of the workforce and account for 40% of the city‟s economy. DUBAI SME has
defined SMEs on the basis of turnover and a headcount of employees, keeping in
mind the industry as shown in the figure below:
Figure 04 Dubai SME Definition of SME‟s

According to research by DUBAI SME which covered 120 trading SMEs,
157 services SMEs and 30 manufacturing SMEs only 50% of these organizations
maintain audited financial reporting. If these findings can be generalized, we can
easily see from the 95% of the companies based in Dubai that only 47.5% maintain
audited financial reporting, which means that a big portion of the companies in
Dubai are not in a bankable position and could not obtain proper funding if it were
needed. This was also apparent in a search, where only 23% of respondents
confirmed that they had received financing in the past 5 years.
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Abu Dhabi has a similar structure to Dubai as is evident in the figure below;
this shows the size of Abu Dhabi SMEs, compared with other cities around the
world.
Figure 05 Breakdown of SME‟s by Size in Other Countries

The only difference between Abu Dhabi and Dubai is that Abu Dhabi
contributes more to the GDP from the oil industry, which dilutes the SMEs
contribution as shown in the figure below:
Figure 06 SME‟s Contribution to GDP
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The absence of a governing body to regulate audit firms which deal only with
the private sector, SMEs in particular, may have great influence on the economy, for
various reasons. For one thing, SMEs in the UAE rely heavily on two main sources
to fund their operations: either additional funds injected into them by the owners as a
form of increase in equity or loans from their shareholders. Otherwise the
management of a company obtains funding in the form of loans from banks and
financial institutions.
Bankers in the UAE, like all banks everywhere, rely heavily on reviewing the
audited financial statements of SMEs in order to assess their creditworthiness before
approving the loans. Bankers assume that the registered auditors in the Ministry of
Economy have fulfilled the requirements for becoming an auditor in the UAE and
will work according to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) and
International Auditing Standards (IASs), with their numerous standards and
pronouncements for governing the audit profession.
Bankers assume that a proper audited financial statement should have the
following criteria, as set by the IASCF (2001) in its framework: that all financial
statements should be understandable, relevant,

reliable, comparable, with fair

presentation and using the accrual basis of accounting. If all audit firms complied
with the requirements of IFRSs and ISAs, then the banker‟s risk in lending would be
minimal. However, if audit firms are not in compliance with the requirements of
IFRSs and ISAs, an auditor might issue a financial statement that was materially
misstated and would put the banker in the position of granting a loan to a troubled
entity or withholding a loan from a healthy entity. According to Barumwete &
Karimunda (2007)

empirical evidence in the context of Sweden suggests that
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bankers rely heavily on financial statements to determine a company‟s
creditworthiness and its ability to pay back its loans.

3.5 Conclusions
This chapter discussed the context of the auditing and accounting profession
in the UAE, by discussing the laws and regulations in the GCC in general terms. The
chapter mainly focused on the status of the profession in the UAE, through
elaborating on the state of audit firms, regulators and the country‟s SME market.
It can be argued that the regulatory context in the UAE is fragmented and
needs to attend to the different needs and pressures in its local, regional and global
contexts. It is because of this fragmentation and the absence of a clear body to
oversee the profession that different and overlapping jurisdictional claims can be
made by various institutions that have an interest in ensuring the practice of quality
auditing.
Overall, despite the fact that the UAE Federal Law No. 22 of 1995 establishes
the rules to ascertain who should be allowed to practice, the regulations still fall short
in relation to the monitoring of audit quality in SMEs in the UAE.
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this chapter is to present the broad theoretical underpinning of
the dissertation, and to outline the research methodology and methods used in this
research. After reviewing the literature on issues pertaining to audit quality and
identifying the various frameworks that explore such issues, I sketched in a general
understanding of the context of the profession in the UAE (see Chapter 3, above). It
should be acknowledged that the choice of research approach for this dissertation
depend heavily on the research objectives and questions. With this in mind, it made
sense to use research methods that were also compatible with the general approach,
and that could be expected to yield answers to such questions.
This chapter is organized into seven sub-sections; it starts by identifying the
research questions, then, after identifying a research paradigm, elaborates on the
general research strategy and design. Section three identifies the general theoretical
framework for the study by identifying the audit quality framework. Section four
details the methods that were used for data collection (interview, survey, participant
observation, as well as a social experiment). The chapter then moves to discuss
possible biases in data collection and analysis for a researcher who works in the field.
The chapter concludes by discussing the validation of procedures and sets out the
ethical considerations for research of this nature.

4.1 Research Questions and Hypothesis
The general choice of research focus has been largely directed by a practical
concern that emerged when I reflected on my experience in the UAE as an auditor.
The general theme of audit quality in the market for SMEs in the UAE was further
developed and some specific research questions emerged:
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Question (1): What is the regulatory and professional context of financial
reporting and auditing in the GCC in general, and the UAE specifically?
Question (2): What are the perceptions of audit quality in the market of SME
clients?
Question (3): Do auditors who audit SME clients in the UAE follow auditing
standards in accepting and conducting their audits?
Question (2) was broken down into specific hypothesis, as listed below:
H1: The perception of audit quality in mid-tier audit firms‘ dealings with SMEs
among Big 4 auditors, mid-tier auditors and professionals varies according to the
input factors relevant to values, ethics, and attitude.
H2: The perception of audit quality in mid-tier audit firms‘ dealings with SMEs
among Big 4 auditors, mid-tier auditors and professionals varies according to the
input factors relevant to knowledge, experience, and time.
H3: The perception of audit quality in mid-tier audit firms‘ dealings with SMEs
among Big 4 auditors, mid-tier auditors and professionals varies according to the
input factors relevant to audit process and quality controls.
H4: The perception of audit quality in mid-tier audit firms‘ dealings with SMEs
among Big 4 auditors, mid-tier auditors and professionals varies according to the
output factors.
H5: The perception of audit quality in mid-tier audit firms‘ dealings with SMEs
among Big 4 auditors, mid-tier auditors and professionals varies according to the
interaction factors.
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H6: The perception of audit quality in mid-tier audit firms‘ dealings with SMEs
among Big 4 auditors, mid-tier auditors and professionals varies according to the
contextual factors.

4.2 Research Paradigm, Strategy and Design
The nature of any research requires consideration of different research
paradigms, epistemology, and ontology matters as they represent beliefs, truth and
the nature of reality. These parameters influence research undertaking and research
conclusions. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss them to adopt the approaches used
in the research. James and Vinnicombe (2002) stated that research philosophy helps
to shape the research designs. The main elements of research philosophy are
represented in the figure below.
Figure 7 Research Philosophy

PURPOSE

TECHNICAL
PERSPECTIVES

RESEARCH
QUESTION

PERSPECTIVE

REERACH DESIGH

(Partington, 2008).
Research philosophy is closely related to the development of knowledge and
its nature. It supports the research strategy and plays a vital role in choosing the most
appropriate design of the research helping to answer the research questions.
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Two key elements of the research philosophy concern ontological and
epistemological matters. They express the ways in which people perceive the
research process (Saunders, Lewis, & Tornhill, 2009, p. 106-109). Ontology is the
theory of being. It deals with the researcher‟s view of the nature of reality and the
whole world (Saunders, Lewis, & Tornhill, 2009, p. 106). Important ontological
stances are constructionism (viewing the social as a reality that is constructed by
people) and objectivism (maintaining that a given reality exists that independently of
people‟s perceptions and actions). For constructionism reality has subjective
elements, while for objectivism it exists objectively (Bryman & Bell, 2007, p. 23).
Epistemology is the science of knowledge. It asks: how can people know the
world? As such it defines also what acceptable knowledge in a field of research is. It
deals with the ways to acquiring knowledge and describes the ways to learn about the
world (Saunders Lewis, & Tornhill, 2009, p. 106). Important branches of
epistemology are interpretivism and positivism. Interpretivism is concerned with
how people interpret their environments. It seeks to understand those interpretations
and, from this, come to a view about the experienced nature of social life and its
institutions. It holds that the study of the social is categorically different from the
natural science, frequently focusing on values, norms and subjective researcher‟s
position. Positivism holds that reality can only be studied through sense data.
Positivists find that interpretations cannot be known with enough certainty to be
studied by social scientists (Bryman & Bell, 2007, p. 17). All too frequently, the
different branches of epistemology are presented as opposites. This is useful for
showing their different interests and approaches. However, individual pieces of
research frequently combine elements from different branches in order to devise
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approaches to research that can satisfy a range of different research questions and
modes if inquiry.
This research project is interested in the norms and values of auditors but also
in potential remedies to improve audit practices in the UAE systematically. It
therefore draws on interpretivism to the extent that it is interested in the perceptions
and moral dispositions of auditors. However, beyond such subjective insights this
study also seeks to find out about the sharedness of such perceptions and moral
dispositions in order to be able to discuss their systemic nature in the UAE context.
This is needed in order to be in a position to develop regulatory recommendations.
Moreover this study adopts a positivistic stance when researching the ethics of UAE
auditors through their revealed behavior in a field experiment.
The Critical Rationalism paradigm best combines the interpretive and
positivist elements desired for this study (Blaikie, 2007). The audit industry as we
know it today is being mostly self-regulated through the professional bodies that are
issuing the standards for auditors to follow and comply with. This approach is being
criticized or supported by a number of practitioners and academics. The professional
bodies that have been monitoring this profession through the certification of its
members and requiring their members to hold the highest ethical standards, cannot
control the fact that these professionals are in a for profit organizations. Profit
seeking professionals might tend to bend the rules in order to spend less time on
assignments in order to maximize their profits, which was the case with Arthur
Anderson undercharging WorldCom audit in order to keep the relationship (Lilling,
2003). Some professional bodies have been active in minimizing the compromise of
audit quality and integrity of the profession through disciplinary actions towards its
member and in some cases the withdrawal of membership of some if its members.
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The non-existence of a professional body in the UAE that plays the role of these
international bodies have created a gap in the monitoring of this industry. And since
the government have issued certain laws to govern the audit industry, this research
aims to survey a number of practitioners, experts, and academics and to interview a
selective sample in order to obtain their perceptions over the integrity of the
profession in the UAE and to examine the need for the regulatory body to overlook
the audit industry as a whole and the ones dealing with the private sector in specific.
Research philosophy is significant as it helps the researcher to improve the
research methods and to clarify the research strategy including the evidence type, the
way it is interpreted, and the way of answering the research questions. It also enables
and assists in research methodology and method evaluation avoiding unnecessary
work through the limitation of inappropriate approaches during the early stages of
research. In addition, the philosophy makes the researcher more creative selecting or
adapting the research methods.
The methodological distinctions usually aim at differentiating between
quantitative and qualitative methods of research. However, the researcher‟s
understanding of philosophy is also essential. A quantitative method of research was
implemented as it is more suitable for the collection of a large amount of data.
Moreover, it allows to generalize participants‟ explicit and/or implicit claims. It is
necessary to know that quantitative and qualitative methods of research are usually
treated as opposing methods. Many researchers implement both methods to get a
deeper understanding of the research questions. However, it is essential to understand
strengths and weaknesses of both approaches.
The research will adopt a descriptive stance of the current situation in the
UAE as a whole in order to identify the gap that exists in audit firms that produce
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fake audit reports in the current practice. Some other audit practitioners might be
even worse and might be issuing financials without any audit procedures being
performed. According to Collis and Hussey (2009), there exist analytical,
descriptive, explanatory, and predictive types of research. Analytical research
enables researched concept understanding. Descriptive research employs quantitative
techniques for data collection, analysis and summary. Exploratory research is used in
case of absence of any previous research, while predictive one speculates about
future events. A better understanding of the studied topic will be provided through
the use of all mentioned research types.
This research will initially explain the current audit industry in the UAE
through examination of the current literature and industry publications. Then, the
research will use a quantitative approach, using surveys and experiments.
The quantitative research method will employ the survey as a tool for the data
collection. This research method enables to contact large groups quickly and
efficiently, provides an opportunity to examine the participants‟ understanding of a
particular topic, and allows to ask all participants the same questions. In the same
vein structure interviewing enables the researcher to ask the same set of questions to
different respondents. In addition, it enables the researcher explain confusing things
that may be unclear or difficult to understand. Thus, structured interviews are a
reliable source of quantitative data.
Data will be gathered from secondary sources such as books, journals, and
articles. Also, since the research is industry related other secondary data such as
government and semi-government sites and industry reports will be used. These data
will be used to shape the literature review chapter to focus on the research question
and to justify the research method being followed. Once the research is focused on a
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research question, primary sources of data will be used in order to answer the
research question. Since an important issue for the research is the potential
usefulness of a governing regulating body to overlook the audit firms that are dealing
with the private sector in the UAE, the research will use primary data gathered from
surveys and interviews. These surveys will be circulated through mail and email, and
the interviews will be done face to face. An experiment will be conducted using a
fictitious company trial balance and trying to obtain an audited report from audit
firms to measure the number of willing audit firms to provide an audit opinion
without performing any audit procedures. This kind of experiment will prove in a
clear manner the existence of audit firms that are not concerned with the integrity of
the profession. Unlike surveys and interviews that only measure people‟s perceptions
towards such a behavior, this experiment will provide conclusive evidence of such
doings.
An abductive approach of research is used in the study that presupposes
taking notes of the existing theories, opinions, and articles. This is the basis for the
interviews. On the basis of these theories, we prepared the interview guide for the
semi-structured interviews. It is difficult to make an investigation without the
analysis of previous researches and theories.
According to Bryman and Bell (2007), there exist five research design types
including experimental, longitudinal, cross-sectional, comparative, and case study
designs (p. 45). The research design will be cross-sectional that is also called a social
survey design. It has been found that “cross-sectional design involves the collection
of data on more than one case (usually quite a lot more than one) and at a single
point in time in order to collect a body of quantitative or quantifiable data in
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connection with two or more variables (usually many more than two), which are then
examined to detect patterns of association” (Bryman & Bell, 2007, p. 53).
The choice of research design is closely related to the purpose of the current
research. It is necessary to take into account the tenure of auditor respondents and
make sure that there is a possibility to provide good distinctions between the
circumstances.
The collection of data will finish at a single time period meaning that the
interview questions will be collected promptly. An experiment is usually done to test
a theory or hypothesis. However, it may be used to discover new information related
to the topic under investigation. If done well, it is one of the best methods of
gathering information from a positivistic perspective because it is systematic,
reliable, empirical, and verifiable.

4.3 Audit Quality: a Theoretical Framework
After reviewing both the professional and academic literature for discussions
on audit quality, the IAASB framework was identified as the most suitable for
exploring the quality of SME audits in the UAE. It encompasses more elements of
quality than all the other models. The model has three main elements, namely; (1)
input factors; (2) output factors, (3) contextual and interaction factors. The
framework is summarized in the table below, but also described in detail in the
subsequent sections.
Table 1 - IAASB's Audit Quality Framework
Framework
Element

Attributes

Academic
References

Inputs
(values,
ethics and
attitudes)

Engagement Level. The engagement
team recognizes audit performance in
the wider public interest, exhibits
objectivity, integrity, professional
competence, professional skepticism

(Whitehouse, 2013);

(Primeau, 2003);
(Ross L. Watts &
Zimmerman, 1979);
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and independence.
National Level. Ethical requirements
make clear the underlying ethical
principles and specific requirements.
Regulators
and
professional
accountancy organizations ensure that
the ethical principles are clear and
understandable.
Moreover,
information
relevant
to
client
acceptance decisions is shared
between audit firms.

(Ross L. Watts &
Zimmerman, 1986);
(Flesher, Previts, &
Samson, 2005);
(Arrunada, 1999);
(Craswell, 1999);
(Patel & Prasad,
2013); (Quick &
WarmingRasmussen, 2009)

Firm Level. The firm enhances the
personal characteristics important to
audit
quality,
emphasizes
the
importance of providing partners and
staff with access to high-quality
technical support and promotes a
culture of consultation. In addition,
financial considerations do not drive
the actions and decisions that may
negatively influence audit quality.
Inputs
(knowledge,
experience
and time)

Engagement Level. Partners and staff
have the appropriate competences,
understand the entity‟s business and
make
reasonable
judgments.
Furthermore, both of them have
sufficient time to undertake the audit
effectively. The partners in the audit
engagement take an active part in risk
assessment, planning, supervising and
reviewing the work performed.
National
Level.
There
are
arrangements for licensing audit
firms/individual auditors and briefing
auditors
on
different
issues.
Moreover, some arrangements aim at
providing appropriate training in the
system of new accounting and
auditing or regulatory requirements.
The requirements related to education
are clear and appropriate training is
resourced.
Hence, the auditing
profession is considered to be one that
takes a highly respected position and
can attract and retain professionals.
Firm Level. Staff and partners have
enough time to provide staff with

(Al-Thuneibat et al.,
2011); (Ghosh &
Moon, 2005);
(Carcello,
Hermanson, &
McGrath 1992);
(Ghosh & Moon,
2005)
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appropriate coaching and timely
appraisal. In addition, substantial
training is provided to audit staff and
partners concerning accounting and
industry issues.
Engagement Level. The engagement
team acts in accordance with the
Inputs
relevant regulations and laws,
(audit
process and auditing standards and the procedures
of the audit firm‟s quality control and
quality
makes appropriate use of information
control
procedures) technology. This level is characterized
by an effective interaction with those
involved in the audit process,
including internal auditors, whereby
applicable
and
appropriate
arrangements
are
made
with
management so as to achieve audit
efficiency.
National Level. Effective systems
exist for investigating allegations of
audit failure and taking disciplinary
action. Auditing standards are made
public to clarify the underlying
objectives and specific requirements.
There are also bodies responsible for
the inspection of external audits,
considering the relevant attributes of
audit quality.

(Kilgore, Radich, &
Harrison, 2011);
(Deis & Giroux,
1992); (Beattie,
Brandt, & Fearnley,
1999); (Michael C.
Knapp, 1987);
(Mkhael C. Knapp,
1985); (McKinley,
Pany, & Reckers,
1985); (Philmore
Alvin Alleyne,
2006); (Randolph A.
Shockley, 1981);
(Sun and Liu; 2011)

Firm
Level.
Appropriate
methodology is adopted to let
professional standards of development
inform the reviews of internal quality
control and external interactions. It
also encourages individual team
members to apply professional
skepticism and exercise appropriate
professional judgment and requires
reviews of audit work and effective
supervision.
In
addition,
the
procedures of rigorous quality control
are established at this level.
Consequently, actions are accordingly
taken and audit quality is monitored.
Outputs

(Deangelo, 1981);
from the auditors – auditors‟ reports (Palmrose & Scholz,
to users, those charged with 2000);
Engagement Level:
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governance, and management, as well (Raghunandan,
as financial and prudential regulators; Read, & Whisenant,
from the entity - the audited financial 2003); (Anderson &
statements and reports from those Yohn, 2002);
charged with governance;
(Aljifri, 2008)
from the audit regulators information on personal audits
Interactions Effective Interactions between:
Management and auditors
Management and those charged with
regulators, governance, users
Those charged with governance and
regulators, users
Regulators and users

Contextual
Factors

Business practices and commercial
law
Corporate governance
Financial reporting timetable
Laws and regulations relating to
financial reporting
The applicable financial reporting
framework
Broader cultural factors
Information systems

(Colbert & Murray,
1998); (Barumwete
& Karimunda,
2007); (Sarens,
Christopher, &
Zaman, 2013);
(Turley & Zaman,
2007); (Zaman,
Hudaib, & Haniffa,
2011)
(Knapp, 1985); (AlQahtani, 2005); (AlAjmi, 2009); (Joshi,
Al-Ajmi, &
Bremser, 2009);
(Ibrahim, 2010);
(Ibrahim, 2009);
(Aljifri &
Khasharmeh, 2006);
(Khalifa, 2012)

4.3.1 Model Input Factors
Input factors are the variables that have an impact on the quality of an audit in
its initial stages and consist of showing proper values, ethics, and attitude, and the
like, with regard to the engagement. These factors ensure that the engagement team
recognizes the fact that the audit is being performed to serve the wider public
interest. In order to do so, the team should have high standards of objectivity and
integrity. The team must be independent in fact and in appearance, and should
perform the audit procedures while maintaining due care and professional skepticism
(IAASB, 2013).
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Other input factors which are equally important for ensuring higher audit
quality are being knowledgeable and experienced in the field and having sufficient
time to carry out all the audit procedures. To this end, partners and audit team
members should have the necessary competencies and a proper understanding of the
business under audit. The team should perform the audit by applying all the required
steps from the risk assessment, planning, supervising, to reviewing the audit
engagement. All aspects of the engagement should be undertaken in a timely manner
and proper time should be allowed to all team members to perform at the highest
standard (IAASB, 2013).
The last input factor is applying a proper audit process through quality
control procedures. This is the part that ensures that the audit is complying with
auditing standards and through the audit firm‟s current quality control procedures.
They serve as the groundwork for performing proper risk assessment and audit
procedures (IAASB, 2013).
4.3.2 Model Output Factors
One way to measure the quality of audits is through their outputs (IAASB,
2013). In the audit industry, the output is limited to the auditor‟s report which is
issued with the financial statements. This section goes beyond this. The research
explores output factors which are not tangible, such as the improvements in the
company‟s financial reporting and the enhancement of internal controls. It also
includes all the reports that are issued to those charged with governance, to the
management, to the audit committee members, to the board of directors, and to
regulators (IAASB, 2013). The ultimate goal of an audit is to provide an opinion on
the financial statements that will assist the shareholders and users of the financial
information to make an educated decision.
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The reporting of the audit opinions and the types of reports issued are
standardized by the International Standards of Auditing (ISA). For example, when
reporting to those charged with governance, auditors are to report the auditor‟s
responsibility, the planned scope and timing of the audit, any threats to the auditors‟
objectivity, any related safeguards that were applied, and any findings from the audit
work. The reporting requirement to the management is different: the auditor is
required to report his recommendations for the improvement of the business process,
any findings related to regulatory issues, trends related to the specific industry and
global best practice.
4.3.3 Model Interaction Factors
Figure 8 Interaction Factors as per IAASB's Audit Quality Framework

As evident from the above figure (International-Auditing-and-AssuranceStandards-Board, 2013), the external auditor interacts with a number of parties. The
graph suggests that these parties also interact with each other independently of the
external auditor.
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The management of the organizations under audit is responsible for preparing
the financial statement in accordance with the International Financial Reporting
Standards and for ensuring that proper internal controls are in place which guarantee
that the financial statement is free from material misstatements, whether due to fraud
or error. The auditors need to interact closely with management so as to verify the
appropriateness of the internal controls through audit procedures that would allow
them to safely express an opinion; otherwise they are not fulfilling their duties. The
interaction between the auditors and the management is highly critical. If their
relationship is constructive, it will lead to improvements in the financial reporting,
improvement in the internal controls, and adherence to regulators and local laws.
Those charged with governance are the executives who are responsible for
overseeing the strategic direction of a company, such as its Audit Committee,
Nomination Committee, Executive Committee and Investment Committee and other
board members. Proper communication between auditors and those charged with
governance helps those charged with governance to conclude on the fairness of the
financial statements and whether management has acted on the issues being
highlighted by the auditors. Sarens, Christopher, & Zaman (2013) and Turley &
Zaman (2007), in a study based in Australia, encourage more informal
communication between the internal auditors and the audit committee. It is also
found that there is a positive relationship between the audit committee‟s
effectiveness and both audit fees and non-audit service fees, in particular for larger
sized clients (Zaman, Hudaib, & Haniffa, 2011).
Auditors also interact with the users of the financial statements, notably at the
general meeting when the appointing, re-appointing and replacing of auditors occurs.
In these meetings the auditors present their opinion on the financial statement and the
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floor is opened to the users of the financial statements to ask any questions they
wish. These questions can motivate the audit firm to have a proper audit done in
order to avoid public humiliation.
Finally, auditors interact with regulators; these regulators can be regulators of
financial markets, such as the Abu Dhabi Exchange and Dubai Financial Markets.
They govern publicly listed organizations which are not part of the present research,
since its focus is on only small and medium-sized enterprises. The other kind of
regulator is the financial institute, such as the banks that are providing loans to
SMEs. Auditors are expected to communicate to the bankers about issues with the
organizations as going concerns or about any material breach of the law. From the
survey results, it appears that the professionals and the Big 4 auditors thought that
mid-size audit firms fall short in adhering to the interaction requirements. This is
also evident in the experiment that is reported in Chapter 8: this showed that no
interaction took place with any of the above parties, and very minimal interaction
took place with the management of the organization that required auditing.
4.3.4 Model Contextual Factors
Figure 9 Contextual Factors as per IAASB's Audit Quality Framework
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The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (2013) suggests
that there are many variables with an impact on the quality of financial reporting.
These variables are defined as the contextual factors. Nevertheless, they also affect
the work of the auditor, since without knowledge of their relevance and their impact
on the entity, the quality of the audit will be compromised.
Business Practices and Commercial Law: The way in which business practices in
any country are conducted reflects the maturity of its commercial environment. The
more advanced the commercial environment, the more support is available for any
specific transaction. In less developed commercial environments, transactions are
based on variables such as trust and personal relationships. In such environments,
there is little documentation or contractual safeguarding. This makes it more difficult
for auditors to verify such informal transactions. The GCC is a commercial
environment which has advanced to its present state very rapidly and is continuing at
a similar pace. It still sees many transactions based on trust and personal
relationships,

in small family owned businesses in particular (IAASB, 2013). In

certain cases where partners who trust each other establish a new company, each
partner spends personal funds on the new business, as opposed to injecting working
capital. The concept of an independent business entity becomes intertwined with
personal accounts and relationships.
Another very important aspect that reflects the maturity of a commercial
environment is the existence of commercial laws to govern the establishment of
various types of organization. These laws also ensure that the rights and obligations
of the transactions are properly established.
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Laws and Regulations relating to Financial Reporting: These are laws and
regulations that can help to establish management‟s responsibilities in relation to
financial reporting, and also introduce some punitive sanctions against management
who engage in fraudulent financial reporting. Such laws should also have an
enforcement mechanism in order to insure proper compliance is in place.
Applicable Financial Reporting Framework: High standards of financial reporting
require a clear financial reporting framework. The framework assists members of
management in their accounting decisions. The framework should also be
straightforward and uncomplicated in order for management and those charged with
governance to effectively oversee the financial reporting.
Corporate Governance: Strong corporate governance in firms positively influences
the reliability of the financial reporting. Those charged with governance are the
people who initiate proper governance with proper oversight over management. One
of the most important committees responsible for the oversight of management is the
Audit Committee. This committee is responsible for reviewing both the internal audit
reports and the external audit report. It is also charged with ensuring that the
management addresses all the issues raised by the external and internal auditors. To
be effective, the committee must have good financial literacy. The more financially
sound the Audit Committee members, the higher the perception of the quality of the
financial reporting (IAASB, 2013).
Information Systems: Proper information system solutions are available to ensure
reliable financial reporting and enforced internal controls. The available information
systems vary in complexity and the more the complex the accounting software, the
more controls that can be put in place to ensure more reliable information. In small
family owned businesses in the GCC, the importance of accounting systems is not
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valued. This has caused the management of these businesses to be satisfied with very
loose internal controls; the owners of the businesses tend to have very limited
financial knowledge and do not comprehend that their business is thereby weakened.
Managements and auditors with lower ethical values and greater financial knowledge
take advantage of this situation for their own personal gain.
Financial

Reporting

Timetable:

Organizations

have

different

reporting

requirements and deadlines depending on what is imposed by their regulators. These
deadlines sometimes cause auditors to work under very tight schedules and hence
sometimes give the auditors too little time to perform the detailed testing that would
obtain higher assurance on the financial information.
Broader Cultural Factors: The existence of different cultures within an
organization makes it more difficult for employees than if everyone at work had the
same behaviors and traditions.

4.4 Data Collection Methods
To collect data for this dissertation four main methods contributed differently
to the data collected, namely; interviews, survey, participant observation and an
experiment. The methods were at times used to reconfirm findings, but also they
were used to complement each other. For example, interviews were used to probe
further into issues revealed in the survey.
4.4.1 Interviews
Interviewing is a key method of data collection in social research. Given the
research questions, which are exploratory, seeking explanations and understanding of
the nature of audit practices in the UAE, interviews were identified as a very useful
tool for collecting data. The interviews emphasized probing and teasing out some of
the issues that pertain to audit quality, which had surfaced, for example in the results
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of the questionnaire. Semi-structured interviews are used to reflect better all the
concerns that a researcher may have. Such interviews allow a fairly open kind of
two-way communication, giving and receiving information. Interviewing is often
treated as a managed verbal exchange. The success and effectiveness of interviewing
mainly depend on the interviewer‟s communication skills (Clough & Nutbrown,
2007).
The participants in the present research were provided with the interview
guide several days before the interview to give them an idea of what they would be
asked. Face-to-face interviews were held, where the interviewees met the
interviewer, ensuring accurate and full data and also mutual confidence and
understandability. The interviewer has an opportunity to change the number of
questions according to the respondent‟s mood and answers, and to avoid
misunderstanding and discomfort (Bryman & Bell, 2007, p. 479). The ethical
concerns of all the participants were taken into account by asking them if they would
like to be anonymous.
The interviews reported below asked respondents to provide their name,
gender, age, nationality, current position, current company, number of years in the
audit industry, number of years with financial responsibility, number of years in the
academic profession, highest educational achievement, certification, number of years
in UAE, and others.
The interviews contained both open-ended and close-ended questions. In
total, 15 questions were put to the participants to answer freely. One of the questions
gave a set of optional answers to choose from. The questions covered the issues of
audit firm differences, the participant‟s experience in the audit industry in the UAE,
auditors‟ professional duties and responsibilities, the monitoring of audit quality and
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audit integrity, financial statements, different impacts on the auditing profession, the
major weaknesses in the audit industry in the UAE, etc.
Interviews were used at two points: first, during the pilot study some
interviews were conducted to explore issues of audit quality in the UAE for audits
related to SMEs. The purpose of these preliminary interviews was to find out if any
context specific factors affected the quality of audit that might not have been covered
in the literature, which focused mainly on an Anglo-Saxon context, or rarely
discussed such issues in the context of the UAE or the GCC countries.
Pilot Interviews are 'trying out' of a specific study (Baker 1994: 182-3) or in
other words are considered the “small scale versions or trial runs done in preparation
for the major study” (Polit et al., 2001: 467). Pilot Interviews are highly
recommended as a startup for the preparation of a research project. They help in
assessing the need for a full scale research study, set the procedure of research, and
help in determining the required sample size needed to conduct the research.
However, these interviews might mistakenly be used for assumptions or mistakenly
considered as reliable source of data and may be mistakenly added to the main
results noted from the research conducted. This leads to the contamination of data.
Once a general framework for the dissertation had been identified, interviews
were used to probe further the elements of audit quality, by trying to discuss some
questions that had not been exposed by the survey. In other words, the respondents
were asked to give examples or explain some of the patterns established by the
survey results. The survey, moreover, yielded fewer responses from the Big 4 and the
interviews were also meant to make up for the lack of participation by auditors from
those firms. Obtaining such views was essential to develop a rounded understanding.
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Qualitative research was conducted to meet the research aims and objectives.
Qualitative research is a good way to determine how things happen. This kind of
research is helpful when monitoring attitudes and behavior in surveys, interviews,
observations, etc. Qualitative research presupposes the investigation of evidence and
answers to questions, the formation of procedure set to effectively answer the
research questions, and the production of findings that could not have been
determined in advance. It provides a rich, descriptive, and valuable understanding of
motivations, attitudes, opinions, and aspirations.
Qualitative research focuses on authenticity, rather than objective reliability
and aims at gathering an authentic understanding of experiences. It provides a deep
picture of the variable-based correlations and explicit rendering of structure, order,
and patterns. The research process presupposes the adjustment of concepts, data
collection tools and methods. It was found that qualitative research methods are able
to produce information only on the particular cases under investigation. A qualitative
study comprises several research methods, including interviews, surveys,
observations, text and document analysis, audio recording, and others. However, they
are often used in combination to provide more reliable data. But the current research
also used elements of quantitative research to provide a better understanding of the
problem under investigation.
A total number of 14 interviews took place. The table below summarizes
some of the background information on interviewees:
Table 2 - Interviewee Characteristics
No.

Age

Gender

Nationality

Current
Position

Current
Industry

Audit
Experience
(Years)

Finance
Experience
(Years)

Qualification

Previous
Big 4
experience

1

31

Male

Filipino

Senior
Accountant

Manufacturing

7

4

CPA

Yes

2

29

Male

Pakistani

Senior
Finance

Manufacturing

4

5

ICAEW, CA

Yes

75
Controller
3

33

Male

Jordanian

Financial
Controller

Trading

7

7

CPA

Yes

4

44

Male

Egyptian

CFO

Education

16

3

CPA, CIA,
CFE

Yes

5

47

Male

American

CFO

Investment

5

12

CPA, CMA,
CGMA

Yes

6

27

Male

Jordanian

Chief
Accountant

Private Equity

3

3

None

No

7

39

Male

Pakistani

Section Head
in Finance

Manufacturing

5

10

ACA, CMA

Yes

8

37

Male

Jordanian

Finance
Manager

Real Estate

4

7

None

No

9

34

Male

British

Director

Big 4

14

None

ICAEW, CA

Yes

10

37

Male

Jordanian

Director

Big 4

15

None

CPA

Yes

11

33

Male

Indian

Senior
Manager

Big 4

11

None

CA

Yes

12

36

Male

Indian

CFO

Real Estate

3

12

CA

Yes

13

34

Male

Jordanian

CFO

Real Estate

8

3

CPA

Yes

14

37

Male

Indian

Finance
Manager

Real Estate

0

11

CA

No

4.4.2 Survey
Surveys are a common research tool used to collect data. A survey was
mainly used to collect and measure the perceptions by respondents of audit quality
for SME clients in the UAE. The survey would be able to identify whether
perceptions of this audit quality varied by professional group. Hence, the survey was
directed towards three groups of professionals: (a) auditors working in one of the Big
4 firms, (b) auditors working in mid-tier audit firms or local audit firms, (c)
professionals in the field such as academics, a finance manager, internal auditor, and
government officials. A survey entitled “Audit Quality in the UAE” was sent to the
above three groups. All the surveys were structured in the same way but were
tailored to each group individually. The survey was based on the audit quality
framework developed by IAASB (2013), and included 16 descriptive and
demographic questions (e.g. age, gender, remuneration, experience, education, size
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of firm, etc.), and an additional 46 questions with 5 Likert-scale answer options that
measured the different aspects of audit quality as identified in the framework. The
questions measured the following 4 dimensions of audit quality:
(a) Input Factors
Inputs - Values, Ethics, and Attitudes, Questions 17 – 26 (inclusive)
Inputs - Knowledge, Experience and Time, Questions 27 – 36
(inclusive)
Inputs – Audit Process and Quality Control Procedures, Questions 37
– 46 (inclusive). My focus was partly on questions 44-46: national level
governance
(b) Output factors, Questions 47 – 51 (inclusive)
(c) Interaction factors, Questions 52 – 55 (inclusive): another part of my
focus.
(d) Contextual Factors, Question 56 – 62 (inclusive): another part of my
focus.
The survey was circulated to 104 audit firms throughout the UAE, which
were asked to circulate it to their employees. However, the respondents were given
the choice to identify the name of the firm where they were currently working. Please
refer to section 5.2 for descriptive tables of the respondents. A total of 123 responses
were received, of which 27 came from Big 4 staff, 52 responses from mid-tier audit
firms and 44 from professionals. There were 3 responses that did not have full
answers and were excluded from the analysis.
4.4.3 Participant Observation
According to Kawulich, (2005) participant observation is defined as ―the
process enabling researchers to learn about the activities of the people under study
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in the natural setting through observing and participating in those activities‖. Zahle,
(2012) describes 4 types of participant observation methods; the one that is adopted
for the purpose of this research is described by Zahle as ―Type 4 observations: The
social scientist may make observations of actions—other individuals‘ as well as her
own—that she, as a competent assessor, meets with approval or disapproval. Again,
her meeting an action with approval suggests that it is appropriate and/or effective,
just as her meeting it with disapproval is suggestive of its being inappropriate and/or
ineffective. Moreover, insofar as she is herself a competent performer, these
observations may take the form of noticing how she herself carries out various
actions. These observations will be suggestive as to how it is appropriate and/or
effective to act.‖ This type of participant observation involvement would oblige the
researcher to be capable of assessing the responses and also of carrying out his own
suggestions, since these would always be for appropriate actions (deemed to be
effective) and nor inappropriate actions (deemed ineffective) (Zahle, 2012).
I am experienced in the field of audit, I am a Certified Public Accountant CPA (Licensed in the Missouri State Board of Accountancy MOSBA) and I have a
Bachelor‟s degree in Accounting and a Master‟s in Business Administration with
emphasis on accounting, from Missouri State University. I also hold a Certified Risk
Assurance Management certificate as well as a Certified Master Trainer certificate.
I have over five years of experience in Assurance and Advisory work with
PricewaterhouseCoopers in the UAE, where I have worked in the Dubai and Abu
Dhabi offices. I was responsible for the day to day management of audit
engagements and applied best practice in accordance with PwC‟s methodology. I
then spent more than a year with Manarah as the Finance Manager for Investment in
Development Projects, where I was responsible for the finance and human resources
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department. Manarah was a newly established investment company and by the end of
its first operational year, it had a portfolio of AED 1.5 Billion Dirhams.
I then joined a local audit – ODEH Certified Public Accountants – a firm that
had been established by my father in 1997, who put all his knowhow into a local
firm. In less than three years, I was able to triple the size of firm in terms of revenue
and number of staff. I was also able to bring in a number of prestigious clients, as
well as a company listed in the Abu Dhabi Stock Market.
I next moved to a listed company in Abu Dhabi Stock Market under the name
of Abu Dhabi Ship Building (ADSB), where I carried out a quick turnaround of its
financial performance in a year. The company in this period tripled its stock price as
it shifted from losses of AED 130 million to a profit of AED 80 million. ADSB is a
specialized shipbuilding company that manages assets of AED 1.5 billion and has
projects worth AED 3 billion.
Recently, I accepted a new challenge with another listed company under the
name of Abu Dhabi National Hotels (ADNH). I am currently heading the finance
department and pursuing a number of initiatives to enhance the performance of the
company. I also sit on two Audit Committees as an independent member. The
cumulative experience that I have gained in all these positions and their being all in
the UAE have enriched my knowledge of the specifics of auditing as an industry in
the UAE.
Since the start of my enrolment to the Doctorate in Business Administration
program, I have been reflecting on my experience in the audit industry noting down
observations about the field and my colleagues, with the purpose of refining my
research question and gathering more data on the issue of audit quality in the market
for SME‟s. I am able to distinguish my role as a professional in the field who was
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practicing audit, and my recent role as a researcher who is very conscious of his
work environment and issues of audit quality in the field.
My observations are evident throughout the research in forms of input to the
findings of the research as well as a very detailed assessment of the procedures that
should have taken place in the experiment as compared to what happened in reality.
Overall, it is fair to say that this is the least method of data collection used, as
I was not very systematic with notes taking, nevertheless, I can confirm that this
method was heavily used during the experiment as a lot of notes were taken with
regards to the communication that took place with audit firms that were invited to
conduct an audit. All discussions through emails and phone call conversations were
documented. During the interviews some comments about the participants were
noted.
4.4.4 Social Experiment
Social experiment is a real word piece of research that entails exploring
certain factors and behaviors among the participants without their being aware that
they are participating in the experiment. According to Zellner and Rossi (1986), a
good social experiment must have a proper methodological approach in order to
achieve its aims. The researcher should also prepare an initial feasibility study for the
experiment to be reasonably sure at an early stage that its objectives can be realized.
The experimenter should himself be an expert in the field so that s/he can detect and
identify any inappropriate practices. This dissertation has considered all the above
and a field experiment has been decided upon because the lack of awareness of
scrutiny among the participants makes it is very likely that authentic behaviors will
be captured. This kind of research is very common in areas where the expected
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outcome concerns unethical and unacceptable behaviors. The nature of this
experiment makes it, however, very time consuming and financially expensive.

4.5 Data Analysis
For Survey results, factor Analysis – through SPSS - was used for data
collected to be reduced to achieve a smaller set of variables out of the large set of
variables. This helps in eliminating measurement errors and producing more efficient
data output. However it might cause the data to be difficult to understand especially
for comparison purposes due to variation in weights (Vincent, 1971).
With regards to interviews, data was analyzed through NVIVO by first
transcribing all interviews on the software and grouping quotes based on Nodes that
are matching to the audit quality framework used. Then, all information was
analyzed based on each variable tested separately.

4.6 Bracketing: Insider Role and Research Bias
In research generally, it is very important to be aware of biases and avoid the
effect of such bias from the early stages of research. Awareness of bias that could
negatively affect such important aspects of research as defining the research
problem, data collection, data analysis and results interpretation is crucial for reliable
and valid research findings. In quantitative research it is largely achieved by
attending to the objectivity, reliability and validity of the research instrument (e.g. a
survey). In qualitative research, however, since the research instrument is mainly the
researcher, it is done by being aware of such biases and when and how they may
interfere with research activities. „Bracketing‟ and reflection are important ways of
dealing with such biases. Tufford & Newman (2012) define bracketing as “a method
used in qualitative research to mitigate the potential damaging effects of
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preconceptions that may taint the research process and thereby to increase the rigor
of the study”.
As a starting point, I was very much aware of my role in the industry and the
way in which my personal interests might affect the choice of a research question.
The worry here was that I might choose a question that was insignificant, of personal
interest only to myself and made no contribution to theory or practice. This concern
was eliminated after discussions with my advisor, and by researching the literature
(professional and academic) about the significance of the dissertation questions.
The researcher also used „reflexivity‟ as a continuous process throughout the
research journey, to attend to any biases that arose. It involved a continuous
examination of my values and interests and their possible impact on the research
process (Primeau, 2003). Reflexivity was practiced continuously with and without
the advisor. Explicit discussions on the way in which the personal interest of the
researcher might interfere with the research process took place during all meetings.
This resulted in a continuous examination of my position and made me aware of my
due role and influence.
I also felt it was my responsibility to be personally involved in all the
activities related to data collection, data analysis and data interpretation, for all the
methods used to collect data for this dissertation (interviews, survey, experiment).
I was also very much aware that a deep knowledge of the industry might
influence how I collected and interpreted the data. To overcome such possible biases,
I followed the usual protocols to ensure the reliability and validity of the research
activities.
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4.7 Validation of procedures
In the process of carrying out this research, the researcher has used secondary
and primary data. The primary data are the results from the surveys and interviews,
whereas the secondary data include literature reviews and information that was
obtained from scientific reports, researches, journals, etc. All questions were
designed to be easily understood. When the data were collected, the researcher sorted
and evaluated it.
The study findings should be of professional practice relevance. The research
method is dependent on the blend of project cases, supplementary data, surveys,
interviews, observations, and questionnaires. If the research provides suggestions
that can be implemented they can act as an action stimulus. Researchers in system
research suggested that relevant research should be accessible to practitioners. In
addition, it should produce a long-term behavior change.
Relevant research should be valid. Validity is closely related to the true
reflection of the current situation and the world in general. Validity indicates likeness
to reality and sometimes defined as data credibility.
Relevant research also requires research reliability and rigor. Evidence
reliability does not depend on the person using it. Reliability indicates an impersonal
and independent investigator. According to Bryman and Bell (2007), reliability
means demonstrating that the study operations can be repeated with the same results.
The questionnaire used to get data was short and did not require much time to be
answered. The structured interview is considered to be an effective research
procedure as it uses the same questions for each respondent. The design of questions,
structure of the interview and survey is essential as it adds to the reliability and
validity of the research data. The survey questions were short and did not require
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much time. The interview validity was ensured through the use of the same
questions for each respondent. The design of survey and interview questions, as well
as their structure adds to the validity and reliability of the research data.
In order to ensure reliability of the study, the study tools will be pre-testing
through pilot interviewing of the respondents. The essence of the pilot-testing of the
questionnaires is ensure that the tool is able to measure all the variables in the study
and that the tool can be used to collect the targeted data accurately. After the testing
of the tool through pilot surveying the tool will be adjusted.

4.8 Ethical Issues
Ethics are the codes and conduct followed by every researcher and are closely
related to values and norms. The primary concern of the researcher should be the
research participant‟s safety, to be preserved by considering the risk and benefit
ratio, taking into account all the available information, making appropriate
assessments and monitoring the research process. It is essential for the researcher to
obtain informed consent from all the participants, as an ongoing process. The
researcher must clearly state the confidentiality and privacy concerns to be
approached. S/he must be sensitive not only to information protection, but also to the
notification of any unforeseen research findings. It is also essential to consider the
adverse events that may occur in the process of the study. All potential participants
must be informed about the nature of the research, the procedures to be used, the
expected benefits, potential risks, stresses, and alternatives. The participants must be
aware what is expected from them. It is essential to choose participants who are
competent to give consent. Should a participant be incompetent because of a disease,
mental status, or emergency, a designated person may provide consent if it is in the
best interest of the participant.
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It is essential to bear in mind ethical issues, including voluntary participation
in interviews and surveys, informed consent, confidentiality, absence of harm,
anonymity, and the assessment of relevant components. Voluntary participation
means that all participants take part in the research of their own free will. They are
free to withdraw their participation at any time they want without any negative
impact on their future involvement in similar services or programs. After leaving the
program or service, the participants are assured of being under no pressure.
Explanations and reasons for quitting are not required. Informed consent means that
all participants get full information about the research, its purpose, aims and
objectives. In addition, they are to be informed about the use of the research findings
and all the potential impacts of their participation, as well as the people who will
have access to these findings. The key purpose of informed consent is that all
participants should be able to decide whether to take part in the evaluation or not. In
case of need, additional information should be provided during the participation.
Confidentiality means that no identifying information will be available to
others or accessible to anyone. It ensures that the information about participants will
be excluded from any reports or documents. Absence of harm means that participants
will be not subjected to any physical or psychological harm that can be in the form of
anxiety, stress, pain, privacy invasion, and others. Anonymity is stricter than privacy
and confidentiality. It means that the participant‟s identity remains unknown to the
whole research team. Anonymity is difficult to achieve, for as participants are
usually known in the context of social research. The assessment of relevant
components refers to cases which are relevant to the program. It is essential to keep
evaluations simple and to stay focused on the intention of the evaluation. However,
Bryman and Bell (2007) state that it is vital to recall the following principles of
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ethical considerations: absence of harm, respect for the research participants‟ dignity,
full consent from the participants, protection of the privacy of the research
participants, adequate levels of confidentiality, anonymity of individuals, elimination
of misleading information, honest and transparent communication, etc.
According to Kimmel (2007), ethical aspects of any research should be
addressed in the following way:


Participants should be informed before being involving in the study;



No sample group members should be subjected to coercion;



Participants‟ privacy should be ensured, together with the guarantee
that no personal data of the respondents will be further distributed;
and



Participants should be repeatedly informed about the research aims
and objectives in the process of collecting primary data.

In using the qualitative and quantitative methods of research and the analysis
of primary data. I maintained high ethical standards during the whole research
process. It is vital to follow ethical norms, since they are relevant to the research‟s
integrity (Bryman & Bell, 2007). The sources used for the data collection were
properly cited and referenced to avoid plagiarism. In addition, the study does not
violate the ethical principles stated by Diener and Grandall (2007), including doing
harm to respondents, privacy invasion, and deception. The participants are provided
with all kinds of confidentiality. Because the research was based on the views and
experience of audit and client firms, they were assured of continued anonymity to
feel them more comfortable and not afraid of providing reliable information even if it
were negative. Anonymity gave the participants more security and made them speak
openly about their auditing experiences.
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CHAPTER 5: IAASB AUDIT QUALITY FRAMEWORK SURVEY RESULTS

5.1 Introduction
The frequency tables below reveal the demographic characteristics of the
sample.

5.2 Respondents Background
Table 3 - Age Groups of Survey Respondents
Age Groups
18 to 24
25 to 34
35 to 44
45 to 54
65 to 74
Total

Frequency Percentage
10
66
33
9
2
120

8.3
55.0
27.5
7.5
1.7
100.0

Cumulative
Percentage
8.3
63.3
90.8
98.3
100.0

Table 3 indicates the frequency of the age brackets for the respondents. From
this table, it can be seen that the respondents in the range of 18 to 24 are 8.3% of
total respondents. The respondents in the range of 25 to 34 years are 55% of the total
respondents. The respondents who were in the range of 35 to 44 are 27.5% of the
total respondents. From the frequency table, it can be observed the respondents in the
range of 45 to 54 years of age accounts for 7.5% of the total. The respondents in the
range of 65 to 74 years of age are 1.7% of the total respondents in the survey. This
puts 82.5% of the respondents in the range of 25 to 44 years old. Only 9% are at least
45 years old and 8% are between 18 and 24 years old.
Table 4 - Distribution of Age among the Sampled Groups of Participants
Age

Sampled Participants
Big 4 Mid-tier Professionals

Total

87

<34 Yrs
≥34 Yrs
Total

23
31
22
4
21
22
27
52
44
*Pearson Chi-Square p-value is 0.011

76
47
123

The p-value of the chi-square test (chi-square=8.954) is p = 0.011, less than
the 5% level of significance. This implies that the age distributions of subjects
within the three sampled populations are significantly different. The proportion of
younger persons (< 34 years old) among the Big 4 respondents is significantly higher
than the corresponding proportions among the other two groups of respondents.
Table 5 – Gender of Survey Respondents
Frequency Percentage
24
20.0
96
80.0
120
100.0

Female
Male
Total

In terms of gender, the proportion of the male respondents was 80% of the
total. The proportion of the female respondents was 20% of the total (Table 03).
Table 6 - Distribution of Gender among the Sampled Groups of Participants
Sampled Participants
Big 4 Mid-tier Professionals
5
9
10
22
42
32
27
51
42
*Pearson Chi-Square p-value is 0.743

Gender
Female
Male
Total

Total
24
96
120

The p-value of the chi-square test (chi-square=0.594) is p = 0.743, greater
than the 5% level of significance. This implies that the gender distributions of
subjects within the three sampled populations are not significantly different.
Table 7 - Distribution of Ethnicity among the Sampled Groups of Participants
Ethnicity
Arabs
Non-Arabs
Total

Big
16
11
27

Sampled Participants
4 Mid-tier Professionals
4
20
48
24
52
44

Total
40
83
123
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*Pearson Chi-Square p-value is 0.000
The p-value of the chi-square test (chi-square=26.758) is p = 0.000, less than
the 5% level of significance. This implies that the distribution of ethnic groups
within the three sampled populations are significantly different. There is a
significantly higher proportion of non-Arabs among the mid-tier respondents than
among the other two groups of respondents.
Table 8 - Distribution of Academic Qualification among the Sampled Groups of
Participants
Academic qualifications
Frequency Percentage
Undergraduate degree(s)
52
43.3
Postgraduate degree(s)
64
53.3
Other
4
3.3
Total
120
100.0

Table 8 indicates the proportion of the respondents in terms of the highest
academic qualifications. From the frequency table, it can be observed that 43.3% of
respondents have obtained an undergraduate degree, 53.3% of the respondents have
obtained a postgraduate degree and 96.6% of the respondents have obtained relevant
certification.
Table 9 - Distribution of Highest Academic Qualifications Attained among the
Sampled
Groups of Participants
Sampled Participants
Big 4 Mid-tier Professionals Total
Undergraduate degree and other
19
19
18
56
Postgraduate degree
8
32
24
64
Total
27
51
42
120
*Pearson Chi-Square p-value is 0.017
Academic qualifications

The p-value of the chi-square test (chi-square=8.155) is p = 0.017, less than
the 5% level of significance.

This implies that the academic qualification

distributions of subjects within the three sampled populations are significantly
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different. There is a higher proportion of undergraduate degree holders among the
Big 4 respondents than among the other two groups of respondents.
Table 10 - Distribution of Remuneration of Survey Respondents
Remuneration, including benefits:
Less than AED 20,000
AED 21,000 - AED 30,000
AED 31,000 - AED 50,000
More than AED 50,000
Total

Frequency Percentage
65
54.2
24
20.0
16
13.3
15
12.5
120
100.0

Cumulative
Percentage
54.2
74.2
87.5
100.0

The frequency table 10 indicates the rate of remuneration, including benefits.
Those who receive less than AED 20,000 represent 54.2% of the total respondents.
The respondents who receive a salary in the range of AED 21,000 to AED 30,000
represent 20% of the total respondents in the survey. The proportion of the total
respondents who receive a salary between AED 31,000 and AED 50,000 is 13.3% of
the total respondents in the survey. The proportion of the respondents who receive a
salary of more than AED 50,000 is 12.5% of the total respondents. A majority of the
respondents, amounting to 74.2%, receive a salary less than AED 30,000.
Table 11 - Distribution of Remuneration among the Sampled Groups of Participants
Sampled Participants
Big 4 Mid-tier Professionals
Less than AED 20,000
15
35
15
AED 21,000 - AED 30,000
4
11
9
AED 31,000 - AED 50,000
5
3
8
More than AED 50,000
3
2
10
Total
27
51
42
*Pearson Chi-Square p-value is 0.013
Remuneration, including benefits:

Total
65
24
16
15
120

The p-value of the chi-square test (chi-square=16.125) is p = 0.013, less than
the 5% level of significance. This implies that the remuneration distributions of
subjects within the three sampled populations are significantly different. The
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respondents from the Professionals group appear to have higher salaries than the
respondents from the other two groups.

Table 12 - Organization Size of Survey Respondents

Fewer than 20 employees
21 - 50 employees
51 - 100 employees
More than 100 employees
Total

Frequency Percentage
19
15.8
17
14.2
7
5.8
77
64.2
120
100.0

Cumulative
Percentage
15.8
30.0
35.8
100.0

Table 12 displays the distribution of the sizes of the respondents‟ work
organizations. From the frequency table, it can be seen that the proportion of the
respondents who said that their organization had fewer than 20 employees is 15.8%
of the total. Respondents who worked in organizations employing 21 to 50 workers
formed 14.2% of the total respondents. The respondents who worked in
organizations with 51 to 100 employees made up 5.8% of the total respondents.
Finally the respondents who worked in organizations with more than 100 employees
composed 64.2% of the total respondents.
Table 13 - Distribution Based on Organization Size among the Sampled
Group of Participants
Sampled Participants
Big 4
Mid-tier Professionals
1
28
17
26
24
27
27
52
44
*Pearson Chi-Square p-value is 0.000

Size of Organization
< 100 employees
>100 employees
Total

Total
46
77
123

The p-value of the chi-square test (chi-square=19.131) is p = 0.000, less than
the 5% level of significance. This implies that the distributions of the organization
sizes in the three sampled populations are significantly different. The Big 4
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companies emerged as significantly greater in size as the organizations of the other
two types of respondent.
Table 14 - Distribution of Survey Respondent by Emirates

Abu Dhabi
Dubai
Sharjah
Ajman
Ras Al Khaima
Total

Frequency Percentage
78
65.0
34
28.3
6
5.0
1
.8
1
.8
120
100.0

Table 14 indicates the proportions of residents of the Emirates. From the
frequency, it can be observed that 65% of the respondents resided in Abu Dhabi, and
28.3% resided in Dubai. The proportion of the total who reside in Sharjah was 5% of
the total respondents in the survey. The proportions of the total respondents who
were residents of Ajman and Ras Al Khaima made up 0.8% of the total respondents.
This shows that the respondents who resided in Abu Dhabi occupied the largest
group of all the respondents in the survey.
Table 15 - Distribution of Survey Respondent by Years of Audit Experience
≤ 3 Yrs
4-6 Yrs
7-10 Yrs
11-15 Yrs
≥16 Yrs
Total

Frequency
23
29
26
29
16
123

Percentage
18.7
23.6
21.1
23.6
13.0
100.0

Cumulative Percentage
18.7
42.3
63.4
87.0
100.0

Table 15 indicates the length of the respondents‟ total audit experience in
years. From the frequency, it can be observed that the respondents with three years
of experience or less represented 18.7% of the total. The proportion of the
respondents who had from four to six years of experience was 23.6%. The range of
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the respondents who had from seven to ten years of experience was 21.1%. The
range of the respondents who had from eleven to fifteen years of experience was
23.6%. The range of the respondents who had have sixteen years of experience or
more was 13%.
Table 16 - Distribution of Years of Audit Experience among the Sampled Group of
Survey Participants
Total Audit Experience
Big
≤ 3 Yrs
10
4 -6 Yrs
8
7-10 Yrs
4
11-15 Yrs
5
≥16 Yrs
0
Total
27
*Pearson Chi-Square p-value is 0.008

Sampled Participants
4
Mid-tier Professionals
9
4
16
5
11
11
9
15
7
9
52
44

Total
23
29
26
29
16
123

The p-value of the chi-square test (chi-square=20.866) is p = 0.008, less than
the 5% level of significance. This implies that the distributions of the total years of
experience of subjects within the three sampled populations were significantly
different. The sampled respondents from the Professionals appear to have had more
audit experience than the other respondents from the Big 4 and the Mid-tier
companies.
Table 17 - Distribution of Survey Respondents by Year of Audit Experience in the
UAE

≤ 3 Yrs
4 -6 Yrs
≥ 7 Yrs
Total

Frequency
48
28
44
120

Percentage
40.0
23.3
36.7
100.0

Cumulative
Percentage
40.0
63.3
100.0

Table 17 indicates the ranges of the total audit experience in the UAE in
years. From the frequency, it can be observed that the respondents with three years
or less of experience in the UAE represent 40% of the total respondents. The
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proportion of the respondents who had from four to six years of experience was
23.3%. The range of the respondents who had more than seven years of experience in
the UAE was 36.7%.
Table 18 - Distribution of Survey Respondents by Year of Audit Experience in the
UAE among the Sampled Groups of Participants
Sampled Participants
Big 4 Mid-tier Professionals
13
24
11
11
6
11
3
21
20
27
51
42
*Pearson Chi-Square p-value is 0.003

UAE Experience
≤ 3 Yrs
4 -6 Yrs
≥ 7 Yrs
Total

Total
48
28
44
120

The p-value of the chi-square test (chi-square=16.13) is p = 0.003, less than
the 5% level of significance. This implies that the distributions of the years of
experience in the UAE of the subjects within the three sampled populations were
significantly different. The Big 4 respondents had a higher proportion with relatively
little experience in the UAE (< 3 years) while the Professionals occupied a higher
proportion with a longer experience (> 7 years).

5.3 Reliability Analysis
This section looks at the results of the survey. First the reliability of the
questionnaire will be evaluated (Bhattacharya, 1979). The normality test will also be
examined to determine whether the data follow a normal distribution (DeAngelo &
DeAngelo, 2007). This is because one assumption of the analysis of variance is that
the data follow a normal distribution.
Table 19 - Reliability Statistics of Audit Quality Framework
Case Processing Summary

Cases

Valid
Excluded a
Total

N
89
34
123

%
72.4
27.6
100.0
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Case Processing Summary
N
%
Cases
Valid
89
72.4
a
Excluded
34
27.6
Total
123
100.0
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha
.975

N of Items
46

From the reliability analysis, it can be observed that the value of the
Cronbach alpha is 0.975, which is substantially larger than 0.7, the ad-hoc minimum
value of alpha to conclude the internal consistency of the 46 items. (Baker, Powell, &
Veit, 2002). This implies that the variables are reliable.

5.4 Results for Input Factors
5.4.1 Inputs – Values, Ethics, and Attitudes
Table 20 - Factor Analysis of Inputs – Values, Ethics, and Attitudes Communalities
Initial
Engagement level: public interest, integrity, objectivity, 1.000
independence, professional skepticism, competence and
due care In audits conducted by NON-Big4 firms on
SME clients
Firm level: independence and “tone at the top.” In audits 1.000
conducted by NON-Big 4 firms on SME clients
Firm level: audit quality on audits conducted by NON- 1.000
Big 4 firms on SME clients
Firm level: Financial considerations in audits conducted 1.000
by NON-Big 4 firms on SME clients
Firm level: technical support in audits conducted by 1.000
NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Firm level: The firm promotes a culture of consultation 1.000
in audits conducted by NON-Big 4 firms on SME clients
Firm level: client acceptance in audits conducted by 1.000
NON-Big 4 firms on SME clients
National level: Ethics in audits conducted by NON-Big 1.000
4 firms on SME clients

Extraction
.675

.733
.787
.765
.772
.562
.639
.746
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National level: Regulators in audits conducted by NONBig 4 firms on SME clients
National level: information relevant to client acceptance
decisions is shared between audit firms in audits
conducted by NON-Big 4 firms on SME clients
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

1.000

.577

1.000

.154

Table 21 - Component Matrix of Inputs – Values, Ethics, and Attitudes
Component
1
.822

Engagement level: public interest, integrity, objectivity,
independence, professional skepticism, competence and due
care in audits conducted by NON-Big 4 firms on SME
clients
Firm level: independence and “tone at the top.” In audits
conducted by NON-Big 4 firms on SME clients
Firm level: audit quality in audits conducted by NON-Big 4
firms on SME clients
Firm level: Financial considerations In audits conducted by
NON-Big 4 firms on SME clients
Firm level: technical support in audits conducted by NONBig 4 firms on SME clients
Firm level: The firm promotes a culture of consultation in
audits conducted by NON-Big 4 firms on SME clients
Firm level: client acceptance in audits conducted by NONBig 4 firms on SME clients
National level: Ethics in audits conducted by NON-Big 4
firms on SME clients
National level: Regulators in audits conducted by NON-Big
4 firms on SME clients
National level: Information relevant to client acceptance
decisions is shared between audit firms in audits conducted
by NON-Big 4 firms on SME clients
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

.856
.887
.875
.878
.750
.800
.864
.759
.393

Table 22 - Total Variance Explained of Inputs – Values, Ethics, and Attitudes
Component

1
2
3
4
5
6

Extraction Sums of Squared
Initial Eigen values
Loadings
% of
Cumulative
% of
Cumulative
Total Variance
%
Total Variance
%
6.410
64.100
64.100
6.410
64.100
64.100
.937
9.371
73.471
.636
6.361
79.832
.431
4.309
84.141
.421
4.206
88.347
.372
3.716
92.063

96

7
8
9
10

.269
2.691
94.754
.232
2.319
97.073
.158
1.581
98.654
.135
1.346
100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

The responses to all 10 questions were scored and factor analyzed for the
three groups. Based on Kaiser‟s criterion, which retains factors with variances
greater than or equal to one, all the items loaded on one factor for the three groups, as
shown in Table 22. The extracted factor explained 64.1% of the total variance of the
10 items. Moreover, the factor explained large fractions of the individual variance of
the items (greater than 60%), except for the 10th item where 15.6% of the variability
is accounted for by the extracted factor (Table 20). The value of the Cronbach alpha
for the 10 items about values, ethics, and attitude is 0.93, which indicates a high level
of internal consistency.
Table 23 - Test of Homogeneity of Variances of Inputs – Values, Ethics, and
Attitudes
Levene
Statistic
1.641

df1
2

df2
104

Sig.
.199

The result of Levene‟s test of homogeneity of the variances of factor 1 scores
within the three groups of respondents is 0.199, which is greater than 0.05. This
means that the variability is not significantly different across the three groups of
respondents. The untransformed factor scores as well as the square root and the
logarithm transforms of the scores are not normally distributed. The p-values of the
Shapiro-Wilk test of the ANOVA standardized residuals are 0.00, 0.00, and 0.00
respectively; see Table 24. Due to the fact that normality was not achieved, ANOVA
on the ranks of the factor scores was used to compare the responses (Inputs: values,
ethics, and attitudes) of the three groups.
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Table 24 - Tests of Normality of Inputs – Values, Ethics, and Attitudes
Kolmogorov-Smirnova
Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic df
Sig. Statistic df
Sig.
.121 107 .001
.946
107
.000

Standardized Residual for
Inputs: Values, Ethics, and
Attitudes
Standardized Residual for
.112 107 .002
.939
Square Root Input Values
Ethics
Standardized Residual for
.120 107 .001
.915
LOG Input Values Ethics
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

107

.000

107

.000

Table 25 - ANOVA Rank of Inputs: Values Ethics and Attitudes
Sum of
Squares
Between Groups 40576.483
Within Groups
61369.017
Total
101945.500

Df
2
104
106

Mean Square
20288.241
590.087

F
34.382

Sig.
.000

Table 25 shows the analysis of variance on the ranks of Inputs: values,
ethics, and attitudes, the value of the F test is 34.382 which has a significance value
of 0.000, below the 0.05 level of confidence. This implies that there is a significant
difference in the mean. Therefore, it can be confidently concluded that there are
significant differences between the mean scores of the Big 4, mid-tier, and
professionals groups.
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Table 26 - Tests of Between Subjects Effects - Dependent Variable: Rank of Inputs:
Values, Ethics, and Attitudes
Source

Type III Sum
of Squares
60757.275a
66148.120
4145.964
1461.495
3243.729
5471.443
1079.052
867.165
1713.326
2250.406

Df
18
1
1
1
3
5
1
1
1
4

Mean Square
F
3375.404
7.212
66148.120 141.328
4145.964
8.858
1461.495
3.123
1081.243
2.310
1094.289
2.338
1079.052
2.305
867.165
1.853
1713.326
3.661
562.602
1.202

Corrected Model
Intercept
Sampled Population
Gender
Remuneration
Firm Size
Age Groups
Demographics
Size
Total Audit
Experience
Error
41188.225
88
468.048
Total
413957.500
107
Corrected Total
101945.500
106
a. R Squared = .596 (Adjusted R Squared = .513)

Sig.
.000
.000
.004
.081
.082
.048
.133
.177
.059
.316

Table 26 shows the results of the general linear model of the dependent
variable ranks of inputs: values, ethics, and attitudes versus the sample group
indicator (Sampled Population) while controlling for all the other variables (gender,
remuneration, firm size, age, demographics, organization size, and audit experience).
The p-value of the sample population while controlling for all these variables was
0.004. This implies that there is significant difference in the mean. Therefore, it can
confidently be concluded that there is significant difference in the mean responses of
the Big 4, mid-tier, and professional groups while controlling for all other factors.
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Figure 10 Mean Average Between Sampled Participants – Input: Values, Ethics, and
Attitude

From the above graph we can note that the mean average of mid-tier auditors
is higher than the mean average of the Big 4 and Professionals. This shows that the
perception of the Mid-tier auditors to the values, ethics and attitude in audits
conducted by NON-Big 4 firms for SMEs is higher than the perception of Big 4
auditors and professionals for audits done by NON-Big 4 firms for SMEs.
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5.4.2 Inputs – Knowledge, Experience and Time
Table 27 - Factor Analysis of Inputs – Knowledge, Experience and Time
Communalities
Initial Extraction
Engagement level: partners and staff have necessary 1.000
.700
competence in audits conducted by NON-Big 4 firms on
SME clients
Firm level: sufficient time in audits conducted by NON-Big 1.000
.564
4 firms on SME clients
Firm level: engagement teams are properly structure in 1.000
.678
audits conducted by NON-Big 4 firms on SME clients
Firm level: appraisals and coaching and on the job training 1.000
.617
in audits conducted by NON-Big 4 firms on SME clients
Firm level: sufficient training is give in audits conducted 1.000
.732
by NON-Big 4 firms on SME clients
National level: partners and staff have sufficient time to 1.000
.706
deal with difficult issues as they arise in audits conducted
by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
National level: robust arrangements exist for licensing 1.000
.612
audit firms/individual auditors in audits conducted by
NON-Big 4 firms on SME clients
National level: education requirements are clearly defined 1.000
.735
and training is adequately resourced in audits conducted by
NON-Big 4 firms on SME clients
National level: arrangements exist for briefing auditors on 1.000
.623
current issues and for providing them training in new
accounting, auditing or regulatory requirements in audits
conducted by NON-Big 4 firms on SME clients
National level: the auditing profession is well positioned to 1.000
.487
attract and retain high quality individuals in audits
conducted by NON-Big 4 firms on SME clients
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
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Table 28 - Component Matrix of Inputs – Knowledge, Experience and Time
Component
1
Engagement level: partners and staff have the necessary
.837
competence in audits conducted by NON-Big 4 firms on SME
clients
Firm level: sufficient time is allocated in audits conducted by
.751
NON-Big 4 firms on SME clients
Firm level: engagement teams are properly structured in audits
.824
conducted by NON-Big 4 firms on SME clients
Firm level: appraisals, coaching, and on the job training are given
.786
in audits conducted by NON-Big 4 firms on SME clients
Firm level: sufficient training is given in audits conducted by
.856
NON-Big 4 firms on SME clients
National level: partners and staff have sufficient time to deal with
.840
difficult issues as they arise in audits conducted by NON-Big 4
firms on SME clients
National level: robust arrangements exist for licensing audit
.782
firms/individual auditors in audits conducted by NON-Big 4
firms on SME clients
National level: education requirements are clearly defined and
.857
training is adequately resourced in audits conducted by NON-Big
4 firms on SME clients
National level: arrangements exist for briefing auditors on
.789
current issues and for providing them with training in new
accounting, auditing or regulatory requirements in audits
conducted by NON-Big 4 firms on SME clients
National level: the auditing profession is well positioned to
.698
attract and retain high quality individuals in audits conducted by
NON-Big 4 firms on SME clients
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Table 29 - Total Variance Explained of Inputs – Knowledge, Experience and Time
Component

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Extraction Sums of Squared
Initial Eigen values
Loadings
% of
Cumulative
% of Cumulative
Total Variance
%
Total Variance
%
6.454
64.541
64.541
6.454 64.541
64.541
.832
8.316
72.857
.671
6.706
79.563
.487
4.872
84.435
.443
4.431
88.867
.350
3.499
92.366
.285
2.850
95.216
.184
1.840
97.057
.169
1.688
98.744
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10
.126
1.256
100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

The responses to all 10 questions were scored and factor analyzed for the
three groups. Based on Kaiser‟s criterion, which retains factors with variances
greater than or equal to one, all the items loaded on one factor for the three groups as
shown in Table 29. The extracted factor explained 64.54% of the items‟ total
variance. Moreover, the extracted factor also explains 48.7% to 73.5% of the
variances of individual items (Table 27). The value of the Cronbach alpha for the 10
items about knowledge, experience and time is 0.938, which indicates a high level of
internal consistency.
Table 30 - Test of Homogeneity of Variances of Inputs – Knowledge, Experience
and Time
Levene
Statistic
.767

df1
2

df2
98

Sig.
.467

The result of Levene‟s test of homogeneity of the variances of factor 1 scores
within the three groups of respondents is 0.467, which is greater than 0.05. This
means that the variability is not significantly different across the three groups of
respondents. The Shapiro-Wilk test of the normality p-value of the factor scores is
0.195, which is higher than 0.05. This means that the normality of the factor scores is
achieved.
Table 31 - Tests of Normality of Inputs – Knowledge, Experience and Time
Kolmogorov-Smirnova
Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic df
Sig. Statistic
df
Sig.
Standardized Residual .086 101 .063
.982
101
.195
for the Inputs of
Knowledge
Experience Time
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic df
Sig. Statistic
df
Sig.
Standardized Residual .086 101 .063
.982
101
.195
for the Inputs of
Knowledge
Experience Time
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction
Table 32 – ANOVA Inputs: Knowledge, experience and time

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of
Squares
37.858
62.142
100.000

Df
2
98
100

Mean Square
F
18.929
29.852
.634

Sig.
.000

Table 32 shows the analysis of variance on the inputs of knowledge,
experience, and time, the value of the F test is 29.852, which has a significance value
of 0.000, less than the 0.05 level of confidence. This implies that there is significant
difference in the mean. Therefore, it can confidently be concluded that there are
significant differences between the mean responses of subjects from the Big 4, midtier, and professionals groups.
Table 33 - Tests of Between Subjects Effects - Dependent Variable – Inputs:
Knowledge, Experience and Time
Source

Type III Sum
of Squares
Corrected Model
58.553a
Intercept
.093
Sampled Population
3.252
Gender
2.690
Remuneration
1.896
Firm Size
6.961
Age Groups
1.811
Demographics
2.039
Size
1.985
Total Audit
2.111
Experience
Error
41.447
Total
100.000
Corrected Total
100.000

df
18
1
1
1
3
5
1
1
1
4

Mean Square
3.253
.093
3.252
2.690
.632
1.392
1.811
2.039
1.985
.528

82
101
100

.505

F
6.436
.183
6.435
5.322
1.250
2.754
3.584
4.034
3.927
1.044

Sig.
.000
.670
.013
.024
.297
.024
.062
.048
.051
.390
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Source

Type III Sum
of Squares
df
Mean Square
F
a
Corrected Model
58.553
18
3.253
6.436
Intercept
.093
1
.093
.183
Sampled Population
3.252
1
3.252
6.435
Gender
2.690
1
2.690
5.322
Remuneration
1.896
3
.632
1.250
Firm Size
6.961
5
1.392
2.754
Age Groups
1.811
1
1.811
3.584
Demographics
2.039
1
2.039
4.034
Size
1.985
1
1.985
3.927
Total Audit
2.111
4
.528
1.044
Experience
Error
41.447
82
.505
Total
100.000
101
Corrected Total
100.000
100
a. R Squared = .586 (Adjusted R Squared = .495)

Sig.
.000
.670
.013
.024
.297
.024
.062
.048
.051
.390

Table 33 shows the results of the general linear model of the dependent
variable of inputs: knowledge, experience, and time versus respondent‟s group (the
sampled population) while controlling for all the other variables (gender,
remuneration, firm size, age, demographics, organization size, and audit experience).
The P-value of the sample population while controlling for all these variables was
0.013, which is a significant value lower than the 0.05 level of confidence. This
implies that there is significant difference in the mean. Therefore, it can confidently
be concluded that there is significant difference in the mean responses of the Big 4,
mid-tier, and professional groups while controlling or all other factors.
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Figure 11 Mean Average between Sampled Participants – Input: Knowledge,
Experience, and Time

From the above graph we can note that the mean average of Mid-tier auditors
is higher than the mean average of Big 4 and Professionals. This shows that the
perception of Mid-tier auditors to knowledge, experience and time in audits
conducted by NON-Big 4 firms for SMEs is higher than the perception of Big 4
auditors and professionals for audits done by NON-Big 4 firms for SMEs.
5.4.3 Inputs – Audit Process and Quality Control Procedures
Table 34 - Factor Analysis of Inputs – Audit Process and Quality Control Procedures
Communalities
Initial Extraction
Engagement level: auditing standards, laws, makes use of 1.000
.768
IT, has effective interaction with internal auditors and
management, supplies proper documentation in audits
conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Firm level: the audit methodology in audits conducted by 1.000
.783
NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
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Firm level: professional skepticism in audits conducted by
NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Firm level: effective supervision and review of audit work
in audits conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Firm level: audit documentation in audits conducted by
NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Firm level: rigorous quality control procedures in audits
conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Firm level: quality control reviews in audits conducted by
NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
National level: auditing standards are promulgated in
audits conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
National level: bodies responsible for external audit
inspections consider relevant attributes of audit quality in
audits conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
National level: effective systems exist for investigating
allegations of audit failure and taking disciplinary action
in audits conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

1.000

.721

1.000

.675

1.000

.685

1.000

.825

1.000

.758

1.000

.761

1.000

.600

1.000

.617

Table 35 - Component Matrix of Inputs – Audit Process and Quality Control
Procedures
Component
1
Engagement level: auditing standards, laws, makes use of IT,
.876
has effective interaction with internal auditors and
management, supplies proper documentation in audits
conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Firm level: the audit methodology in audits conducted by
.885
NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Firm level: professional skepticism in audits conducted by
.849
NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Firm level: effective supervision and review of audit work in
.822
audits conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Firm level: audit documentation in audits conducted by
.828
NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
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Firm level: rigorous quality control procedures in audits
conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Firm level: quality control reviews in audits conducted by
NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
National level: auditing standards are promulgated in audits
conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
National level: bodies responsible for external audit
inspections consider relevant attributes of audit quality in
audits conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
National level: effective systems exist for investigating
allegations of audit failure and taking disciplinary action in
audits conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

.908
.871
.872
.774

.786

Table 36 - Total Variance Explained of Inputs – Audit Process and Quality Control
Procedures
Component

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Extraction Sums of Squared
Initial Eigen values
Loadings
% of Cumulative
% of
Cumulative
Total Variance
%
Total Variance
%
7.194
71.938
71.938
7.194
71.938
71.938
.757
7.566
79.504
.483
4.825
84.330
.376
3.758
88.088
.295
2.947
91.034
.268
2.679
93.713
.225
2.251
95.964
.175
1.745
97.709
.132
1.320
99.029
.097
.971
100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

The responses to all 10 questions were scored and factor analyzed for the
three groups. Based on Kaiser‟s criterion, which retains factors with variances
greater than or equal to one, all the items loaded on one factor for the three groups, as
shown in Table 36. The extracted factor explained 71.94% of the total variance of
the 10 items. Moreover, the extracted factor also explained 60% to 82.5% of the
variances of individual items (Table 34).The value of the Cronbach alpha for the 10
items about audit process and quality control procedures is 0.955, which indicates a
high level of internal consistency.
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Table 37 - Test of Homogeneity of Variances of Inputs – Audit Process and Quality
Control Procedures
Levene
Statistic
df1
df2
Sig.
1.487
2
96
.231
The result of Levene‟s test of homogeneity of the variances of factor 1 scores
within the three groups of respondents is 0.231, which is greater than 0.05. This
means that the variability is not significantly different across the three groups of
respondents. The Shapiro-Wilk test of the normality p-value of the factor scores is
0.587, which is higher than 0.05. This means that the normality of the factor scores is
achieved.
Table 38 - Tests of Normality of Inputs – Audit Process and Quality Control
Procedures
Kolmogorov-Smirnova
Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic Df
Sig. Statistic
df
Sig.
Standardized Residual for
.084
99
.084
.989
99
.587
Inputs: Audit Process and
Quality Control Procedures
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

Table 39 - ANOVA - Inputs: Audit Process and Quality Control Procedures

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of
Squares
33.546
64.454
98.000

Df
2
96
98

Mean Square
16.773
.671

F
24.982

Sig.
.000

Table 39 shows the analysis of variance on inputs: audit process and quality
control procedures. The value of the F test is 24.982, which has a significance value
of 0.000, less than the 0.05 level of confidence. This implies that there is significant
difference in the mean. Therefore, it can confidently be concluded that there are
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significant differences between the mean scores of the Big 4, mid-tier, and
professionals groups.

Table 40 - Tests of Between Subjects Effects - Dependent Variable: Inputs Audit
Process and Quality Control Procedures
Source

Type III Sum
Mean
of Squares
Df
Square
F
a
Corrected Model
56.618
18
3.145
6.081
Intercept
.805
1
.805
1.557
Sampled Population
1.296
1
1.296
2.506
Gender
2.369
1
2.369
4.579
Remuneration
1.726
3
.575
1.112
Firm Size
8.851
5
1.770
3.422
Age Groups
.535
1
.535
1.035
Demographics
1.295
1
1.295
2.503
Size
.922
1
.922
1.783
Total Audit
1.273
4
.318
.615
Experience
Error
41.382
80
.517
Total
98.000
99
Corrected Total
98.000
98
a. R Squared = .578 (Adjusted R Squared = .483)

Sig.
.000
.216
.117
.035
.349
.007
.312
.118
.186
.653

Table 40 above shows the results of the general linear model of the dependent
variable inputs: audit process and quality control procedures versus the group
indicator (Sampled Population) while controlling for all the other variables (gender,
remuneration, firm size, age, demographics, organization size, and audit experience).
The p-value of the sample population, while controlling for all these variables, is
0.117, which is significant at the 15% level, but not at the 5% level of confidence.
However, there is some evidence that the differences between the mean responses of
the three groups of respondents are not due to confounding factors (i.e., the control
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variables in Table 40), although this evidence is not conclusive (0.05 < p-value <
0.15). This implies that we cannot rule out the possibility that the significant
difference in the means between the groups is caused by the other factors.
Figure 12 Mean Average between Sampled Participants – Input: Audit Process and
Quality Control Procedures

From the above graph we can infer that the mean average of mid-tier auditors
is higher than the mean average for the Big 4 and Professionals groups. This shows
that the perception among mid-tier auditors of the audit process and quality control
procedures in audits conducted by NON-Big 4 firms for SMEs is higher than the
perception among Big 4 auditors and professionals for audits done by NON-Big 4
firms for SMEs.
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5.5 Results for Output Factors
Table 41 - Factor Analysis of Output Communalities
Initial Extraction
Engagement level: delivered on time to the 1.000
.746
shareholders in audits conducted by NON-Big4
firms on SME clients
Engagement level: delivered on time to those 1.000
.844
charged with governance and management in
audits conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME
clients
Engagement level: delivered on time to the 1.000
.812
regulators in audits conducted by NON-Big4 firms
on SME clients
Firm level: there are sufficient reports from those 1.000
.723
charged with governance in audits conducted by
NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
National level: audit regulators provide 1.000
.559
information on individual audits in audits
conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Table 42 - Component Matrix of Output Factors
Component
1
Engagement level: delivered on time to the shareholders
.864
in audits conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Engagement level: delivered on time to those charged
.919
with governance and management in audits conducted by
NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Engagement level: delivered on time to the regulators in
.901
audits conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Firm level: there are sufficient reports from those charged
.850
with governance in audits conducted by NON-Big4 firms
on SME clients
National level: audit regulators provide information on
.748
individual audits in audits conducted by NON-Big4 firms
on SME clients
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Table 43 - Total Variance Explained of Output Factors
Component
Initial Eigen values

Extraction Sums of Squared
Loadings
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% of
Cumulative
% of Cumulative
Total Variance
%
Total Variance
%
1
3.683
73.666
73.666
3.683 73.666
73.666
2
.674
13.476
87.142
3
.330
6.603
93.745
4
.224
4.481
98.226
5
.089
1.774
100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
The responses to all 5 questions were scored and factor analyzed for the three
groups. Based on Kaiser‟s criterion, which retains factors with variances greater than
or equal to one, all the items loaded on one factor for the three groups as shown in
Table 43. The extracted factor explained 73.67% of the total variance of the 10
items. Moreover, the extracted factor also explained 55.9% to 84.4% of the variances
of individual items (Table 41).The value of the Cronbach alpha for the 5 items about
audit outputs is 0.908, which indicates a high level of internal consistency.
Table 44 - Test of Homogeneity of Variances of Output Factors
Levene
Statistic
2.336

df1
2

df2
94

Sig.
.102

The result of Levene‟s test of homogeneity of the variances of factor 1 scores
within the three groups of respondents is 0.102, which is greater than 0.05, implying
that the variability is not significantly different across the three groups of
respondents. The Shapiro-Wilk test of normality p-value of the factor scores is 0.59,
which is higher than 0.05. This means that the normality of the factor scores is
achieved.
Table 45 - Tests of Normality of Output Factors

Standardized Residual
for Outputs

Kolmogorov-Smirnova
Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic df
Sig. Statistic df
Sig.
*
.059
97 .200
.989
97
.590
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a. Lilliefors Significance Correction
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance.
Table 46 – ANOVA of Output Factors

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of
Squares
13.735
82.265
96.000

df
2
94
96

Mean
Square
6.867
.875

F
7.847

Sig.
.001

Table 46 shows the analysis of variance on outputs. The value of the F test is
7.85, which has a significance value of 0.001, below the 0.05 level of confidence.
This implies that there is a significant difference in the mean. Therefore, it can
confidently be concluded that there are significant differences between the mean
scores of the Big 4, mid-tier, and professionals groups.
Table 47 - Tests of Between Subjects Effects - Dependent Variable - Output Factors
Source

Type III Sum
of Squares
Corrected Model
49.643a
Intercept
.244
Sampled Population
2.781
Gender
1.686
Remuneration
1.245
Firm Size
13.907
Demographics
3.184
Age Groups
5.431
Size
1.734
Total Audit
8.496
Experience
Error
46.357
Total
96.000
Corrected Total
96.000

Df
18
1
1
1
3
5
1
1
1
4

Mean Square
2.758
.244
2.781
1.686
.415
2.781
3.184
5.431
1.734
2.124

78
97
96

.594

F
4.641
.411
4.679
2.837
.699
4.680
5.358
9.138
2.917
3.574

Sig.
.000
.523
.034
.096
.556
.001
.023
.003
.092
.010

The table above shows the results of the general linear model of the
dependent variable outputs versus the group indicator (sampled population) while
controlling for all other variables (gender, remuneration, firm size, age,
demographics, organization size, and audit experience). The P-value of the sample
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population while controlling for all these variables was 0.034, which is a significant
value lower than the 0.05 level of confidence. This implies that there is significant
difference in the mean. Therefore, it can confidently be concluded that there is
significant difference in the mean responses of the Big 4, mid-tier, and professional
groups while controlling for all other factors.
Figure 13 Mean Average between Sampled Participants – Outputs Factors

From the above graph we can infer that the mean average of mid-tier auditors
is higher than the mean average of the Big 4 and professionals group. This shows
that the perception among mid-tier auditors of the output in audits conducted by
NON-Big 4 firms for SMEs is higher than the perception among Big 4 auditors and
professionals of audits done by NON-Big 4 firms for SMEs.
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5.6 Results for Interaction Factors
Table 48 - Factor Analysis of Interaction Communalities

Auditors ensure effective interaction between them and
management, those charged with governance, users and
regulators in audits conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME
clients
Management has enough interaction with those charged
with governance, regulators and users in audits conducted
by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Those charged with governance, e.g. audit committees,
have effective interaction with regulators and users in
audits conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Regulators have enough interaction with users of audited
financial statements in audits conducted by NON-Big4
firms on SME clients
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Initial
1.000

Extraction
.802

1.000

.850

1.000

.794

1.000

.768

Table 49 - Component Matrix of Interaction Factors
Component
1
Auditors have effective interaction between them and
.895
management, those charged with governance, users and regulators
in audits conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Management has enough interaction with those charged with
.922
governance, regulators and users in audits conducted by NONBig4 firms on SME clients
Those charged with governance, e.g. audit committees, have
.891
effective interaction with regulators and users in audits conducted
by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Regulators have enough interaction with users of audited financial
.876
statements in audits conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME
clients
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Table 50 - Total Variance Explained of Interaction Factors
Component
Initial Eigen values

Extraction Sums of Squared
Loadings
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% of Cumulative
% of Cumulative
Total Variance
%
Total Variance
%
1
3.213
80.333
80.333
3.213 80.333
80.333
2
.405
10.133
90.466
3
.246
6.140
96.606
4
.136
3.394
100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
The responses to all 4 questions were scored and factor analyzed for the three
groups. Based on Kaiser‟s criterion, which retains factors with variances greater than
or equal to one, all the items loaded on one factor for the three groups as shown in
Table 50. The extracted factor explained 80.33% of the total variance of the four
items. Moreover, the extracted factor also explained 76.8% to 85% of the variances
of individual items (Table 48). The value of the Cronbach alpha for the 4 items about
audit interactions is 0.916, which indicates a high level of internal consistency.
Table 51 - Test of Homogeneity of Variances of Interaction Factors
Levene
Statistic
2.384

df1
2

df2
93

Sig.
.098

The result of Levene‟s test of homogeneity of the variances of factor 1 scores
within the three groups of respondents is 0.098, which is greater than 0.05, meaning
that the variability is not significantly different across the three groups of
respondents. The untransformed factor scores as well as the square root and the
logarithm transforms of the scores are not normally distributed. The p-values of the
Shapiro-Wilk test of the ANOVA standardized residuals are 0.017, 0.022, and 0.015
respectively; see Table 52. Due to the fact that normality was not achieved, ANOVA
on the ranks of the factor scores was used to compare the responses (Interactions) of
the three groups.
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Table 52 - Tests of Normality of Interaction Factors
Kolmogorov-Smirnova
Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic
df
Sig. Statistic df Sig.
.109
96
.007 .967
96 .017

Standardized Residual for
Interactions
Standardized Residual for Square
.116
Root Interaction
Standardized Residual for LOG
.126
Interaction
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

96

.003

.969

96

.022

96

.001

.966

96

.015

Table 53 - ANOVA Rank of Interaction Factors

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of
Squares
12701.608
59879.392
72581.000

df
2
93
95

Mean
Square
6350.804
643.864

F
9.864

Sig.
.000

Table 53 shows the analysis of variance on the ranks of interactions the value
of the F test is 9.86, which has a significance value of 0.000, less than the 0.05 level
of confidence. This implies that there is a significant difference in the mean.
Therefore, it can confidently be concluded that there are significant differences
between the mean scores of the Big 4, mid-tier, and professional groups.

Table 54 - Tests of Between Subjects Effects Dependent Variable: Rank of
Interactions
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept

Type III Sum
of Squares
33974.979a
56214.780

df
18
1

Mean
Square
1887.499
56214.780

F
3.765
112.121

Sig.
.000
.000
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Sampled
2501.115
1
2501.115
4.988
Population
Gender
502.663
1
502.663
1.003
Remuneration
2279.454
3
759.818
1.515
Firm Size
5720.953
5
1144.191
2.282
Age Groups
2798.453
1
2798.453
5.582
Demographics
230.536
1
230.536
.460
Size
1690.588
1
1690.588
3.372
Total Audit
7327.048
4
1831.762
3.653
Experience
Error
38606.021
77
501.377
Total
298397.000
96
Corrected Total
72581.000
95
a. R Squared = .468 (Adjusted R Squared = .344)

.028
.320
.217
.055
.021
.500
.070
.009

Table 54 shows the results of the general linear model of the dependent
variable interactions versus the sample group indicator (sampled population) while
controlling for all the other variables (gender, remuneration, firm size, age,
demographics, organization size, and audit experience). The p-value of the sample
population while controlling for all these variables was 0.028, which is a significant
value lower than the 0.05 level of confidence. This implies that there is significant
difference in the mean. Therefore, it can confidently be concluded that there is
significant difference in the mean responses of the Big 4, mid-tier, and professional
groups while controlling for all other factors.
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Figure 14 Mean Average between Sampled Participants – Interactions Factors

From the above graph we can note that the mean average of mid-tier auditors
is higher than the mean average of the Big 4 and professional groups. This shows
that the perception among mid-tier auditors of the interaction in audits conducted by
NON-Big 4 firms for SMEs is higher than the perception among Big 4 auditors and
professionals of audits done by NON-Big 4 firms for SMEs.
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5.7 Results for Contextual Factors
Table 55 - Factor Analysis of Contextual Communalities

Business practices and commercial law are well established
in audits conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Laws and regulations relating to financial reporting are clear
in audits conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
There is an applicable financial reporting framework in
audits conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Corporate governance rules are established and clear in
audits conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Information systems are used and adequate in audits
conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
There is a clear financial reporting timetable in audits
conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Cultural factors affect the audit in audits conducted by NONBig4 firms on SME clients

Initial

Extraction

1.000

.756

1.000

.779

1.000

.551

1.000

.634

1.000

.777

1.000

.641

1.000

.929

Table 56 - Component Matrix of Contextual Factors
Component
1
2
Business practices and commercial law are well established in .861
-.120
audits conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Laws and regulations relating to financial reporting are clear in .882
-.015
audits conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
There is an applicable financial reporting framework in audits .742
.015
conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Corporate governance rules are established and clear in audits .787
.120
conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Information systems are used and adequate in audits conducted .879
-.069
by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
There is a clear financial reporting timetable in audits .709
.372
conducted by NON-Big4 firms on SME clients
Cultural factors affect the audit in audits conducted by NON- -.205
.942
Big4 firms on SME clients
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
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Table 57 - Total Variance Explained of Contextual Factors
Component

Extraction Sums of Squared
Loadings
% of
Cumulative
Total
Variance
%
4.007
57.240
57.240
1.059
15.135
72.375

Initial Eigen values
% of
Cumulative
Total Variance
%
1
4.007 57.240
57.240
2
1.059 15.135
72.375
3
.596
8.515
80.890
4
.512
7.311
88.201
5
.371
5.294
93.495
6
.239
3.415
96.909
7
.216
3.091
100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

The factor analysis of the responses to the 7 questions extracted two factors.
With the exception of the last question relating to culture, the loadings of the
remaining questions on the first extracted factor were similar. The first factor
explained 57.24% of the variance and the second factor explained 15.14% of the
variance, making a total of 72.38%. The first factor is closely correlated with the
variables that measure contextual factors; these are called “Contextual Factors”. The
second factor is highly correlated with the last variable, which is named “culture”
because this is what it measures. The value of the Cronbach alpha for the 7 items
about audit outputs is 0.894, which indicating a high level of internal consistencies.
Table 58 - Test of Homogeneity of Variances of Contextual Factors
Levene
Statistic
2.271

df1
2

df2
92

Sig.
.109

The result of Levene‟s test of homogeneity of variance of Factor 1 scores
resulted in a p-value = 0.109 which is greater than 0.05; this means that the
variability is not significantly different across the three groups of respondents. The
untransformed factor scores as well as the square root and the logarithm transforms
of the scores are not normally distributed. The p-values of the Shapiro-Wilk test of
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the ANOVA standardized residuals are 0.02, 0.007, and 0.001 respectively; see
Table 59. Due to the fact that normality was not achieved, ANOVA on the ranks of
the factor scores was used to compare the (contextual) responses of the three groups.
Table 59 - Tests of Normality of Contextual Factors
KolmogorovSmirnova
Statistic Df Sig.
Standardized Residual for
.107
95 .010
Contextual factors
Standardized Residual for
.123
95 .001
Square Root Contextual
Standardized Residual for
.112
95 .005
LOG Contextual
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic df
Sig.
.968
95
.020
.962

95

.007

.948

95

.001

Table 60 - ANOVA Rank of Contextual Factors

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of
Squares
12504.638
58808.362
71313.000

df
2
92
94

Mean
Square
F
Sig.
6252.319 9.781 .000
639.221

Table 60 shows the analysis of variance on the ranks of contextual factors the
value of the F test is 9.781 which has a significance value of 0.000, less than the 0.05
level of confidence. This implies that there is significant difference in the mean.
Therefore, it can confidently be concluded that there are significant differences
between the mean scores of the Big 4, mid-tier, and professional groups.
Table 61 - Test of Homogeneity of Variances – Culture Variable
Levene
Statistic
3.023

df1
2

df2
92

Sig.
.054

The result of Levene‟s test of homogeneity of the variances of factor 2 scores
resulted in a p-value of 0.054, which is greater than 0.05, indicating that the
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variability is not significantly different across the three groups of respondents. The
Shapiro-Wilk test of normality p-value of the factor scores is 0.882, which is higher
than 0.05. This means that the normality of the factor scores is achieved.
Table 62 - Tests of Normality of Culture Variable
Kolmogorov-Smirnova
Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic df
Sig. Statistic df
Sig.
*
.071
95 .200
.993
95
.882

Standardized Residual
for Culture
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

*. This is a lower bound of the true significance.
Table 63 - ANOVA – Culture Variable

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of
Squares
5.150
88.850
94.000

Mean
Square
2.575
.966

df
2
92
94

F
2.666

Sig.
.075

Table 63 shows the analysis of variance on culture. The value of the F test is
2.67 which has a significance value of 0.075, more than the 0.05 level of confidence.
This implies that there is no significant difference in the mean. Therefore, it can
confidently be concluded that there are no significant differences between the mean
scores of the Big 4, mid-tier, and professional groups.

Table 64 - Tests of Between Subjects Effects Dependent Variable: Culture
Source

Type III Sum
of Squares
Corrected Model
18.980a
Intercept
3.000
Sampled Population
.001
Gender
.456
Remuneration
.102
Firm Size
8.576
Age Groups
.125
Demographics
.710

df
18
1
1
1
3
5
1
1

Mean
Square
1.054
3.000
.001
.456
.034
1.715
.125
.710

F
1.068
3.040
.001
.462
.035
1.738
.127
.720

Sig.
.400
.085
.971
.499
.991
.136
.723
.399
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Size
.063
1
.063
.064
Total Audit
1.627
4
.407
.412
Experience
Error
75.020
76
.987
Total
94.000
95
Corrected Total
94.000
94
a. R Squared = .202 (Adjusted R Squared = .013)

.801
.799

Table 64 shows the results of the general linear model of the dependent
variable of contextual factors versus the sample group indicator (Sampled
Population) while controlling for all the other variables (gender, remuneration, firm
size, age, demographics, organization size, and audit experience). The P-value of the
sample population while controlling for all these variables was 0.971. This implies
that the significant difference in the mean between the groups is caused by the other
factors.
Figure 15 Mean Average between Sampled Participants – Contextual Factors
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From the above graph we can note that the mean average of mid-tier auditors
is higher than the mean average of the Big 4 and professional groups. This shows
that the perception among mid-tier auditors of contextual factors excluding culture in
audits conducted by NON-Big 4 firms for SMEs is higher than the perception among
Big 4 auditors and professionals of audits done by NON-Big 4 firms for SMEs.
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS – INPUT
FACTORS

6.1 Introduction
Chapter 5 showed the results of the surveys of the three different groups
concerning the input factors that are grouped as follows: 1- Values, Ethics, and
Attitudes, 2- Knowledge, Experience and Time, and 3- Audit Process and Quality
Control Procedures. These surveys were undertaken to see if they all perceived audit
quality similarly in relation to the input elements of the Audit Quality Framework.
The present chapter focuses on the analysis of input factors and discusses the results
of the survey, relating these findings to the findings from the interviews. This chapter
is also intended to contextualize the overall discussion of the input factors by
situating the findings in debates within auditing. Each input factor is analyzed
independently to examine if there is a difference in the perception of audit quality
within SMEs in the UAE between the three groups.
This chapter‟s theoretical contribution lies in measuring the differences in the
perceptions of audit quality in SMEs in the UAE between the Big 4, mid-tier, and
professional groups.
This chapter is organized as follows: after this introduction, input variables
are grouped into three sub-areas, namely; Input 1 (values, ethics, and attitudes),
Input 2 (knowledge, experience and time), and Input 3 (audit process and quality
control procedures).

127

6.2 Input Factors
6.2.1 Inputs – Values, Ethics, and Attitudes
The concept of values, ethics and attitude is a very broad topic that has been
discussed in the literature from different angles, spanning different industries. In
general, ethics is defined as ―the systematic study of conduct based on moral
principles, reflective choices, and standards of right and wrong conduct‖
(Onyebuchi, 2011, p. 275, cited in Wheelwright, 1959). Ethical behavior is also
defined in relation to consequentialism, whereby professionals make choices based
on the consequences of the alternative actions that they take (Onyebuchi, 2011).
Ethics as a theme has been one of the prominent topics covered by regulatory bodies
and professional institutes, such as the International Federation of Accountants This
and the auditors‟ role in relation to it has gained particular prominence in the wake of
financial scandals. For example, professional auditors are obliged to comply with the
Code of Ethics of the profession, such as that issued by IFAC (InternationalFederation-of-Accountants, 2010). IFAC‟s Code of Ethics covers general areas such
as integrity, objectivity, professional competence, due care, and confidentiality. The
Code of Ethics also covers areas that impact on the public, such as appointments,
conflicts of interest, second opinions, fees, non-audit services, marketing, gifts,
custody of clients‟ assets, and independence. The Code of Ethics covers areas that
impact on the business as well such as the preparation of information, sufficient
expertise, financial interests, and inducements. It has been argued that because the
Code of Ethics is very detailed, it leaves less room for professionals to make
uneducated choices (Onyebuchi, 2011).
Professional ethical requirements make clear the underlying principles and
specific requirements expected of professionals. It is the task of regulators and
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professional accountancy organizations to ensure that those ethical principles are
clear and understandable.
In this dissertation, the survey focused, among other things, on the issue of
professional ethics as among the attributes influencing audit quality, under the
subtheme “input factors”. The survey responses about values, ethics, and attitudes
have an alpha reliability coefficient of 0.93 which indicates a high level of internal
consistency. This suggests that these survey items provide reliable measurements of
the participant‟s perceptions of the value, ethics and attitude dimensions in audit
quality. Moreover, these survey items, with possibly the exception of information
relevant to client acceptance decisions at the national level which had low
communality are adequately summarized by the factor scores used to compare the
perceptions of the three groups (tables 20 -22). This means that values, ethics, and
attitudes was seen as a meaningful construct in relation to audit quality even after
controlling for the participants‟ characteristics (gender, remuneration, firm size, age,
demographics, size, and experience), the three groups differed significantly in their
perceptions of those input factors (Table 26). Moreover, as shown in Table 25, there
is a significant difference in the perception of these input factors relating to
knowledge, experience and time between the three groups that were surveyed. As is
evident from Figure 10, which compares the mean average of the responses to the
sample groups, it is evident that the Big 4 and the professional firms have
approximately similar views of the quality of audits done by mid-tier and local firms
for SMEs in the UAE. These views were more negative than those of the mid-tier
firms, who have more confidence in the quality of their own work and that of other
mid-tier firms. This implies that different groups evaluate these input factors
differently, which is in line with the claim put forward that supports Hypothesis H1:
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The perception of audit quality in mid-tier audit firms‘ dealings with SMEs among
Big 4 auditors, mid-tier auditors and professionals varies according to input factors
relevant to values, ethics, and attitude.
The survey findings were also supported by the interviewees‟ responses.
Most of the interviewees mentioned that maintaining high ethical standards is
required by the International Auditing Standards (IAS). Ethical standards were very
closely linked to audit quality. Interviewees who were asked if auditors are
performing their work in accordance with IASs responded differently;
―They are bound to do so…they should do so… based on the
professional ethics they should do so. But as to the actual practice,
again based on my experience, I can say that sometimes they tend to
be more loose, especially when they are familiar with the client and
they know probably that there is nothing wrong with the client, so
they tend to be loose sometimes.‖ (Male, Accounts Supervisor Manufacturing, Ex Big 4, CPA qualified) .
Although ethical standards were deemed useful by most researchers and
available frameworks, discussions over what happens in practice were less
enthusiastic. Most interviewees had less confidence in the ethics of some audit
firms and/or some individual auditors even on the staff of the Big 4.
―Yes, I confirm that there are some audit firms who do not do the
bare minimum to issue financial statements.‖ (Male, Financial
Controller - Trading, Ex Big 4, CPA qualified).
Distinctions were made, however, between the firms and their size, with
the Big 4 claiming more ethical conduct. There was a focus on the fact that the
audit practice is heavily based on individual characteristics, as opposed to firm
characteristics. As is clear from the extract below, the ethics of a practice is
questioned by some individuals, even practices by the Big 4 firms.
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―In the Big Four, you have to remember one thing: at the end of the
day, the -- the --the audit is a service provider -- the -- the big firms.
So, it depends on the people. Some partners within the Big Four, are
extremely ethical. And they will follow it, black or white. Some other
partners are more on the grey area. Like, care about the fees. So you
don't know what you're getting.‖ (Male, CFO – Real Estate, Ex Big 4,
CPA qualified).
The above quotation highlights the need for auditors to have high ethical
standards as required by the IAS, as well as revealing that professionals do not
believe that all auditors in the UAE maintain these high ethical standards. From their
perspective, some auditors are actually “loose” and immoral from an ethical point of
view. This is aligned with survey results. Table 27 makes it evident that there is a
difference in the perception of ethical values between the different groups.
Many reasons were cited for the professional auditors‟ lack of ethics, for
example, in issues of independence, when some auditors showed over-familiarity
with the client, as well as being very fee focused regardless of other considerations.
The findings of this dissertation confirm what has been discussed in the auditing
literature in relation to audit quality. For example, Carey & Simnett (2006) mention
that independence is not always maintained when the auditor had enjoyed a longer
tenures. Other researchers, contrariwise, argue that there are more reporting failures
in the earlier years of a firm‟s engagement (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002); (Ghosh
& Moon, 2005). Patel & Prasad (2013) also argue that low-balling audit fees causes
an increased supply of non-audit services and claim that this occurs more often in
Non Big 4 firms than in Big 4 firms, which greatly affects audit quality.
According to Hayes, Dassen, Schilder, & Wallage (2005) there are several
characteristics that are associated with the ethical behavior of auditors. They are
illustrated in the figure below.
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Figure 16 - Ethical Principles

(Hayes et al., 2005)
Overall, most interviewees suggested that the ethical behavior of auditors in
the UAE is unacceptably low, sometimes offering comparisons with other countries.
When asked to speculate on the reasons for this, they tended to link it to the
demographics of the country and the transitory nature of the audit workforce. There
are very few UAE citizens who are qualified and working in this industry. Some of
the labor force in the UAE is imported on a seasonal basis by certain firms only
during the audit season. This raises issues of loyalty:
―loyalty becomes a bit on the shady side‖ (Male, Director, Big 4,
ICAEW qualified).
The issue of loyalty and its link to ethics as observed by respondents is in line
with the arguments put forward by Hayes et al. (2005), who argued that ethical
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behavior is linked to being a responsible citizen and the loyalty of individuals to their
environment.
Another major factor that was mentioned by most interviewees was linked to
their belief that auditors in this region are particularly commercially driven. This,
they claimed, has greatly influenced their ethical behavior because they focus mainly
on maintaining good relations with their clients and/or increasing their fees
regardless of the consequences. Audit firms sometimes work for the same clients for
a long time at reduced fees to keep them loyal. In these circumstances interviewees
have discussed the fact that less and less audit work and procedures get performed
and that, even though the audit fees are low, the profitability of these engagements is
very high because very much less time is spent on them. Yet, as some other
interviewees hinted, if an audit client is susceptible to an increase in fees, the audit
firm is prepared to spend more time on the engagement, but still would be more
willing to work with the client to justify letting questionable things pass. These
interviewees discussed how auditors were able to act in a very careless way due to
the absence of functioning governance practices in place to hold them accountable.
Although there are rules and ethical guidelines in place to regulate how
auditors should behave, no enforcement of these rules is found. This applies
particularly to the question of who is allowed to practice audit and how. Monitoring
the composition and the behavior of audit teams, in small and medium firms in
particular is problematic in the region. This was a sentiment echoed by many
interviewees:
―Unfortunately, the economy here is very commercially driven,
meaning there is no ethical boundaries, everyone just wants to save
some money and then leave. And that demographic, is based on the
fact that it's a lot of expatriates that are coming here and looking at it
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from a commercial perspective instead of an ethical job. And when
you have that mindset, you basically don't care. You're just gonna go
do the job and go home. Get your cash, and go.‖ (Male, CFO – Real
Estate, Ex Big 4, CPA qualified).
Another interviewee linked the poor quality to the commercial aspect of the
industry:
―As per my personal opinion and what I‘ve seen, I think yes, it is
more of a commercial work. They just try to finish it off soon, to go to
the next client or to finish other assignments.‖ (Male, Financial
Controller - Defense, Ex Big 4, ICAEW qualified).
Commenting specifically on the composition of audit teams, one respondent
commented on the lack of proper certification to carry out external audits and its
impact on quality:
―Let say, it depends of course on the company, actually I‘ve seen
people having a CIA Certified Internal Audit certificate, which are
allowed to do external audit and sign it. From my point of view this is
not right; Certified Internal Audit doesn‘t relate [to] anything for
external audit.‖ (Male, Chief Accountant - Investment, Ex mid-tier
firm)
The critical issue here is that this has damaged the industry‟s reputation in the
country and audit is no longer being looked at positively by the organizations that are
being audited. The management staff in these organizations get their financial
statements audited only when they require an audit from a bank and/or a government
body. And they get the Big 4 firms to audit their accounts if they want to show more
reliability in financial matters to obtain bigger loans and better facilities. When
interviewees were asked to deliberate on this, one of the respondents shook his head
and simply said:
―There is no respect --- there is no respect to the auditor‖. (Male,
CFO – Real Estate, Ex Big 4, CPA qualified).
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These comments were common amongst many interviewees. One of them,
who has international experience in the field, mentioned that the audit profession is
not as respected in the UAE as it is elsewhere.
―to answer your question, they do not respect auditors the way that
abroad -- international, and other more developed and more mature
industries look at the auditor. The auditor is really respected there
and he's looked at as [a] professional. Here, he's looked at as a
service provider and that's it.‖ (Male, CFO – Real Estate, Ex Big 4,
CPA qualified).
An interviewee explained in detail how the actions of a few can ruin the
reputation of an industry and gave the example of the ENRON scandal and how
negatively it impacted around the world on the industry as a whole.
―But obviously as an industry, as a profession, it‘s disastrous for us,
because it ruins the reputation of all the firms.‖ (Male, Director, Big
4, ICAEW qualified).
In November 2015, a conference was organized by the Abu Dhabi
Accountability Authority which convened more than 15 leaders of the public sector in
the Middle East and North Africa in association with the IFA to discuss what was
labeled as “intruders”. In this conference the audit practice was criticized heavily for
admitting intruders to the profession; the President of ADAA, Mr. Riyad Al Mubarak,
called all associations to come forward with ways to monitor the profession more
closely. This was a public statement that was endorsed by a number of the
profession‟s leaders, who acknowledged this weakness in the profession and
highlighted its importance and severity (Jamal, 2015).
The audit industry is not being perceived with respect, as evidenced by the
fees that organizations are willing to pay to audit firms. These fees are very low,
according to people experienced in the field, as shown in Table 65, Chapter 8,
because of the negative reputation that they bear in the market, and also because of
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the availability of some local and mid-tier firms who are willing to do the job for a
fraction of the price charged by the Big 4.
6.2.2 Inputs – Knowledge, Experience and Time
In this section, knowledge, experience and time variables, emphasize the
professional knowledge that auditors have in a particular industry. This knowledge
can be acquired through education and professional certification and through
experience. It is safe to assume that the more experienced an auditor is in a subject
area, the less time s/he needs to perform its audit procedures. These three traits are
very closely interlinked as can be seen from the basic definition of the word
knowledge as ―Facts, information, and skills acquired through experience or
education; the theoretical or practical understanding of a subject‖ (Oxford
University Press, 2015, p. 1). Meadow et al. (2007) define knowledge as a justified
true belief that depends on community acceptance through valid information
collected from multiple sources. Auditors who perform particular audit procedures
should be well aware of the reasons for selecting a particular testing method and
rejecting others. They need to be fully aware of the risks that are entailed in
noncompliance with any of the internal controls that should be in place. All the Big 4
firms have acknowledged the importance of such specialized industry experts; this is
evident from the structure of audit firms which have specialized teams in different
industries.
The survey responses about knowledge, experience and time have an alpha
reliability coefficient of 0.938 which indicates a high level of internal consistency.
This suggests that these survey items provide reliable measurements of the
participant‟s perceptions of the ethics dimension in audit quality relevant to
knowledge, experience and time. Moreover, these survey items are adequately
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summarized by the factor scores used to compare the perceptions of the three groups
(Tables 27-29). This means that knowledge, experience and time was seen as a
meaningful construct in relation to audit quality even after controlling for the
participants‟ characteristics (gender, remuneration, firm size, age, demographics,
size, and experience), the three groups differed significantly in their perceptions of
those input factors (Table 33). Moreover, as shown in Table 32, there is a significant
difference in the perception of these input factors relating to knowledge, experience
and time between the three groups that were surveyed. This implies that different
groups value these input factors differently, which supports Hypothesis H2: The
perception of audit quality in mid-tier audit firms‘ dealings with SMEs among Big 4
auditors, mid-tier auditors and professionals varies according to the input factors
relevant to knowledge, experience, and time.
Figure 11 compares the mean average of the responses to the sample groups,
making it clear that the Big 4 firms and professionals have approximately similar
views of the quality of audits undertaken by mid-tier and local firms for SMEs in the
UAE. These views were lower than the mid-tier firms, who have more confidence in
the quality of their own work and that of other mid-tier firms.
The survey findings were largely supported by the interviewees‟ responses,
since most of the interviewees mentioned that having high levels of knowledge,
experience and time was linked to audit quality. The quotations below from
participants reflect many facets of issues linked to audit quality:
Low-balling [undercutting] affects firms cutting costs by sending
smaller and less qualified teams, and ultimately affects audit quality:
―I think, from my experience, from what I‘ve seen with my six years
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here, you know, sometimes when the fee is very low for a firm, they
tend to take shortcuts. And what I mean by shortcuts is maybe they
don‘t adequately resource the audits, so they‘ll have only one
individual, maybe a junior guy, or a junior manager. So sometimes
with a low fee you‘ve probably put inaccurately trained staff, people
are probably unqualified, or managers that don‘t have the relevant -the right experience‖ (Male, Director, Big 4, ICAEW qualified)
Inadequate audit procedures are adopted to resolve time pressure issues, and
they too negative affecting audit quality:
―No, usually they don‘t have enough time to complete their audit.
They manage it by filling and copy pasting.‖ (Male, Financial
Controller - Trading, Ex Big 4, CPA qualified)
The above quotation not only confirms the fact that auditors and professionals in the
UAE market acknowledge the importance of knowledge, experience and time; it also
reveals that professionals do not believe that auditors in the UAE are maintaining
these traits at an acceptable level.
The findings of this research are consistent with discussions in the literature,
whereby audit experience was positively linked to audit fees, notably by Cahan &
Sun (2015). Research has also been extended to link findings to better audit quality
on the basis of the characteristics of the audit partner, such as gender, education,
engagement tenure, and industry specialization. It was noted that audit industry is
closely associated with working longer hours and involves a need to socialize more
with clients or peers, which is perceived as more masculine behavior (Khalifa, 2013).
Education is linked to auditors‟ knowledge and experience by Hambrick & Mason
(1984). Links between industry-specific knowledge and higher quality audits when
the auditor can detect errors and misstatements having proper accruals and/or
reporting matters of concern, have been established in the literature (Bonner, 1990);
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(Solomon, Shields, & Whittington, 1999); (Owhoso, Messier, & Lynch, 2002);
(Low, 2004); and (Nagy, 2014).
6.2.3 Inputs - Audit Process and Quality Control Procedures
The third element of input factors concerns the audit process, and quality
control procedures. Audit Process is a very important and complicated aspect of
performing audits (International-Auditing-and-Assurance-Standards-Board, 2013).
According to ISA 220, an engagement quality control review is defined as “A
process designed to provide an objective evaluation, on or before the date of the
auditor‘s report, of the significant judgments the engagement team made and the
conclusions it reached in formulating the auditor‘s report. The engagement quality
control review process is only for audits of financial statements of listed entities and
those other audit engagements, if any, for which the firm has determined an
engagement quality control review is required.‖ Audit firms which adopt proper
audit processes in performing their work assure the shareholders and other
stakeholders of the usefulness of the financial statements and their credibility. Firms
which have a proper audit process in place, translated in an audit methodology, can
ensure their compliance with laws, regulations, internal controls, codes of best
practice, and international accounting standards. That said, it can be argued that the
audit process is not a systematic process since it is subject to many individual
judgments, for example in identifying audit risk and levels of materiality. However,
having a clear audit process in place helps systemize the audit cycle from the
accepting of an audit engagement to identifying the audit program that is most
appropriate for each client and finally issuing a proper audit opinion on the financial
statements.
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According to Hayes et al. (2005), there are four basic phases of an audit
process, namely:
1. Client acceptance (pre-planning)
2. Planning and design of an audit approach
3. Test of evidence
4. Completion of the audit and issuance of an audit report
Client Acceptance (pre-planning)
In order for an audit firm to accept a client, certain judgments should be made
in advance. Audit firms need to evaluate the client‟s background and inquire into the
reasons for wanting an audit. This helps audit firms identify if there are any risks
associated with a client before accepting the engagement. Audit firms also must
ensure their compliance with all ethical requirements before dealing with any client.
In so doing, the audit firm is required to ask any previous audit firm if it should not
accept the engagement for any reason, such as recourse to litigation, the ethical
values of the company‟s management, and if there were any disagreements over
accounting standards. Lai & Chen (2014) introduce a client acceptance method
(CAM) that helps audit firms evaluate potential clients, given that this approach is
closely correlated with human judgments. McFadden (1999) argues that audit firms
can avoid and manage liability risks and reduce the cost of malpractice insurance if
proper client acceptance procedures are adopted.
Planning and design of an audit approach
The next phase is the planning phase, where audit firms start following a
procedure to understand the entity‟s internal controls and its environment in order to
assess the acceptable levels of materiality that are appropriate for the engagement
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and to prepare the audit program for the engagement. This phase can be done by
performing high level analytical procedures on the financial statements and holding a
number of interviews with the company‟s senior management. The audit program
must ensure that all assertions in the financial statement are covered.
Test of evidence
This is the stage of actual document verification and testing, where auditors
are obliged to gather and document sufficient audit evidence in their files to ensure
that the financial statements represent fairly the financial position of the company
being audited. These tests and examinations can consist of different types of test to
assess different financial assertions. These tests may take the form of controls
testing, substantive testing, and/or analytical procedures.
Completion of the audit and issuance of an audit report
At the completion phase, auditors are must evaluate the governance of the
company being audited and ensure that no material events have taken place
subsequently. A very detailed review of the financials should be made by staff from
different levels. Finally, the findings should be reported to the management and the
board of directors before the signed financial statements are issued.
The survey responses about audit process and quality control procedures have
an alpha reliability coefficient of 0.96 which indicates a high level of internal
consistency. This suggests that these survey items provide reliable measurements of
the participant‟s perceptions of the audit process and quality control procedures
dimension in audit quality. Moreover, these survey items are adequately summarized
by the factor scores used to compare the perceptions of the three groups (Tables 3436). This means that audit process and quality control procedures was seen as a
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meaningful construct in relation to audit quality even after controlling for the
participants‟ characteristics (gender, remuneration, firm size, age, demographics,
size, and experience), the three groups differed significantly in their perceptions of
those input factors (Table 40). Moreover, as shown in Table 39, there is a significant
difference in the perception of these input factors between the three groups that were
surveyed. This implies that different group‟s value these input factors differently
which is also in line with the claim put forward; this validates hypothesis H3: The
perception of audit quality in mid-tier audit firms‘ dealings with SMEs among Big 4
auditors, mid-tier auditors and professionals varies according to the input factors
relevant to audit process and quality controls. Figure 12 compares the mean average
of the responses to the sample groups; it is evident from this that the Big 4 firms and
professionals have approximately similar views of the quality of audits carried out by
mid-tier and local firms for SMEs in the UAE. These views were lower than the midtier firms themselves, who have more confidence in the quality of their work and that
of other mid-tier firms. These results are in line with expectations and prior literature
in the field.
The survey findings were also supported by the interviewees‟ responses and
revealed additional views showing that even Big 4 audit firms have concerns not
only about the mid-tier audit process and quality, but also about the other members
of the Big 4 group. When a director in the Big 4 was asked about the audit quality of
others, he remarked:
―No. My answer‘s ‗no‘. I don‘t think they do. And when I say that,
what I mean is we‘ve won clients. Okay? Which have been done by
another firm. And this is -- this is both. Big Four and small firms as
well, that we‘ve taken over. And we've had such major accounting
issues - that it‘s resulted in restatements, it‘s resulted in significant
audit adjustments, it‘s actually then resulted in bad blood, between us
as an audit firm and our client.‖ (Male, Director, Big 4, ICAEW
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qualified)
As a participant observer in the field of auditing, I faced a similar incident
where the Big 4 firm that I worked for refused an accounting engagement that was
accepted by another firm which took over the same engagement within the year. The
staff of our firm was instructed not to speak of the issue in public because this was a
major issue that was discussed in the local news.
The same respondent highlighted an important aspect:
But I‘m not saying that this is rampant. It could well be, you know -all firms have quality assurances, so maybe those same firms are
doing an excellent audit for other clients.‖ (Male, Director Big 4,
ICAEW qualified).
In my view, and reflecting on my experience both as an auditor for a Big 4
firm and for a smaller firm, or as a finance professional, this is an important twist. It
is certainly true that the Big 4 audit firms are doing high quality work job in most of
their audit engagement in the UAE. However, in certain engagements, when the
client is either important or highly influential, the Big 4 will face the ethical dilemma
of whether to allow some treatments to satisfy the client. These treatments are always
reserved for areas where the accounting standards are not clear, for example, revenue
recognition based on the percentage of completion, as opposed to being based on the
completed contract. However, a firm should take a certain stand and enforce it on all
clients. In these circumstances Big 4 firms tend to be more lenient to satisfy an
influential client. This was evident in the case of one of the Big 4 firms in Abu Dhabi
which did not want to allow a development company to recognize on the basis of the
percentage of completion. This development company drew attention to this in the
media and changed its auditor to another Big 4 firm which was prepared to allow the
use of percentage of completion. Three years later, this firm stopped the practice and
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admitted that the IFRS was not clear; it then took the stand that the first firm had
taken. These events were discussed by one of the interviewees, who mentioned that
this is a local practice which does not influence stock prices.
―The property development group were two months into the audit
when they found out that this company's going to only recognize it
upon completion, to which they said "Okay, thank you for your fees
but we're shifting to the one that recognizes it upon -- on percentage
completion", and they shifted! You have to understand, Ahmed, in this
country, unlike the -- the mature industries in the world, when you
change an auditor, it doesn't influence your stock and your share
market value. In the US, and in London, it's a big deal‖ (Male, CFO –
Real Estate, Ex Big 4, CPA qualified)
Another way that Big 4 firms can tackle this is by adopting higher materiality
levels that would allow a client some flexibility in its records. Big clients are usually
chosen for peer review and hence less margin of error is accepted. In my view, this is
high likely to happen in this region because of the fragile governance framework
over audit firms, which makes the risk of being exposed very slim.
One interviewee mentioned other factors causing these behaviors, such
as the tax free economies that characterize most of the Gulf countries. Being
untaxed tempts most organizations to show higher levels of profit, since profits
are not taxable. The management‟s motives are driven by expectations of
higher bonuses and pay raises. So this interviewee linked the tax regime to
higher governance and controls over the audits:
―I don‘t think that they do it to the extent that they are supposed to do
it because there are no consequences of not doing that, we don‘t have
tax filing in here so they are not really obliged to do it. It‘s mainly
done either to renew a trade license or to take a specific banking
credit limit or whatever it is, so I don‘t think they really do it to the
extent that they supposed to do it and I‘m saying that from either
experience that I had myself with some auditors or from whatever I
have heard from friends and clients who have been audited in UAE‖
(Male, Financial Controller - Trading, Ex Big 4, CPA qualified).
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The issue of some mid-tier audit firms not performing certain audit
procedures before they issue their financial statement was highlighted:
―Yes, I confirm that there are some audit firms who do not do the
bare minimum to issue financial statements‖ (Male, Financial
Controller - Trading, Ex Big 4, CPA qualified).
Furthermore, when I challenged this interviewee that his comment on the
existence of poor audit jobs within the Big 4 was difficult to credit, given the
presence of quality reviews, he told me he believed that very few jobs are audited
and the ones that are picked up for review are mostly known in advance.
―Yeah definitely, because, I don‘t think that they pick more than 5%,
and there are some instances I believe that even they kind of get tips
on which ones are expected to be quality reviewed‖ (Male, Financial
Controller - Trading, Ex Big 4, CPA qualified).

6.3 Conclusions
This chapter showed that the three groups perceived audit quality differently
in relation to the input elements of audit quality. The survey results showed that the
Big 4 auditors and the professionals have more faith in the audit quality of Big 4
audits in terms of input related factors. They believe that Big 4 audit firms hire staff
who have higher values, ethics, attitude, knowledge, and experience. They also
believe that the Big 4 staff have more time to perform their work as well as better
access to audit process and quality control procedures. In the context of the UAE, it
was noted that even though the BIG 4 staff have more knowledge and experience
than the staff in the mid-tier, that did not really translate to higher audit quality as
these auditor held lower values, ethics, and attitudes. The loyalty to the profession in
the UAE is often questioned by interviewees. This was evident in the industry as it
on top of the normal high turn-over rates that the profession undergoes in any
context, the UAE has the added complexity of the temporal nature of its staff, due to
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the short-term contracts that the country has. This is made worse, by the imported
labor into the country by the profession at times of high season (September – May).
Another issue that faces the profession in the UAE, which links to the above
discussed issues, is the subject of the high staff turnover in the due to employees
leaving the country to other western countries after gaining necessary experience.
This is particular noticeable within the Big 4. A big number of auditors in the BIG 4
are from Asia and Middle East. And due to the strong economic and political status
of the UAE, individuals residing in the UAE have better chances to get transferred to
Europe, Canada, Australia, or USA. These auditors take advantage of the BIG 4
policies of internal transfers and the ease of obtaining working visas from the UAE
as compared to their countries. UAE is often referred to as the gate way from Asia
and Middle East to Europe and Americas. Staff interchange or transfer between the
BIG 4 firms is very limited, as there is a „gentlemen‟ agreement amongst them not to
hire from each other. Also, the salary gap between auditors and finance managers in
different industries is quite significant which also encourage auditors to be in
constant search to jump to the industry as it is offering better packages.
Mid-tier professionals had a different stance, believing that when it comes to
auditing SMEs, mid-tier firms are equipped with the proper staff who have high
values, ethics, attitude, knowledge, and experience. They also believe that the midtier staff have more time to perform their work as well as access to the appropriate
relevant SME audit process and quality control procedures. In the context of the
UAE, it was noted that mid-tier auditors do not have similar opportunities of the BIG
4 auditors. That is why they believe that they have higher values, ethics, and attitude
to the profession. They believe that they are more loyal to the profession and staff
turnover in these firms is comparatively lower than the BIG 4. Both BIG 4 and mid-
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tier auditors are aware of the existence of some small audit firms that are not
performing proper audits and they explicitly put these firms aside when they discuss
input factors.
The interviewees added more insights to the survey results; they started to
link the input factors of audit quality to other factors such as commercial aspects of
the audit industry, available resources, demographics, internal quality controls, and
government governance on audit firms. Respondents varied in terms of audit quality
assurance and many issues that face both the Big 4 and mid-tier audit firms were
highlighted.
Many respondents linked quality issues to different elements of the audit
quality framework (e.g. ethics, experience). From the interviews, it appeared that
certain people were more focused on linking quality to fees than others, who were
more concerned about the quality of staff and their education or their loyalty. Some
interviewees gave direct examples. Some were basing their remarks on their
perceptions and what they had heard from the market. Some professionals were not
exposed to the same scenarios as others. In conclusion, it is fair to say that the UAE
should introduce a governing body that governs the audit firms and ensures that
auditors are complying with the rules and regulation associated with this field. The
next chapter will examine the differences between the three groups through
analyzing the output, interaction, and contextual factors in the same way: linking the
results to the existing literature and the interviews that were conducted.
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS – OUTPUT,
INTERACTION AND CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
7.1 Introduction
Chapter 6 focused on the analysis of input factors, linking the results to the
existing literature and to the interviews conducted. Each input factor was analyzed
independently to examine if there were differences between the three groups in the
perception of audit quality within SMEs in the UAE. This Chapter examines these
differences through analyzing the output, interaction, and contextual factors. These
are the factors that are concerned with the audit opinion issued by the audit firm and
the level of interactions that happens between auditors and management or those
charged with governance. All these are being done in a specific contextual factor
encompassing the local laws (for example, the UAE) and specific to its culture
(IAASB, 2013).
This chapter‟s theoretical contribution lies in the fact that it measures the
differences in the perception of audit quality in SMEs in the UAE between the Big 4,
Mid-tier, and Professionals as groups, based on the output, interaction, and
contextual factors in play. It is linked to the extent research. Moreover, a number of
interviews with very highly experienced professionals and auditors are analyzed and
linked to the survey results.

7.2 Output Factor Analysis
From my experience as a participant observer in the field, I infer that
transparency reports such as annual reports and corporate governance reports issued
by organizations and reviewed by audit firms give the users of financial statements
more confidence on the audit firm. These reports highlight key performance
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indicators in more detail and provide higher levels of disclosure, which reflect higher
levels of output. Contrary to the inherent management responsibility for producing
financial statements, the auditors in the UAE tend to informally take on this task and
produce their financial statement mostly for management. The audit reports indicate
that these financial statements were even prepared by the management and are the
responsibility of the management. But it is commonly accepted that auditors take on
this task and professionals tend to assess the quality of an auditor by reviewing
financial statements which are perceived to have been prepared by an auditor.
The survey in the present study covered the issue of output factors as among
the attributes influencing audit quality and a separate variable, due to its importance.
The survey responses about output factors have an alpha reliability coefficient of
0.908 which indicates a high level of internal consistency. This suggests that these
survey items provide reliable measurements of the participant‟s perceptions of the
ethics dimension in audit quality relevant to outputs. Moreover, these survey items
are adequately summarized by the factor scores used to compare the perceptions of
the three groups (Tables 41-43). This means that outputs was seen as a meaningful
construct in relation to audit quality even after controlling for the participants‟
characteristics (gender, remuneration, firm size, age, demographics, size, and
experience), the three groups differed significantly in their perceptions of those
output factors (Table 47). Moreover, as shown in Table 46, there is a significant
difference in the perception of these output factors between the three groups that
were surveyed. This implies that different groups‟ value these output factors
differently, which is also in line with the claim put forward and that supports
hypothesis H4: The perception of audit quality in mid-tier audit firms‘ dealings with
SMEs among Big 4 auditors, mid-tier auditors and professionals varies according to
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the output factors. As evident from Figure 13, which compares the mean average of
the responses to the sample groups, it is evident that the Big 4 firms and the
professionals have approximately similar views of the quality of audits relevant to
the output factors carried out by mid-tier and local firms for SMEs in the UAE.
These views were lower than those among the mid-tier firms, who have more
confidence in the quality of their own work and that of other Mid-tier firms.
When interviewees were asked if they were aware of incidents in which
auditors had signed financial statements containing unqualified opinion, and they
were confident that it was materially misstated, one responded:
―Absolutely, yes. I -- I know because I -- we, have had to restate
financial statements‖ (Male, Director Big 4, ICAEW qualified).
Then interviewees were explicitly asked if they believed that opinion
shopping; existed2. Many did:
―I think it does, I think it‘s very easy to get a clean opinion, I think the
market on our end is not regulated to control damage, there have been
new instances where you find out that there is something which may
have been brought to the attention of the shareholders or mainly used
to be highlighted at the different level but either it is pushed down or
bullied down by the company or just because to keep the contact and
not to lose the client, the auditor is forced to give something that favors
the client‖ (Male, Financial Controller - Manufacturing, Ex Big 4,
ICAEW qualified).
Another respondent said:
―Yes definitely, it would exist, I saw it myself from two different
perspectives, and it‘s either opinion shopping or opinion negotiation.
So if you are still with one of the Big 4, for example, and this is an
example and they come back and tell you that we have to issue a
qualified opinion for a specific reason, depending on your size and
your importance, you can always negotiate in more favorable opinion
On the other side if you are shopping between audit firms you can
definitely get the audit opinion that you want to see on your financial
statement. Now another thing is whether this financial will be
acceptable in front of third party. That‘s another story but you can
2

as defined by Banimahd & Beigi (2012) “is a situation in which clients try to receive
a favorable audit report by switching its audit firms”,
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eventually get the opinion that you want, I believe.‖ (Male, Financial
Controller - Trading, Ex-Big 4, CPA qualified).
Opinion Shopping has always been a controversial issue due to the difficulty
of proving its existence. Banimahd & Beigi (2012) and Krishnan & Stephens (1995)
were among the researchers who showed that opinion shopping did not take place
when companies changed their auditors, as opposed to Lennox(2000), who showed
that some firms did practice opinion shopping in the context of the UK.
Most of the interviewees concurred that they had heard about audit firms that
issued unqualified audit opinions on the financial statements of organizations without
doing even the bare minimum of substantive testing that is required by the Auditing
Standards. Some of the interviewees are wholly convinced that these practices exist
and were very explicit about their existence. They showed discomfort over this
phenomenon, because it is creating very marked disrespect for the audit industry. It is
also creating very unfair competition, from a commercial perspective, between the
audit firms that do not spend enough time on an assignment, unlike respectable audit
firms which allocate highly qualified staff to spend the required time on audit jobs.
Due to the claims that were put forward with regard to audit firms issuing
audit opinions without testing them, the researcher decided to investigate this
phenomenon further, as described in the experiment in Chapter 8. The experiment
was based on the idea of inviting audit firms to audit a financial statement that the
researcher had manipulated. The intention was to see how easily auditors can be
convinced about transactions which do not have any support. The findings in Chapter
8 with regard to this experiment are alarming, for they show that audit firms have
issued unqualified opinions to the submitted financial statements after a single day
and very cheaply.
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7.3 Interaction Factor Analysis
The survey covered the issue of interaction factors among the attributes
influencing audit quality as a separate variable, due to its importance. The survey
responses about interaction factors have an alpha reliability coefficient of 0.916
which indicates a high level of internal consistency. This suggests that these survey
items provide reliable measurements of the participant‟s perceptions of the
interaction dimension in audit quality. Moreover, these survey items are adequately
summarized by the factor scores used to compare the perceptions of the three groups
(Tables 48-50). This means that interactions was seen as a meaningful construct in
relation to audit quality even after controlling for the participants‟ characteristics
(gender, remuneration, firm size, age, demographics, size, and experience), the three
groups differed significantly in their perceptions of those interaction factors (Table
54).Moreover as shown in Table 53, there is a significant difference in the perception
of these interaction factors between the three groups that were surveyed. This
implies that different groups value these interaction factors differently, which is also
in line with the claim put forward and validates hypothesis H5: The perception of
audit quality in mid-tier audit firms‘ dealings with SMEs among Big 4 auditors, midtier auditors and professionals varies according to the interaction factors. As
evident from Figure 14, which compares the mean average of the responses to the
sample groups, the Big 4 firms and the professionals have approximately similar
views of the quality of audits carried out by mid-tier and local firms for SMEs in the
UAE. These views were lower than those of the mid-tier firms, who have more
confidence in the quality of their own work and that of other mid-tier firms.
The interviewees suggested that the interaction between the audit firms and
the management is at an acceptable level for them to perform all the audit
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requirements. In some cases the auditors had to apologize for accepting a new
engagement or withdraw from an existing one due to certain limitations of scope.
However, when it came to the issue of interaction between the auditors and the
regulators, a respondent confirmed that only the Abu Dhabi Accountability Authority
is involved with the auditors who deal with government bodies:
“I believe you have a process now here in Abu Dhabi, whereby all
government accounts, where they‘re audited by audit firms, that work
is scrutinized and reviewed by a regulator. In this case, that‘s the Abu
Dhabi Accountability Authority. So, in my humble opinion, I‘m not
saying the Abu Dhabi Accountability Authority should get involved,
because their mandate is purely for government audits, but you
should have a process whereby you have a regulator in the market,
who oversees the regulatory and supervisory role of all audit firms,
and I‘ll give you two examples: PCAOB, in the US, is responsible for
looking at all US audit firms who are involved in oil companies, and
similarly, in the UK, you have a similar organization, -- that -- you‘ll
have to forgive me, I've forgotten their name, but they‘re the
equivalent, of PCAOB, as well as ADAA. So I think that‘s the only
way you can capture it, because a lot of these clients, who are the
small firms, that, say, are involved, they themselves don‘t have people
in roles who are equipped to understand accounts. And that – which
is why they always engage an auditor to help them‖. (Male, Director
Big 4, ICAEW qualified).
Another respondent had similar views:
“Yes, definitely we do need that, in the Big 4, what I can say is that
they have quality reviews which is basically a people from different
offices of the same audit firm, visits and do quality checks, which I
believe improves or make people take a second look on their files in
order to improve, enhance look at things which are missing here and
there, so that‘s something good to happen, but definitely if there is a
government body, that‘s even better and maybe another thing that can
be done is Big 4 reviewing each other, for example.‖(Male, Financial
Controller - Manufacturing, Ex-Big 4, CPA qualified).
When he was asked if the other firms beside the Big 4 have a review process
in place and whether the government should intervene in governing these firms the
same responded replied:
“No, I think government has to intervene because I don‘t think that
the market will be able to fix it on their own.‖ (Male, CFO Investment, Ex-Big 4, CPA & CIA qualified).
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The views from most respondents were almost the same:
―I believe that the government should develop a body, the body that
should license or which license the audit firm should have a body to
make sure that the local firms are complying with the standards.‖
(Male, CFO - Investment, Ex-Big 4, CPA & CIA qualified).
This respondent, who worked for a small audit firm, confirmed the fact that
he has never encountered any type of quality review:
―At the moment and from my experience, no. I didn‘t see, as I told
you, I worked for 3 years, I did not see even a single guy come in and
[say] ―can I see the file‖ or whatever. I think that we heard, that we
are expecting like that, but till the moment we didn‘t see anything like
that.‖ (Male, Financial Controller - Investment, Ex-Local audit firm).
Most of the interviewees concurred that there was a gap in the audit practice
in the UAE with regard to the interaction between audit firms and the governing
bodies. Most interviewees are willing to have a regulatory body introduced in the
UAE. The failure to have one is described by respondents as a weakness in the audit
practice of the UAE, where firms believe that they can escape unscathed no matter
what they have done, without having to answer to anyone. It goes back to the nature
of the audit work. Each assignment is handled by an audit team of varying size,
depending on the size of the engagement. With time, auditors tend to understand the
way in which their supervisors work and the areas they focus on. Auditors and
management are also critically assessing their supervisors and partners and their
integrity, as one interviewee mentioned:
―Other partners are more on the grey area. Like, care about the fees.
It will depend -- it will a hundred percent depend on the person sitting
across from you.‖(Male, CFO – Real Estate, Ex- Big 4, CPA)
On the basis of such assessment and their perception of the quality of audit
supervisors and partners, junior auditors tend to treat engagements differently. Most
interviewees acknowledged this and asked for a regulatory body of some kind to
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ensure that quality auditing is enforced by a third party, rather than depending on the
integrity of the audit firms.

7.4 Contextual Factor Analysis
The survey covered the issue of contextual factors among the attributes
influencing audit quality as a separate variable, due to its importance. The survey
responses about contextual factors have an alpha reliability coefficient of 0.894
which indicates a high level of internal consistency. This suggests that these survey
items provide reliable measurements of the participant‟s perceptions of the
contextual dimension in audit quality. Moreover, these survey items are adequately
summarized by the factor scores used to compare the perceptions of the three groups
(Tables 55-57). This means that contextual was seen as a meaningful construct in
relation to audit quality even after controlling for the participants‟ characteristics
(gender, remuneration, firm size, age, demographics, size, and experience), the three
groups differed significantly in their perceptions of those contextual factors (Table
63). Moreover, as shown in Table 60, there is a significant difference in the
perception of these contextual factors between the three groups that were surveyed.
This implies that different group‟s value these contextual factors differently, which is
also in line with the claim put forward and that and validates Hypothesis H6: The
perception of audit quality in mid-tier audit firms‘ dealings with SMEs among Big 4
auditors, mid-tier auditors and professionals varies according to the contextual
factors. As evident from Figure 15, which compares the mean average of the
responses to the sample groups, it is evident that the Big 4 firms and the
professionals have approximately similar views of the quality of audits carried out by
mid-tier and local firms for SMEs in the UAE. These views were lower than those of
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the mid-tier firms, who have more confidence in the quality of their own work and
that of other mid-tier firms.
In the context of the GCC and more specifically the UAE, cultural aspects as
a contextual factor are more apparent not only in organizations, but also in the whole
country. The diversity is predictable, since people of more than 200 nationalities live
there. As mentioned earlier, loyalty is a major variable that impacts on audit quality.
The existence of a diversity of nationalities working in the audit industry and the
very low number of UAE nationals working in this industry have raised the concern
of loyalty to the profession among staff among many of the respondents, as emerges
in this response:
“Unfortunately, because of the workloads that our people go through,
I think that also is not conducive to allow you, you know, it doesn‘t
enable nationals to -- to come through the ranks, because they get
offers which are amazing, and which are much less rigorous than the
audit profession, and, nonetheless , there are some UAE nationals
who are thriving. We‘ve seen a couple. Our biggest problem is … the
audit profession is trying to retain those people. Because as soon as
they qualify, they become significantly in demand. Within, within the - the -- the -- the country. So -- so that‘s one point. The point about
the demography of the people working within the firms -- the audit
firms. Yes, it‘s a very transient society. Transient being, you know, the
people are all expats, from all over the world. Sometime have
domination by one sect, or one community. Our firm also is
dominated, predominantly, by certain people, by people from certain
demography, but the difficulty we have in terms of loyalty, which you
asked, an allegiance, is, you see, the -- they're -- in terms of when you
look at the Big 4, there isn‘t much of a muchness, they‘re very much
all the same, when it comes to doing an audit, and, but the problem
all of us have is, as a profession, is our , is our, salaries. And our
packages. And the reality is, we are considered probably the lowest
end --of -- of --of -- all industry.‖ (Male, Director Big 4, ICAEW
qualified).
This respondent believed that UAE nationals should get more involved in this
industry, as he proposed:
―more locals should be involved. More locals should be involved,
starting from scratch and reaching senior levels.‖ (Male, Ex-Big 4,
CFO, CPA qualified).
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When I raised the concern of lower pay than other opportunities might offer
to UAE locals, he explained
―that's what the government comes in. The government should entice
locals to jump into the Big 4 and start from scratch, at high salaries
that are paid by the government. They have to get in, because that's
the only way to add, somewhat accountability to the job, because the
locals is not going anywhere, and it is his reputation at stake, if his
reputation is damaged, he is ruined. So, to a certain extent, he will try
to keep that. (Male, Ex-Big 4, CFO, CPA qualified).
Finally, this respondent commented on the varied cultural mix in the UAE
and its impact on audit quality,
―Knowledge: I would agree with, quality: no. Knowledge, yes,
because they are quite smart and they know IFRS, and they done the
homework on that. But when it comes to quality, I don't think that they
care.‖ (Male, Ex-Big 4, CFO, CPA qualified).

7.5 Conclusions
This chapter showed that the three groups perceived audit quality differently
in relation to the output, interaction, and contextual elements of audit quality. The
survey results showed that the Big 4 auditors and also the professionals, had more
faith in the audit quality of Big 4 audits in terms of output, interaction, and
contextual related factors. They believed that the Big 4 audit firms produced higher
quality audited financial statements and interacted better with management,
regulators, users, and those charged with governance.
Mid-tier professionals had a different stance; they believed that when it came
to auditing SMEs, mid-tier firms were equipped to produce high quality audited
financial statements and interact properly with management, regulators, users, and
those charged with governance.
The interviewees added more insights to the survey results and that was
linked to context of the UAE; they started to link the output, interaction, and
contextual factors of audit quality to other factors. There was a great emphasis on the
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commercial aspects of the audit industry as the profession is seen to be more
commercial in the UAE by comparison to other countries. Another aspect that is
unique to the UAE context is the availability of resources. It was highlighted that a
lot of the auditors get engaged from a number of Asian countries on a part time
assignments during the busy seasons. It was noted that these part time auditors spend
their time looking for a full time job in the UAE rather than spending time in the
audit engagements that they were sourced for, which results in less time spent on
those audits to which their expertise was imported, hence lowering the quality of
audits.
The overall demographics of the auditors in the UAE sheds another light on
the quality of audits in the market of SME‟s. For example, interviewers often cited
that there very few Emarati auditors in relation to other nationalities such as Asians,
Arabs, and Westerners. Respondents believe that the demographics play a major role
to audit quality as the expats were seen as more commercially driven, and not
similarly worried about their reputation in the market as local auditors, since they can
depart from the UAE at any point they chose.
Even that internal quality controls systems are in place in the UAE audit
firms, the adherence to these controls was questioned and majority of the respondents
saw the need for a government authority to govern audit firms. Respondents varied in
terms of audit quality assurance and many issues that face both the Big 4 and midtier audit firms were highlighted. This has helped in validating how Francis
framework that discussed all these factors independently perceived by interviewees
to have interactions with each other as described later in PCAOB and IAASB
framework.
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In my opinion, what allows the variability of audit quality and its varying
perception between different professional groups is the self-regulation of this
industry in the UAE. Each professional group member has a story to tell based on
his/her direct experience and what s/he has encountered during a professional career.
Some professionals are exposed to different scenarios from others.
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CHAPTER 8: THE QUALITY OF AUDITS: EVIDENCE
FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT IN THE UAE

8.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the results of a field experiment in the UAE. The
purpose of the experiment was to find out whether auditors of SMEs are following
auditing standards and good common practice in accepting and conducting an audit.
The main focus of the experiment was on the „client acceptance phase‟ in the
procedure of an audit, since this is the part that can be observed clearly by a
researcher. Besides, given the time constraints and scope of the firms surveyed, the
design of the experiment did not include observing the quality of audits while they
are being conducted.
The audit quality in this chapter is mainly linked to the auditors‟ ability to
follow International Auditing Standards (ISAs) 200, 210, 220, which focus on what
is required in the process of client acceptance. Although the above ISAs were the
focus of the study, in the process of conducting the experiment, it became apparent to
me that audit firms went beyond “client acceptance” and engaged in some audit
activities that were not expected. This made other ISAs also relevant to the
experiment, e.g. nos. 250, 315, 320, 330, 500, 501, 520, 550, 570.
The experiment was designed so that the audit firm was not financially
dependent on the outcome of the experiment. That is to say, the experiment
introduced a simple audit engagement where an audit firm‟s decision to impair its
independence was unlikely, given the insignificant audit fee involved.
The chapter has two main findings; first, that some auditors did report
unreliable financial information which the audit firm would have identified if basic
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audit procedures had been performed, and second, that the quality of audit firms does
vary between different branches of the same firm.

Overall, the results of the

experiment showed that there are major issues with the operation of the market for
auditing SMEs in the UAE. Such issues have major implications for the credibility of
some financial statements when audited, and also for the reputation of auditors
overall.
Regarding acceptance, many firms were ready to accept the engagement and
sometimes offered to take on an audit that was allocated less than 2 days for
completion without asking who the members of the management team were. This
implied that the independence verification was not properly carried out. Moreover,
the audit firm selected to perform the audit did not obtain critical records of the
company even though the ISA require this to enable the auditor to be reasonably sure
whether the latest financial data are free from material misstatement. Since these
records were not requested, I was led to conclude that it would not be accurate to
judge these financial data as free from any material misstatement and could have
been a disclaimer of opinion if these records had been obtained.
It is worth mentioning that although the experiment covered most audit firms
in the SME market in the UAE, the results of such an experiment should not be
generalized to all firms in the same context or to firms of different size.
Following this introduction, the chapter discusses the experimental population from
which a sample was drawn. It also elaborates on the experiment design by explaining
what was involved in the experiment. The chapter also outlines and discusses the
results of the experiment and concludes by reflecting on the ethical considerations
that are specific to this experiment, since this is highly pertinent to a discussion of
the results.
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8.2 Experimental Population and Sample
Since the research aim was to focus on the market of small audit firms which
are dealing with the SMEs in the UAE, the firms surveyed did not include the big
audit firms such as the Big 4 firms and some of the multinationals. The exclusion of
these firms was based on the fact that such firms rarely engage in this market.
Moreover, the Big 4 firms are subject to rigorous quality peer reviews from their
head office either annually or once every three years, and/or internal reviews to
ensure that certain standards are observed. These audit firms from the outset have in
place well designed methodologies and audit procedures, and the programs and
audits undergo review at different levels within each firm.
Given the regulatory structure of the market, as well as common practice in
the field in the SME market, local offices tend to have fewer internal controls in
place and the decision making and audit performance can be observed in some cases
by even a single individual. Their audit files, if they exist, are rarely reviewed. Due
to such known weaknesses of internal control within some firms, the experiment
focused on small and medium sized firms which in any case tend most to engage in
this market.
A list of 109 audit firms in total was identified for inclusion in the
experiment, from this number, as noted above, the Big 4 were excluded, as well as
other firms for which contact information was unobtainable. This resulted in 80
firms. An email was sent to all of them (see Appendix 9 for a copy of it). The 109
firms represented more than 95% of the firms practicing in the UAE. The firms
contacted for the experiment represented 76% of all the audit firms practicing in the
UAE, and covered almost 80% of the local firms in the country (for a general
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background on how the market for SME audit is structured, please refer to section
3.3.3, Chapter 3,above, for information on accounting and audit firms in the UAE).

8.3 Experimental Design
I posed as the finance manager of a company which was looking to conduct
an annual audit. An existing company with a valid license issued from the
Department of Economic Development in Abu Dhabi was selected 3. The selection of
this entity was based on the general principle that the assignment for the auditor
should be a straightforward one. This was a newly established company, i.e. it did
not have many transactions going through its accounts. The purpose here was to
ensure that the accounts were simple enough for the auditors to develop as clear an
understanding of the company as possible before issuing an audit report. The
company was only one year old, and the transactions that were recorded were to do
only with expenses related to rent, office supplies, legal fees, salaries, and travel. As
shown in Appendices 10 and 11, the company in reality had no revenue. The total
expenses incurred were AED 445,284, and assets totaling AED 25,000 which
included a laptop, deposits, and bank guarantees only. The liabilities were AED
125,742, which consisted mostly of amounts for rent, salaries, and to a related party.
Equities were AED 100,741, from the accumulated losses of AED 445,284 that were
financed by the owner‟s injections of funds to the company and the company capital.
As shown in Appendices 12 and 13, the researcher manipulated the financial
statements by entering a number of unsupported transactions. First, revenue of AED
1,535,000 was identified and an equivalent amount was recorded as receivable from
3

Permission was sought from the company partners to use the license number for
research purposes only, on condition that the license number and company identity
were kept anonymous, and also not to disseminate or use the audit report for other
purposes than this research.
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one client. The cost of revenue was also recognized as an amount of AED 743,500
and an equivalent amount was recognized as payable to one of the parties related to
the company. These two entries alone brought the results from an actual loss of AED
445,284 to a profit of AED 346,216.
The 80 firms which had been contacted were asked on the email to audit the
above company as soon as possible. The only documentation that was sent to them
was the prior balance for the 11-month period ending November 2014, and a copy of
the trade license. The contacted firms were also asked to submit an audit proposal
highlighting their audit fees and the duration of the audit (see Appendix 9 for this
email). I did not plan to follow up any of the firms in question, and depended only on
the responses received as a result of the email.

8.4 Experiment Results
To exactly the same email, sent to 80 audit firms, 27 firms responded with an
offer to do the work (a response rate of 33.75%). I did not follow up the
organizations that did not respond. Because the object of the research was to see who
would respond with an unrealistic proposal, within a particular time frame. This
would indicate the unrealistic speed of the audits that these firms expected, which is
a strong quality indicator, basically producing lower quality audits. Of the 27 firms
that replied, 96% sent back an official commercial proposal within 2 working days.
10 of the 27 firms, (37%) phoned me in my role as the finance manager seeking more
information to clarify understanding of the engagement and the industry to which the
company to be audited belonged. They also sought to understand the reasons behind
the requirements of this audit. One might have thought that this was a positive
indicator that these firms were complying with the due diligence requirements before
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accepting the engagement, but I was surprised to discover that the phone call was
always followed up by an immediate offer of the assignment.
Table 65 below summarizes what the responding audit firms offered
summarized by audit fees and assignment duration.
Table 65 – Summary of Experiment Audit Proposals
Company Name

Information
Requested by firm
1= None
2= Basic information

Company 01
Company 02
Company 03
Company 04
Company 05
Company 06
Company 07
Company 08
Company 09
Company 10
Company 11
Company 12
Company 13
Company 14
Company 15
Company 16
Company 17
Company 18
Company 19
Company 20
Company 21
Company 22
Company 23
Company 24
Branch 1
Company 24
Branch 2
Company 25
Company 26
Total Number of responses
Total sampled audit firms
Response rate

Fees

Assignment
duration

1
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
2

3,000
12,000
4,000
5,000
2,000
3,500
3,000
7,000
4,000
3,000
4,000
15,000
2,500
16,000
2,000
1,500
6,500
2,000
7,500
5,000
3,000
Rejected
2,500
15,000

2
5
3
3
2
2
2
5
3
3
3
5
2
5
2
3
4
2
4
5
2

1

3,000

2

2
2

5,000
6,000

4
3
27
80
33.75%

1
5
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From the 27 offers received, only one firm refused the job, because it was not
registered in Abu Dhabi. It is interesting to note that the understanding of this firm
was incorrect: the situation is that as long as a firm is registered as an auditor with
the Ministry of Economy, it can legally practice as an auditor regardless of its
location in the UAE (please refer to the conclusion section, below, for a more
detailed discussion of the way in which different jurisdictional claims over audits
may limit the work of auditors). 15 offers were for fees that were below AED 5,000.
7 offers were for fees that were between AED 5,000 and AED 10,000, while 4 offers
were for a fee greater than AED 10,000 as shown in the table below.
Table 66 - Summary of the Fees of Audit Offers
Fees
Rejected
< 5,000
5,000 - 10,000
> 10,000
Total Offers
With regard to the time frame of

Number of offers
1
15
7
4
27
the audit, 10 firms agreed that the audit

would be conducted in under 2 days, 11 asked for only 3-4 days and 6 indicated a
need for more than 5 days, as shown in the table below.
Table 67 – Summary of Timeframe of Audit Offers
Time in days
1-2
3-4
5 or above
Total Offers

Number of offers
10
11
6
27

8.5 Discussion
From my experience in the audit industry (please refer to section 4.9, Chapter
4, above, concerning the role of the researcher as a participant observer), combined
with what the standards stipulate in relation to accepting/working through an
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engagement and conducting the audit, it was apparent that a large proportion of the
audit firms in the experiment were not acting professionally.
In any typical audit engagement there are basic processes that must be
adhered to by the auditor in order to enable him/her to perform a proper high quality
audit that would allow the audit firm to give a proper opinion on the financial
statement. The basic process of an audit engagement is as follows:
a) Acceptance of a client
b) Planning the audit approach
c) Substantive testing
d) Audit finalization and issuing the opinion
The following sections outline what is mandated by the current auditing
standards, before discussing the results of the experiment.
Acceptance of clients
As required by International Auditing Standards ISA nos. 200, 210, and 220,
in any audit engagement the auditor must assess whether there are any reasons that
might oblige the audit firm to reject a proposal for the audit engagement being
requested. Research has established the value of this step; Lai & Chen (2014) discuss
how critical it is from a risk management perspective for audit firms to evaluate
which clients to accept. The ramifications for not doing so properly could not only
lose a firm‟s reputation, but also lead to legal battles that might close a firm down
(Ethridge, Marsh, & Canfield, 2005). The details of this process are outlined in
Table 66 below. The table also shows where these audit firms fell short in meeting
this requirement. To aid an overall understanding of how critical those steps are, each
procedure is giving a rating for importance and compliance in the form of a color
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coded group and a rate as a percentage. The table sets out how respondents
performed overall in relation to meeting these standards.
Table 68 - Client Acceptance Assessment Based on Appropriate Audit Procedure
Appropriate Procedure
to take place
Verify the client‟s
background by inquiring
about its management and
nature of its business
Evaluate professional and
ethical requirements –
independence, etc.

Verify the reason for
obtaining an audit

Determine if there is a
need to get an expert
opinion

Prepare proposal

Actions taken in experiment

Rate

The acceptance stage for all bidders
handled in two ways: either no
procedure at all was initiated and a
proposal was sent directly; or a very
rudimentary
5-minute
phone
conversation gave the auditor a very
brief idea of the engagement.
However, no questions were asked
about management that would allow
an audit firms to ensure its
independence. Nor were any questions
asked with a view to ensuring
compliance with local laws and ethics
This was done via a phone call or
email. Not all the firms that proposed
an audit verified the reason. They were
often satisfied to know that the
statement was needed only to allow
the license to be renewed.
No questions were ever asked on the
complexity of the transaction or
whether any of the assets needed a
valuer or if any points requiring legal
advice.
All were very successful in providing
a proposal in under 3 working days.

50%

10%

10%

5%

Staff selection

Very few firms had a section on staff 5%
capabilities in their proposal

Obtain engagement letter

None of the firms mentioned an 20%
engagement letter and the firm that
was selected did the work without
being officially engaged.

Red: Due procedure was not followed and the risk was not mitigated
Orange: Certain procedures were followed but might not have been sufficient
Green: Procedures were followed and the risk was mitigated
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From the above table and as evident from doing a simple average of the
weighted average of compliance based on the assigned rate, we can conclude that the
audit firms that participated in the experiment showed only 21% compliance with the
required procedures related to client acceptance. This low rate of compliance is an
indication that the firms in the sample were proposing to take on assignments and
engage

in

auditing

without

assessing

whether

their

independence

was

unchallengeable or if the assignment needed an expert opinion and without obtaining
an engagement letter from the client.
Another aspect that the experiment revealed relates to how much time is
needed to perform an audit and what fee is requested. Although the amount of time
and the proper fee for such a job are always based on the subjective evaluation of an
auditor, one may safely estimate an average time and audit fee for a simple job of
this kind. This audit job could be completed in 5 days or so, and should earn an audit
fee of more than AED 10,000. But since this is a subjective matter and based on my
opinion, slight variations in the offers are to be expected. The huge variations in
Tables 66 and 67, related to the length of time required to perform the task and the
appropriate fee, are indicative of the expected quality of the work to be delivered by
an auditor. For example, it is unreasonable to expect that the same job could take a
day and would earn an auditor AED 3000, while a different auditor estimated a
period of 5 days and charged higher audit fees. The inexplicable variations in audit
fees charged by audit firms is something that is well documented in audit research.
To pursue further this point about fees, I followed up the firm that proposed
the lowest audit fee (AED 2,500), and managed to negotiate a price of AED 1,250.
Soon after it accepted this engagement in a phone conversation, this firm sent me
some draft financial statements by email. The following day I received transactions
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which were part of the financial statements – all unsupported. I was asked to review
the financial statements and if I had no concerns to actually sign them and wire the
transfer of AED 1,250 to the firm‟s account so that it could print the hard copy of the
financial statements and sign and stamp it. I did as requested and received from the
audit firm the financial statements properly signed and stamped.
Variations in audit fees can be seen not only between different firms and
firms of different sizes, but even within different branches of the same firm. One
audit firm that had an office in Dubai offered to do the work in 5 days for AED
15,000, while a branch office in a different Emirate (Ras Al Khaima) offered to do
the same job for AED 3,000 in two days. One would expect that such an offer from a
different Emirate should cost more if the audit team has to travel to a different place,
which should add to the cost of the audit (e.g. hotels, transport, etc.)
a) Planning the audit approach
The IAASB have published ISA 315, which explains the need to understand
the firm being audited and its context by assessing the risks of material
misstatements that it poses. ISA 330 is also concerned with the auditors‟ procedures
to counter the assessed risks involved in the engagement. According to Hubbard
(2000) a number of tips are provided to encourage audit planning, such as requiring
the management of the audit firm to sign the planning documents as well. Hughes
(1974) in an attempt to cover the most important planning areas such as audit timing,
audit extensiveness, audit scheduling and audit surprise, claims that they are all
mitigated when the assignment is properly planned. This process is, however, very
difficult to assess without having access to auditors‟ files and working papers. The
table below shows the procedures that should be considered and compared to the
researchers‟ insights on the subject matter. Each procedure is giving a rating for
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importance and compliance in the form of three color coded groups and a percentage
rate.

Table 69 – Engagement Planning Assessment Based on Appropriate Audit Procedure
Researchers’ insights
The auditor should verify a number
of things, such as:
Regulations and laws applicable to
the entity, as required by ISA nos.
250, 550, and 570.
Nature of the entity – Major
contract,
Governance,
Organizational structure, etc.
Strategies and objectives
Internal controls through testing
policies and procedures, etc.
Even though I had no access to the
audit files, none of the above was
requested. Hence it may be
concluded that the audit firms did
not comply with this requirement
Evaluate the risks of
Since none of the above
material misstatements
understanding that an auditor
should fully understand the entity, I
was not in a position to assess the
risks that are associated with the
entity and link them to the
assertions required – completeness,
existence, valuation, occurrences,
measurements,
obligations,
presentation
and
disclosures.
Moreover, the audit firm was thus
unable to determine the degree of
risk and consider the likelihood of
adverse occurrences.
Calculate Materiality, as
It is difficult to assess if audit firms
required by ISA 320, and
have done this and I would not
520
have been able to assess this
properly.
Arrange the audit program It is difficult to assess if audit firms
with a commentary on all
have done this and I would not
identified risks, as required have been able to assess this
by ISA 315
properly.
Appropriate Procedure
Perform audit procedures
to understand the context
of the business as well as
the internal controls, as
required by ISA 315

Rate
50%

20%

15%

15%

Red: Due procedure was not followed and the risk was not mitigated

171

Orange: Certain procedures were followed but might not have been sufficient
Green: Procedures were followed and the risk was mitigated.
From the above table and as is evident from a simple average of the weighted
average of compliance in conjunction with the assigned rate, we can conclude that
the audit firms that participated in the experiment showed only 32.5% compliance
with the procedures that relate to planning the audit approach. This low rate of
compliance is an indication that audit firms in the UAE are performing audit
assignments without properly planning the audit approach.
One major difficulty in this experiment is to use the audit files of the firms
concerned conclusive evidence on planning the audit. I naturally had no access to
this. However, it can be safely assumed that the firms in question did not meet the
standards required (see the above table), to reach the audit conclusion that was
provided.
b) Substantive testing
According to ISA 500, auditors are supposed to obtain proper audit evidence
by control testing and/or substantive testing. The mix of testing approaches must
provide sufficient and appropriate audit evidence to substantiate a proper audit
opinion. The standard also considers the reliability of the evidence that must be
obtained, which may not be the same as the oral representation of issues by the
management. All the audit evidence obtained must meet the standards of assertions,
namely, to be supplied, complete, accurate, and observing rights and obligations,
valuation, and existence. According to Florea & Florea (2011) a number of ways to
obtain relevant audit evidence is available to auditors and each method suits some
circumstances and together they ensure that the relevant assertions are covered.
Some of these methods are physical examination, confirmation, documentation,
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analytical procedures, enquiries to the client, re-performance, and observation of
procedures. The table below shows some of the procedures that should be carried out
by an audit firm. The listed procedures are those that I am confident were not carried
by the audit firm in my experiment since it did not request any of the required
documentation. Below, only the areas that formed part of the company financial
statement are discussed.
Table 70 - Minimum Audit Procedures Required
Appropriate Procedure that should have been followed
Cash and Cash Equivalents:
Perform bank confirmations
Test bank reconciliation
Enquire from management regarding cheques drawn before year-end and
released after year-end.
Test the translation of cash accounts denominated in foreign currencies
Test transfers between client bank accounts
Identify arrangements with related parties
Fixed Assets
Obtain a fixed asset continuity schedule
Obtain a detailed listing of fixed assets
Test fixed asset additions
Test disposal of fixed assets
Test depreciation expenses
Accounts Receivables
Obtain a detailed listing of receivable balances from accounts (aged by customer)
Test cut-off of the sales/accounts receivable by selecting sales according to a
review of the cut-off data
Confirm the selected receivable balances accounts
Review write-offs of bad debts
Assess the adequacy of the allowance for doubtful accounts
Accounts Payable and Other Accruals
Obtain a detailed list of accounts payable (aged by vendor)
Test suppliers‟ balances by testing supplier statements, performing direct
confirmations, reconciling suppliers‟ statements, and investigating variances.
Search for unrecorded liabilities
Intercompany Balances
Intercompany Confirmations
Test Intercompany transactions
Revenue
Review major contracts
Test sales invoices
Cost of Sales
Verify the costing of projects
Test any subcontracting arrangements
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General and Administrative testing
Testing all invoices of the various classes of expenses

The above comprises the minimum required procedures that the audit firm
should have carried out in the course of its field work. Since none of the above
procedures took place, the audit firm was not able to identify the revenue of AED
1,535,000 that was identified along with the equivalent amount that was recorded as
receivable from one client. The cost of revenue was also recognized as an amount of
AED 743,500 and an equivalent amount was recognized as payable to one of the
related parties of the company. These entries have no supporting documentation and
a simple inquiry would have identified these entries to an auditor. This section was
not rated, because I believe that compliance was 0%, since nothing was required
from the audit firm beyond the Trial Balance and the Trade Licence of the company.
c) Audit finalization and opinion issuance
For the final stage of the audit process, the ISSAB have also issued standards
of guidance. ISA 570 requires auditors to re-evaluate going concern issues before
issuing audit opinions. ISA 250 also requires audit firms to ensure compliance with
laws and regulations. ISA 501 requires an assessment to be made on all potential
litigations and claims by providing proper accruals and appropriate disclosures. In
this process, audit firms are required to do the following:


Obtain legal representation from the clients‟ lawyer



Obtain a management representation letter



Subsequent event testing



Re-assessing materiality

The selected audit firm, however, did not ask for the above legal and
management representation. In my opinion, the audit firm, given the standards for
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guidance, was very careless in getting no representation from the members of
management to state that the financial statement reflected the company‟s situation
and that they were responsible for all the figures and disclosures. This practice
clearly indicates that these audit firms are not worried about the consequences of
their audit opinions. Such irresponsibility may be due either to the fact that in the
history of the UAE auditors have never been held responsible for their opinions; or to
pure ignorance on the part of their firms. In any case, such reckless acts can be
controlled and minimized if only minimum governance is in place.

8.6 Ethical Considerations
This experiment presents me with a number of ethical issues. The nature of
the experiment, and the ramifications it may have had on the firms that took part
(involuntarily) in the experiment raise some ethical issues. Moreover, the company
that was the subject of the experiment and its owners should be taken into
consideration when reflecting on the ethics of this approach. Additionally, I occupied
two apparently conflicting positions, as a professional who belonged to the industry
and as a researcher wishing to bring some issues to the surface. It is hence important
for me to reflect on these issues and take what action is needed to deal with them.
In general, in designing and conducting the experiment, I was aware of most
of the above ethical issues. This helped me to embed some safety measures to
minimize, if not rule out, all possible harm to those involved. Alongside general
issues of confidentiality which are pertinent to the entire process of this dissertation,
there are some experiment-specific ethical concerns that I should tackle, before,
during and after the experiment was conducted. The following section focuses on
these.
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The first problem the researcher had to face was that of „informed consent”.
The respondents were aware of the nature of the research when I employed the other
methods of collecting data for this dissertation (e.g. interviews, survey). Informed
consent is defined as “the process in which a patient/participant consents to
participate in a research project after being informed of its procedures, risks, and
benefits (Bulger, 2002) [3].
Ideally, all the participants in the experiment should have been made fully
aware of its nature and what it entailed at the same time as obtaining their formal
consent to taking part in it; however, this would of course have defeated the purpose
of the experiment. Hence, I had to make up for the lack of consent by protecting the
identity of respondents in every possible way. For this reason, data collected from the
experiment which reveal the identity of the firms has either been destroyed or the
traces which would allow these firms to be identified have been removed.
A related ethical dilemma for me was my role as part of the audit industry.
Being a witness to such fraudulent and illegal activities raises some ethical questions,
such as what role should be played to stop them. This issue can resolved, however,
by thinking of the dissertation overall, and its intention to propose a solution to
resolve quality related issues in the industry.
Informed consent from the owners of the company was obtained before
conducting the experiment. In addition, the financial statements audited by the firm
that was paid AED 1,250 were destroyed immediately after the research was
finalized. To verify the existence of these statements, they were shown to my advisor
before their destruction.
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8.7 Conclusions
It can be concluded that the audit quality will vary from a firm to another, on
the basis of the rapid response that was received from the firms when they were
approached, the huge variability of the audit fees offered and the varying times
agreed for conducting the audit Furthermore, the quality of such an audit may be
questioned, given the departure from professional standards (ISAs) shown in many
instances by those offering the service. This finding is critical to the audit industry in
the UAE, showing that firms which act in this manner anticipate no consequences
and that the short period of time allocated to me to conduct this audit is alarming. It
reflects the complete negligence of the firms and endorses the view that they are not
concerned that any governing body may check on them at a future date.
From the results of this experiment, it can be argued that the UAE has many
audit firms dealing with SMEs and not complying with the International Auditing
Standards. This noncompliance can be seen as an option preferred by such audit
firms; there is no regulatory structure to ensure that they adhere to the minimum
standards of audit quality, and do not focus only on the commercial aspects of the
job.
One limitation of the experiment is my inability to examine the audit files of
many of those firms. However, this shortcoming cannot be addressed in the present
research, due to the inherent difficulties of client confidentiality, and the attendant
legal issues.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter summarizes the overall research findings and assesses the
dissertation‟s overall contribution. The chapter also lists the dissertation‟s
recommendations and practical implications for the industry, and suggests ways in
which the results of the study may be disseminated.

9.1 Summary and Main Findings
This section summarizes the main findings of the dissertation. Although
various methods for data collection were used (survey, interviews, participant
observation, field experiment), the summary does not distinguish between them but
on the main areas of data no matter how they were collected.
The general context of the profession in the GCC and the UAE: The
Ministry of Economy, Commercial Affairs Sector, which deals with policies and
procedures for audit firm registration is also responsible for the monitoring aspects of
the profession.
Research has shown that the UAE auditors who audit government institutes
and semi-government entities are monitored by different local authorities, such as the
State Audit Institute (SAI) and the Abu Dhabi Accountability Authority (ADAA).
However, audit firms such as the models that exist internationally and work for
private businesses, small and medium enterprises in particular, are not monitored by
any authority, any not-for-profit association, or any professional institute. The main
regulation concerning the work of the SME audit firms in the UAE is related to the
general regulation covering those who are permitted to set up an auditing firm.
Given the lack of a regulatory body or institute to co-ordinate the work of
audit professionals in the country, the reliance on International Accounting and

178

Auditing Standards to provide a general framework in which professionals can
operate is heavy. Given the structure of the market in the UAE, whereby many small
and medium sized audit firms compete for a small market of SME clients and no
regulatory or governing body exists to oversee the former, an environment is created
where commercialism is favored above professionalism. In this country, the audit
industry for SME clients has become more and more commercially driven, far from
serving the public interest by maintaining the highest levels of professional practice.
This industry in the UAE is mostly regulated by commercial laws. It follows
the UAE Federal Law No. 22 of 1995. The law lays down the registration
requirements, licensing, auditors‟ duties and responsibilities, and penalties. It also
lists the training requirements, the procedures and the application process for
registering and outlines the rights and obligations of registered auditors.
Many companies in the country have hence adopted the International
Accounting Standards. This is directly related to the fact that the accounting
profession in the UAE is not mature and the country has not developed nation-wide
accounting standards. Research has shown that the country lacks the governing
framework necessary to monitor an auditor‟s dealing with SMEs. The accounting
profession in the UAE is fragmented and is not subject to local laws. According to
the literature analysis, the Big 4 and other international accounting firms import their
knowhow and assurance practices and methodologies to the UAE.
The absence of a governing body to regulate the audit firms that deal with the
private sector, SMEs in particular, may substantially influence the UAE economy.
To fund their operations, SMEs mostly rely on two sources. These are either loans
from shareholders or additional funds provided by company owners in the form of an
equity increase. In either case, bankers and shareholders rely on a firm‟s audited
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financial statements before they decide to approve the additional loan or equity
funding. It is, of course, in the interest of management to obtain these funds to secure
their jobs; hence, they may be inclined to show better financial performance than is
warranted to ensure that these funds are approved. The existence of audit firms
which do not carry out audits as required allows financial statements to be published
which do not show the true status of the company to be approved for funding. This
then allows the funds to reach the hands of management based on the wrong decision
that the bankers or shareholders have made by relying on an audited financial that
showed a rosy picture of the company. Eventually, these companies fail to settle their
debts and are liquidated and banks have to write off loans made to them; or
shareholders accept that they have invested in a loss making entity and look for new
management staff, who do the same thing all over again.
Exploring the quality of SME audits in the UAE: This dissertation
examined the quality of SME audits in the UAE, using a survey, participant
observation, and interviews. I used my background as an auditor to identify some of
the issues of concern. The use of a survey and interviews was essential to explore
quality issues in sufficient depth. The focus of the survey was on examining the
perceptions of auditors and professionals on the quality of the audits performed for
SME clients. The survey used the IAASB audit quality framework to gauge these
perceptions in relation to four broad factors: input, output, context and interactions.
The three groups (auditors from the Big 4, medium sized and small auditing firms,
non-auditing professional groups) perceived audit quality differently in relation to
the input, output, contextual and interaction factors of the IAASB Audit Quality
Framework. The Big 4 auditors and the professionals in the UAE had higher
confidence in the Big 4 audits that were performed for SMEs. This finding was
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opposed to the way in which mid-tier firms perceived themselves to be better
practitioners when it came to auditing the country‟s SMEs. This means that many of
the attributes of auditors matter, including their skills, experience, mindset, their
audit methodology, ethical values, the availability of adequate technical support, and
the effectiveness of the auditing tools. Therefore, the key aim of the audit quality
framework should be to increase the understanding and awareness of the elements of
audit quality, encourage effective communication between stakeholders, and enhance
the further improvement of audit quality.
It has been found that the policy of auditing is based on a well-established
system of values, attitudes, ethics, experience, knowledge, procedures of the audit
process and quality control. Understanding these factors ensures a good position
when it comes to proper auditing. Auditing training is essential because auditing
skills are integrated into a quality audit framework which requires continuous
professional development. High quality auditing depends on the standard setters,
education providers, professional bodies, and regulators. Audit quality is a complex
concept which investigates its own influence on the conduct of audit engagements
and audit evaluations. It emphasizes the societal and organizational context which
enhances the understanding of the process through which auditors attain the
appropriate audit quality.
The interviews in the present study confirmed the survey results that the
quality of SME clients varied the interviews also highlighted the need for higher
ethical standards from the auditing practitioners. Most of the interviewees link the
lower ethical standards in the UAE to the demographics of the country and in turn to
the loyalty of its professionals towards their profession. There was a great emphasis
on the view that many auditors are commercially driven and for this reason many
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shortcuts are resorted to. Many interviewees, moreover, raise concerns over the
knowledge and experience that local auditors have in the UAE. Since most of these
auditors are expatriates from different countries with different qualifications, the
interviewees linked the commercial aspect of running an audit firm to the facts
surrounding a firm‟s choice of which auditor to hire. Cheaper professionals with little
experience, even almost none, are recruited from Asian countries on a part-time
basis, ignoring better educated professionals who hold higher accredited degrees.
Some interviewees confirmed the existence of the extreme practice of some audit
firms, who perform no audit procedures whatever and issue unqualified opinions on
miss-stated financial assertions for very low fees. All these issues have reduced the
quality of the audit work that is being done for the SMEs, which over time has
become reflected in lower fees, indicating that less and less time is being put into the
audit procedures. Finally, the respect for the profession, according to my
interviewees, is at the minimum; it seems as though anyone can get an audit
completed in little time at minimum cost.
The research shows the perceptions of audit professionals with regard to the
variables that measure audit quality. These people differ from auditors from the Big
4, auditors in the mid-tier firms and professionals in the industry such as internal
auditors, finance managers, CFOs and academics. The research also reveals a
number of negative perceptions of the quality of the audits that are being performed
these days in the UAE; these negative perceptions were attributed to a number of
factors, such as time allocated to the work, audit fees, auditors‟ education, auditors‟
experience, the involvement of governance bodies, and the proper interaction of all
shareholders, etc.
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Examining the quality of audits using a field experiment: performing a
field experiment to examine the quality of SME audits was seen as essential to
support the anecdotal evidence presented earlier. The field experiment results
reflected the concerns of the interviewees on the quality of audits for SME clients. I
sent a number of audit firms dealing with SME clients a set of financial statements to
audit, without supporting documents. The experiment showed that a great many
auditors responded with an offer to perform this service, without asking for
supporting documents or getting any additional information about the company to be
audited. The respondents also demanded audit fees that varied very widely, some
charging very small amounts, while others charged extortionately. The number of
days required to perform the service also varied greatly.

The field experiment

confirmed allegations by interviewees that auditors working for SME clients do not
follow any auditing standards to ensure that a minimum standard of work is
provided.
Implication of findings with reference to UAE context: In the context of
the UAE and based on the comments of the interviewees and evidence from the
context chapter, it was evident that the UAE context relating to input factors is very
challenging to the audit industry. There is a lot of emphasis on the fact that auditors
in the UAE are not as loyal to the profession and to the notion of public interest as
compared to other countries. This perception is derived from the fact that the
demographics of the UAE is very diverse and the turnover rates in the audit industry
are even higher than the average turnover rates for the industry in other countries. It
is also noted that there is more emphasis on the commercial aspect of the business
rather than the professional commitment to serve public trust. Even though that this
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is a for-profit industry and the commercial aspect is given, however, it was noted that
the emphasis over the commercial aspects is higher than any other country.
It is also worth mentioning that auditors have a diverse background in the
UAE and they hold recognized certifications from different international bodies.
There is a pool of knowledge share within audit firms, as most of the employees
come from different backgrounds and have different recognized certifications.
Auditors hold certifications such as ICAEW, ACCA, CPA, CA, and others. They at
some time have the combined knowledge to resolve very complex transactions but
unfortunately they lack the interest to do so. The time to conduct an audit was also
one of the areas that was heavily emphasized that in the context of the UAE an audit
manager can have a big portfolio of audit clients as compared to how other audit
manager in other countries handle as lower audit clients. The big portfolio of cliental
indicates lesser time spent on each engagement in order to maximize the job
profitability. The concept of maximizing profitability is acceptable, however, not at
the cost of audit quality.
In general, the UAE context lacks the local staff that work in this industry. It
is evident that this industry is heavily employed by expats and very few Emaraties
work in this industry. The local authorities such as ADAA and SAI are encouraging
the Emaraties to get into this industry through a number of initiatives such as
financially bridging the Emaraties salaries if they work in the private industry. Or by
the simple fact that Emaraties can practice audit if he has only a bachelor in
accounting as compared to an expat who needs a certification and five years post
experience.
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9.2 Theoretical Contribution of the Dissertation
Although the aim of a professional doctorate is to contribute to professional
and organizational practices by researching an issue that is of practical significance
to the field, this dissertation also has some theoretical contributions to the wider
literature on auditing and audit quality. The dissertation is the first to operationalize
the general framework of IAASB, with all its components, to explore issues of audit
quality. The uniqueness of the region also contributes to the value of the findings and
their originality, since no study has explored audit quality with reference to all the
components of the IAASB model in the UAE. Such a study is timely because the
UAE is at the center of the GCC countries, and plays an important role in its
financial markets and operations.
The dissertation is also the first to use a field experiment on authentic
auditors to examine issues of audit quality in the UAE, and determine whether
auditing practitioners are following International Auditing Standards in their
engagements. The study shows overall how weaknesses in the regulatory and
professional structures of the profession may lead to poor quality audits in the UAE.

9.3 Practical Implications and Recommendations – Towards Better
Quality Audits for SMEs in the UAE
Enhancing the quality of audits is a very complex task, and can be handled
from different perspectives. It is important to recognize that there is no single model
that can be identified for use in generating quality audits in all contexts. The history,
context and regulatory structures of professional groups vary from one place to
another, and as a result the recommendations that this dissertation proposes should be
seen in relation to the UAE in a wider context. Hence, suggestions for improving
audit quality have to encompass a variety of proposals, perhaps starting with macro-
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processes such as the establishment of a governing body, as well as micro-processes
such as better training in best practice for auditors serving SME firms. The users of
financial statements should also be educated about the nature of audits and what
expectations they should hold; this would help to enhance the quality of the audits in
the long run.
According to the Ministry of Economy, the Commercial Affairs sector is
responsible for “setting the necessary legal framework for organizing the audit
accounts profession based on the legislations issued in this respect in joint
cooperation with the economic legislations department and other governmental and
private entities in the country.” (Ministry of Economy website).
A major recommendation that this dissertation is making is the creation of a
special governing body to span all the Emirates and govern auditors overall,
including the audit firms which provides services for SME clients. The role of this
body would be not only to police what happens in the field, but also to educate SME
auditors and promote best practice. The presence of such a body would ensure at
least that a minimum level of audit quality is adhered to; otherwise, the transitional
nature of the UAE may encourage practicing audit firms to follow no standards that
would encourage high quality audits. Such a governing body could be modelled on
previously existing models in the country, such as the ADAA, which audits
governmental entities.
An alternative recommendation which might be implemented would be to
help resolve some of the issues related to audit quality by means of currently
existing governing bodies (e.g. ADAA, SAI) and extend their jurisdiction.
ADAA for example, has a wealth of experience in checking the quality of audits
performed on governmental institutions in Abu Dhabi. If the SAI or ADAA took on
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this role, and trained other Emirate related bodies it might help to reduce quality
problems in the various emirates where the SME clients are located. Such official
bodies have experience in auditing larger entities, and their monitoring of audit firms
dealing with SMEs might be seen as a more efficient way of solving the problem of
the minimal standards observable at present. Such bodies are well resourced; for
example, according to ADAA (2015) the government gave them AED 125 million to
operate for the year ending 31 December 2014, which is a great deal to spend on
their work. Of the 125 million, 111 million was spent on employees‟ salaries and
benefits. It would be useful if the ADAA, for example, could allocate 2 of its staff
members who were properly trained to a small department such as is required for
governing those audit firms deal with SMEs. The function of this department would
not be the same as what ADAA currently does in auditing local departments,
councils, and authorities. Companies and projects are also part of the subject entities
that are now monitored by ADAA, in addition to the institutions, companies and
projects in which the Abu Dhabi Government‟s interest is equal to or greater than
50%, inclusive of their subsidiaries. It would be impractical for the ADAA to attempt
to do the same for SMEs.
ADAA could set up a new department to review audit firm compliance at a
very high level through requiring its staff of 2 to select audit firms and some of their
audited files at random to ensure that audit procedures for SMEs are being
maintained at the right quality. If these two individuals managed to cover 3 visits to
an audit firm every month, it would be enough cover 72 audit firms a year, which is
almost 66% of the audit firms in the UAE at present. This would mean that every
single audit firm in the country could be visited at least once in every 18 months.
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Once this practice is established, audit firms would be encouraged to meet at
least the minimum criteria in their audits, and maintain audit files intact since they
could always expect to be visited and would not know which files would be
examined. The experiment in this study would be an exemplary case. If this file were
picked for review, it would be evident to ADAA that no supporting documentation,
confirmations, or representation letters were maintained in the audit file. Should an
audit firms be caught in a similar practice, warnings could be applied for the first
couple of instances followed by fines. If the audit firm in question was not able to
comply with the current standards, the firm‟s license could be revoked. This solution
is practical and very efficient; it would not cost ADAA more than the salaries of two
local civil servants, whereas if very senior staff were hired it might cost as much as
AED 1.5 million per year, almost 1.3% of what was being spent altogether on
ADAA‟s employees in 2014.
Moreover, ADAA might not have to hire dedicated staff for this, for they
might be able to use staff time better if idle time was shown in their timesheets. But
at the end of the day, the benefits to the country from implementing this practice
cannot be measured money. With more reliable financial information in the market,
the whole economy would become stronger and the whole financial sector would
become more transparent. Lenders would be able to provide more secure loans and
investors would be in a better position to invest once they had more reliable data.
Another recommendation that would enhance the quality of audits for SME
clients in the long run would be the organization of small and medium sized auditing
firms into societies, where best practice can be shared and also advice from the more
experienced staff.
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In summary, audit quality can be improved in a number of ways; broader
mechanisms such as the introduction of a governing body to ensure meeting the basic
standards of audit work is needed, and internal mechanisms within those firms (e.g.
training) can be looked at. Issues of hiring in the context of the UAE should not be
ignored. Hiring properly experienced staff who have suitable qualifications,
knowledge and training is the first step. These candidates must be screened for ethics
and values which meet the expectations of the profession. Internal quality reviews
and peer reviews are also common ways of ensuring audit quality. Audit quality can
also improve according to market preferences: bankers, lenders, investors, and, in the
case of UAE, free zones, can dictate which audit firms they are comfortable with and
trust their opinions.

9.4 Further Research
Researching issues of audit quality is not only interesting, but could also lead
to significant changes in practice, so long as this research is made accessible to
practitioners. Research into audit quality frameworks and the way in which they aid
our understanding of audit quality in any given context is necessary. Such research is
highly beneficial in the context of an emerging professional audit arena, such as that
in the GCC context.
Although archival research and analysis of secondary sources are useful ways
to conduct research, issues of audit quality are better investigated directly through
interviewing and observing the work of audit firms. For such an approach,
information derived from investors, boards of directors, third parties, and
stakeholders is of high value, because it deepens our understanding of audit quality.
Thus, despite the fact that audit quality is a widely investigated concept,
further research is needed to analyze the individual characteristics of auditors, the
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influence of different auditors on the perception of audit quality and related factors.
As the scope of this study was limited to the SMEs and auditors in the UAE only,
further research should be conducted in other countries in the GCC.

9.5 Disseminations of Results
An important aspect of professional doctorates is related to the dissemination
of results and ways of ensuring both continuity and willingness to change things in
practice. The results of this dissertation will be disseminated in a number of ways.
Some of those activities have already taken place:
(a) Communication with professional bodies and regulators in the UAE: this
will be done through summary documents to be sent, as well as oral
presentations to a selected number of these bodies.
(b) Presentations to audit practitioners in the field: this will form part of
reflecting on auditors‟ practice as professionals. I made a presentation to a
group of international audit practitioners (Empacta) in a workshop that
was organized by two academics from UAEU on 13th November 2015.
The workshop generally focused on creating connections between
research scholars and auditing practitioners in the field. The 18
participants of the workshop (mostly professionals) came from various
parts of the world. The presentation of some of the research findings was
meant not only as a way of disseminating the findings, but also a way to
elicit practitioners‟ feedback and reflections on these findings. A long
and very interesting discussion was generated by the participants, in
which most of them agreed that the results of the present work are in
agreement with their own observations about the quality of audits in this
market in their own counties. Participants who came from developed
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professional and regulatory contexts (e.g. Germany) were surprised that
such bad auditing practice occurs in the context of the UAE. More
presentations with local practitioners in the UAE are planned.
(c) Participating in academic conferences: I will engage with the academic
community to discuss the findings of this study and already have a paper
accepted for presentation at the “UAEU Annual Research and Innovation
conference” which is organized by UAEU and due on 24-25 November
2015. In this conference I will present the experiment results again, with a
view to providing a platform to strengthen scientific research and
innovation. In this conference, around 285 different researchers will
present papers from different fields.
(d) Research publications: one of the ways by which I hope to disseminate
the results of this study is through publications, both in academic journals
and professional outlets. For example, findings from the experiment
chapter are already being presented at an academic conference, and the
paper for the conference will be submitted for review in an academic
journal.
It is worth mentioning that, given the gravity of some of the findings of the
study (e.g. the experiment results), I may be asked by some decision makers to oneto-one meetings where the results of this study can be closely discussed.

9.6 Limitations of the Study
It cannot be denied that various challenges have been faced in compiling this
research. For example, a major challenge that I faced was access to field data. The
auditing industry is well-known to be very protective of its operations, and audit
firms in particular have many reasons to treat their audit files as confidential. They

191

are bound by their clients not to share confidential information with others. Sharing
audit files with outsiders, moreover, entails opening the door to criticism and so does
releasing information about audit programs and firms‟ methodologies, which is
proprietary. I was aware of these challenges and accordingly structured the data
collection methods to obtain data from sources that complemented each other. For
example, while it was not possible to obtain direct access to client files to assess the
quality of audits for SME clients, a method such as the field experiment that I used
helped to offset this limitation.
Another limitation faced was the financial limitation on following up all 27
offers received in the experiment out of the 80 audit firms that were approached (this
was an acceptable response rate). However, only one firm was selected to produce an
audit report for the bogus company, and I paid it for its services. It can be argued
that, even though one company produced an unacceptable audit opinion, this cannot
be generalized to the remaining 27 firms. But the amount of money that would have
been needed to pay all the audit firms for producing a financial report would have
had serious implication for the researcher. It is also argued that the representativeness
of the firm chosen was endorsed by the phone calls conducted with some of the 27
firms, whose staff confirmed over the phone their willingness to issue an audit report
in a very short time without obtaining the necessary audit evidence (see Chapter 8,
above).
Another challenge that I faced was the limited number of my interviewees,
compared to certain other studies in the field. Theoretically more interviews would
have yielded more data, but 14 interviewees in relation to the number of auditors in
the UAE is not a small number. In any case, the interviews reached „saturation
point‟, whereby the themes emerging from the interviewees were starting to repeat
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themselves. Even a chance addition to the interview protocol did not yield new
interview data; at this point, it was felt that additional numbers would not add any
qualitative value to the material already gathered.

9.7 Reflections on Meeting the DBA Program Goals
The DBA program has 10 program learning outcomes (PLOs). Students are expected
to meet these PLOs by the time of graduation. I am aware that these PLOs are linked
to all the activities and courses that we take during the program life cycle, via a map,
which indicates which activities contributed to the achievement of the PLOs.
Naturally, the final assessment of whether I meet those PLOs or not is left to the
examination committee, but upon reflection on those goals and assessing my own
progress after completing my dissertation, I can say that I believe I have met all the
program learning outcomes, to varying degrees.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1 – Subject Entities as Defined by ADAA

(ADAA, 2012)
In addition to the above, and according to (ADAA, 2012), ADAA have the
following subject entities that fulfills its criteria
Table 71 List of ADAA Subject Entities
Abu Dhabi Quality and Conformity Abu Dhabi Retirement Fund
Council

Abu Dhabi Municipality

Khalifa Fund for Projects Development

Al Ain Municipality

Western Region Development Council

Western Region Municipality

Emirates Heritage Club

The Center of Waste Management - Abu

Dar Zayed for Islamic Culture

Dhabi

Zoo and Water Life Establishment in Al The Center for Regulation of Transport
Ain

by Hire Cars (Trans Ad)
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The National Rehabilitation Center

Compensations Fund for Owners of Taxi

Abu Dhabi Farmers Services Centre

Licenses

Organic Agriculture Center

International

Farmer Owner Financial Subsidies Fund

Conservation

Family Development Foundation

Mohamed

Zayed Higher Organization

Conservation Fund

Social

Care

and

Minors

Fund

bin

for

Habara

Zayed

Species

Affairs Statistics Centre - Abu Dhabi

Foundation

Presidential Flight Authority

Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahayan Charitable Office of the Brand Abu Dhabi
& Humanitarian Foundation
Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahayan Charity
Foundation
Emirates Foundation
Private Housing Loans Authority
Khalifa

University

for

Science,

Technology and Researches
Emirates

College

for

Educational

Development
Paris-Sorbonne University–Abu Dhabi
Abu Dhabi Vocational Education and
Training Institute
Institute of Applied Technology
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Appendix 2 - List of the most Productive Free Zones in the UAE

The concept of free zones came to solve the foreign investors‟ issues in
partnering with Emirate citizens and allowed investors to own a 100% of their
business. However free zones are being regulated in a way that companies in the free
zone are mostly serving the private industry and are not being favored by the
government projects. This has limited free zone companies to land major contracts
directly with government projects and are serving more of a subcontracting arm for
the local companies that has at least 51% Emirate shareholder. Free zone authorities
do require the companies established in the free zone to submit their audited
financials, however, some free zones require companies to deal with audit firms that
have presence in the free zone and some other free zones have established a listing of
approved auditors to deal with. The concept of approved auditor list is also present
with the banking industry who provides its clients with a listing of the approved
auditors and moreover ranked in categories of A, B, or C as a quality measure
imposed by bankers and free zones based on their internal judgment. Table below
shows a list of free zones in the U
Table 72 - List of Free Zones in the UAE
Masdar City

Abu
Dhabi
Ports Abu Dhabi Airport Free
Company
Zone
Khalifa Industrial Zone
Zones Corp
TwoFour54
Dubai Airport Free Zone
Dubai Silicon Oasis
Jebel Ali Free Zone
Dubai Multi Commodities Dubai Internet City
Dubai Media City
Center
Dubai Studio City
Dubai Academic City
Dubai Knowledge village
Dubai Outsource Zone
Enpark
Intl. Media Production
Zone
Dubai Biotech Research Dubai Auto Zone
Gold and Diamond Park
Park
Dubai Healthcare City
Dubai Intl. Financial Dubai Logistics City
Centre
Dubai Maritime City
Dubai Flower Centre
Intl Humanitarian City
Sharjah Airport Free Hamriya Free Zone
Ahmed Bin Rashid FZ
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Zone
Ajman
Free
Zone RAK
Investment RAK Free Zone
Authority
Authority
RAK Maritime City
Fujairah Free Zone
Fujairah Creative City
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Appendix 3 – DFSA Findings
The DFSA monitoring team have assessed 33 onsite assessments, assessed 56
principals, and reviewed 106 audit engagements as follows:
Figure 17 - Summary of DFSA Reviews

(Dubai-Financial-Service-Authority-DFSA, 2013)
The DFSA monitoring team has summarized their finding in to three major
points as follows:
All registered auditors in the DIFC should exercise a greater level of
professional skepticism especially with areas related to management judgment. This
research will measure the professional skepticism of participating auditors‟
throughout UAE. In order to see the level of professional skepticism that exists
between auditors in the country as a whole rather than just DIFC.
Registered auditors should not only seek evidence that is supporting the
balances in the financial statements and the management‟s judgments, they should
also search for facts that might challenge these balances and judgments.
Registered auditors should work on obtaining more corroborating evidence to
support their audit conclusion.
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The key findings of the audit monitoring team of DFSA are summarized
below:
Going concern was not properly investigated in five audit engagement files
where the file lacked evidence that the audit partner have exercised due professional
care to challenge the management‟s assumptions supporting the entity‟s going
concern.
Employees’ independence of six registered auditors was questioned by the
DFSA monitoring team as these audit firms was retaining its employees passports.
This kind of practice does impair the independence of the staff to raise any of their
concerns since their passports are being withheld by the audit firms.
External confirmations on eight audit engagements were not received from
independent third parties. Only one engagement out of those eight managed to
perform alternative audit procedures as compared to seven engagements who failed
to perform alternative audit procedures to cover the audit assertions that would have
been covered if the audit confirmation were received. Also, eighteen audit
engagements have failed to document the confirmation process. And fifteen audit
engagements did not have the appropriate control over the confirmation process as it
was evident that the client was the one who circulated the confirmations on behalf of
the audit firm.
Preparation of financial statements is currently being done by the audit
firms which present a self-review threat. This was evident in five audit engagement
were the financial statements were prepared by members of the audit firm who were
also part of the audit team. This self-review threat was properly identified by the
audit partners but was not properly mitigated by assigning a member of the audit
firm who is not involved in the audit.
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Sufficient corroborating audit evidence was not assessed by the DFSA
monitoring team as some engagements were performed by audit firms that are part of
the network of the registered auditors. The registered auditor has issued an audit
opinion to the client based on an inter-office opinion. The registered auditor has
failed to obtain a copy of the audit file and to show the monitoring team that he has
performed a review on the audit file. This did not allow the monitoring team to
review the audit file in order to assess whether appropriate audit evidence was
obtained.
Quality of audit work was found to be insufficient in two audit files and it
was concluded by the DFSA monitoring team that the personnel that were involved
in these files lacked sufficient knowledge over audit requirements and did not receive
appropriate training.
Audit partners’ involvement throughout the audit initiation, supervision and
performance was not sufficient. Engagement partners either got involved at the final
stages of the audit or have delegated his responsibility to newly promoted partners
who are not properly registered as audit principle in accordance with the DFSA rules
and procedures.
Sufficiency of audit procedure was found to be not enough in a number of
files and in various occurrences. Certain material revenue transactions were not
audited and the audit firm was satisfied with a representation letter from the
management. Proper cross referencing of revenue samples was not done properly. In
certain occurrences, senior in charge have documented that he has sited certain
documents, however, no proper documentation of the references of these documents
were done to allow re-performance. Also receivables were not tested properly
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through independent third party confirmations and no alternative procedures were
evident in file.

Appendix 4 - List of Audit Firms
Table 73 - List of Audit Firms in the UAE
1

Aarmak Auditing
& Accounting

41

2

Abdul Husain &
Associates

42

3

Active Auditors

43

4

AGX AUDITING

44

5

AIM Auditing

45

6

Al Ayoubi
Accounting &
Auditing Chartered
Accountants
Al Basha
Accounting &
Audit
Al Hamili& Co
Public Accountants

46

Al Khader& CO
(Chartered
Accountants)

49

7

8

9

10 AL KTTBI &
ASSOCIATES
Chartered
Accountants

Ghanim Alsaadi
Auditing (Old
name -Ali Al
Muhari
Auditing)
Ghassan Al
Saheb Public
Acc.
Griffin Nagda &
Company)
Haris &
Associates
Auditing
Haytham
Accounting &
Auditing
HLB Hamt
Chartered
Accountants

81

ODEH & Co
Certified Public
Accountants

82

84

Paul & Hassan
Chartered
Accountants
PKF Chartered
Accountants
Pwc

85

Qubic Auditing

86

R.A.K Accounting
& Auditing

47

HLB Jivanjee
and Company

87

Ramesh Ramu &
Audit Associates

48

Horwath Mak
Chartered
Accountants
&Business
Advisors
HRM
Associates,
Chartered
Accountants
International
Auditing &
Consulting
Center

88

RAO & ROSS
Chartered
Accountants

89

Rodl Middle East

90

RSM Dahman &
Co Auditors

50

83
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11 AL Maqtari
Auditing

51

International
Chartered
Accounting
JAXA Chartered
Accountants
Jitendra
Chartered
Accountants
Kaid Auditing
Chartered
Accountants

91

12 Al Najma Auditors

52

13 Al Rammahi
Auditing Chartered
Accountants
14 Al Saif Auditing &
Accountants

53

15 Alliott Hadi Shahid
Chartered
Accountants

55

Kanaan &
Associates
Certified Public
Accountants
(Old Name Adonis Kanann
Certified
Khalil Al
Rahman
Kothari Auditors
& Accountants
KPMG Lower
Gulf Limited

95

16 Alyah Auditing
Accountants
17 As'ad Abbas & Co

56

18 Ashok Kapur &
Associates
Chartered
Accountants
19 ASP Auditing
Chartered
Accountants,
Auditors &
Consultants
20 ASR Chartered
Accountants
21 Awni Farsakh &
Co

58

59

KSI Shah &
Associates

99

SPA Auditing
Chartered
Accountants

60

M Al Ali
Auditing
M&M Auditing
Al Menhali

100

M.A. Vasi
Chartered
Accountant
M.S.K
International
Auditors
Mahendra Asher
& Co. Chartered
Accountants
Marshal &
Associates
Accountants
Auditors

102

Sufian Al Agha Co.
Public
Suhaila &
Associates
Chartered
Talal Abu
Ghazalah& Co
International L.L.C
Tamim Auditing
Accountants

22 Axis Line
International

62

23 Baker Tilly MKM
Chartered
Accountants
24 BDO Chartered
Accountants &
Advisors
25 BEHL, LAD & AL
Sayegh Chartered
Accountants

63

54

57

61

64

65

92
93

94

96
97
98

101

103

S. M. Joshi
Chartered
Accountants
Saif Chartered
Accountants
Sajjad Haider& Co
Chartered
Accountants
SALIM
RAJKOTWALA
CHARTERED
ACCOUNTANTS
Sangani & Co.
Chartered
Accountants

Shah & Alshamali
Assoc
Shrichand Shroff
Chartered
SKM International
Chartered
Accountants

104

Thakkar &Tahir

105

UHY Saxena
Chartered
Accountants
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26 Caliber Middle
East Chartered
Accountants
27 Coast Accounting
& Auditing

66

MASHAL AL
ZAROONI
CHARTERED
Master Auditing

106

United Auditing

107

68

Masters Legal
Accountants

108

29 Dilawar Auditing

69

109

30 El Medani
Accounting &
Auditing
31 Ernst & Young
Middle East

70

Mazars
Chartered
Accountants
MBK Auditing

Unity Auditing
Chartered
Accountants
Youssry& Co.
Auditing and
consultants
Zenith Certified
Chartered
Accountant

28 Deloitte &Touche
(M.E)

32 ESM Chartered
Accountants Old
name (MFS
Chartered
Accountants LLC)
33 Essaar& Associates
Chartered
Accountants
34 Ethics Plus Public
Accountants

72

35 Excel Auditing &
Accounting

75

36 Executive
Chartered
Accountants

76

37 Falcon
International
Consulting &
Auditors
38 Farhat Office &
CO.
39 Fuller International
Certified Public
Accountants

77

N.R Doshi& Co
Chartered
Accountants

78

Nayef Abu
sekrean Public
NUF Chartered
Accountants
LLC

67

71

73

74

79

MERALIS
CHARTERED
ACCOUNTANT
S&
REGISTERED
AUDITORS
Moaaz Mohamed

Moore Stephens
Chartered
Accountants
Morison Menon
Chartered
Accountants(RA
KFTZ Branch)
MRS KNB
Chartered
Accountants
MSI Alnoman&
Ravi Chartered
& Accountants
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40 GDT Associates
FZC

80

Numerica
Chartered
Accountants

Appendix 5 – Interview Protocols

Purpose of the Study. As part of the requirements for Doctorate of Business
Administration at UAEU, I have to carry out a research study. The study is
concerned with the Perceptions of audit quality in SME‟s in the UAE. We are in the
process of conducting a study in the audit industry in the UAE to examine the need
for more governance over the audit firms that deals with the private sector
What will the study involve? The study will involve a survey and a number of
selected interviews of key personnel in the industry.
Why have you been asked to take part? You have been asked because of your
direct experience in the field of study and your feedback will provide the study with
more insightful information to make the study more meaningful.
Do you have to take part? This is a voluntary research that we hope most
professionals will understand its benefits and would participate for the benefit of the
industry as a whole. Attached is a consent form for participating in the research. If
for any reason a participants decided to withdraw from this research even after
conducting the interview he/she is entitled to do so within two weeks of the date of
the interview. All data collected from the participant will be destroyed.
Will your participation in the study be kept confidential? Yes. No direct clues
will be made in the research that might lead to your identity. All quotes and extracts
from the interview will be entirely anonymous.
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What will happen to the information which you give? Data collected will be held
for the period of the research. All data will be kept after the research confidentially
away from any third parties and will be destroyed after one year of the completion of
the research.
What will happen to the results? The results will be part of the thesis submitted to
the university. The thesis will be seen by the supervisor and the DBA panel who will
assess and grade the study. The thesis might also be used by other students and get
published in research journals.
What are the possible disadvantages of taking part? On the contrary, participating
in this research will help develop this industry and might lead to a more controls and
governance on audit firms.
What if there is a problem? At the end of the interview, I will discuss with you
how you found the experience and in case you were distressed for any reason, you
can ask to cancel and destroy all information collected in the interview process.
Who has reviewed this study? This study was approved by the College of Business
and Economics Department of UAEU

Consent Form
I………………………………………agree to participate in Ahmad Odeh‟s research
study.
The purpose and nature of the study has been explained to me in writing.
I am participating voluntarily.
I give permission for my interview with Ahmad Odeh to be tape-recorded
I understand that I can withdraw from the study, without repercussions, at any time,
whether before it starts or while I am participating.
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I understand that I can withdraw permission to use the data within two weeks of the
interview, in which case the material will be deleted.
I understand that anonymity will be ensured in the write-up by disguising my
identity.
I understand that disguised extracts from my interview may be quoted in the thesis
and any subsequent publications if I give permission below:
I agree to quotation/publication of extracts from my interview
I do not agree to quotation/publication of extracts from my interview

Signed…………………………………….

Date……………….
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Appendix 6 – Circulated Survey – Mid-tier auditors
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Appendix 7 – Circulated Survey – BIG 4 auditors
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Appendix 8 – Circulated Survey – Professionals
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Appendix 9 – Circulated Email
―Dear Sir, I am in the process of renewing the attached license that expired last
week. I need the financials audited and I do not have a lot of time. Please see
attached the financials of the company. It is only one year old and very
straightforward. Can you please tell me how much will it cost to get them audited
and how long do you need. The attached is the financials up to end of November
only, so the audit will only be for the period of 11 months‖
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Appendix 10 – Original Profit and Loss Statement of Company for the
period ended 30 November 2014
Table 74 – Experiment: Original Profit and Loss Statement of Company for the
period ended 30 November 2014
TOTAL
Ordinary Income/Expense
Expense
60000 · Advertising and Promotion
60200 · Bank Service Charges
61100 · Business Licenses and Permits
61200 · Legal & Visa Fee
62000 · Training & Conference
62200 · Travel Expense
62300 · Meals and Entertainment
63100 · Health Insurance
63200 · Interest Expense
65200 · Printing and Stationary
67100 · Rent Expense
67200 · Signage Expenses
67500 · Retainers Fee
68100 · Telephone Expense
69000 · Payroll Expense
Total Expense

450
428
452
9,942
22,035
79,750
3,269
600
365
1,669
61,014
2,739
300
8,104
254,167
445,284

Net Ordinary Income

(445,284)

Net Income

(445,284)
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Appendix 11 - Original Balance Sheet of the Company as of 30 November
2014
Table 75 – Experiment: Original Balance Sheet of the Company as of 30 November
2014
Nov 30,
14

Nov 30, 14

ASSETS

LIABILITIES &
EQUITY

Current Assets

Liabilities

Checking/Savings

Current Liabilities
20000 · Accounts
Payable
20001 · Due to Related
Party

10002 · ADIB

(8,122)

10010 · Petty Cash

17,183

10013 · PRO Petty Cash

(1,155)

Total Checking/Savings

3,000

Total Accounts Payable
Other Current
Liabilities
20002 · Salary Payable
Total Other Current
Liabilities

3,000

Total Liabilities

7,906

Other Current Assets
12000 · Bank Guarantees
Total Other Current
Assets
Total Current Assets

10,906

Fixed Assets
14000 · Furniture and
Equipment

28,707
22,035
50,742

75,000
75,000
125,742

Equity
31000 · Capital Account

14001 · Laptop
Total 14000 · Furniture
and Equipment

2,095

Total Fixed Assets

2,095

2,095

Other Assets
16000 · Security Deposit

12,000

Total Other Assets

12,000

TOTAL ASSETS

25,001

31001 · Mr. Bak

76,500

31002 · Mr. IAP
Total 31000 · Capital
Account
32000 · Current
Account
32001 · Mr. Bak

71,889
148,389

155,632

32002 ·Mr. IAP
Total 32000 · Current
Account
33000 · Retained
Earnings

189,274

(148,752)

Net Income

(445,284)

Total Equity
TOTAL LIABILITIES
& EQUITY

(100,741)

344,906

25,001
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Appendix 12 – Modified Profit and Loss Statement of Company for the
period ended 30 November 2014
Table 76 – Experiment: Modified Profit and Loss Statement of Company for the
period ended 30 November 2014

Sales
Cost of Sales
Expense
60000 · Advertising and Promotion
60200 · Bank Service Charges
61100 · Business Licenses and Permits
61200 · Legal & Visa Fee
62000 · Training & Conference
62200 · Travel Expense
62300 · Meals and Entertainment
63100 · Health Insurance
63200 · Interest Expense
65200 · Printing and Stationary
67100 · Rent Expense
67200 · Signage Expenses
67500 · Retainers Fee
68100 · Telephone Expense
69000 · Payroll Expense
Total Expense

Net Income

Total
1,535,000
(743,500)
(450)
(428)
(452)
(9,942)
(22,035)
(79,750)
(3,269)
(600)
(365)
(1,669)
(61,014)
(2,739)
(300)
(8,104)
(254,167)
(445,284)

346,216
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Appendix 13- Modified Balance Sheet of the Company as of 30 November
2014
Table 77 – Experiment: Modified Balance Sheet of the Company as of 30 November
2014
Nov 30,
14
ASSETS
Current Assets
Checking/Savings
10002 · ADIB

-

10010 · Petty Cash

-

10013 · Trade receivables
Total Checking/Savings
Other Current Assets
12000 · Bank Guarantees
Total Other Current
Assets
Total Current Assets
Fixed Assets
14000 · Furniture and
Equipment
14001 · Laptop
Total 14000 · Furniture
and Equipment
Total Fixed Assets

1,525,906
1,525,906

3,000
3,000
1,528,906

2,095
2,095
2,095

Other Assets
16000 · Security Deposit
Total Other Assets
TOTAL ASSETS

12,000
12,000
1,543,001

Nov 30, 14
LIABILITIES
&
EQUITY
Liabilities
Current Liabilities
Accounts Payable
20000
·
Accounts
Payable
20001 · Due to Related
Party
Total Accounts Payable
Other
Current
Liabilities
20002 · Salary Payable
Total Other Current
Liabilities
Total
Current
Liabilities
Total Liabilities

28,707
22,035
50,742

75,000
75,000
125,742
125,742

Equity
31000 · Capital Account
31001 · Mr. Bak
31002 · Mr. IAP
Total 31000 · Capital
Account
32000
·
Current
Account
32001 · Mr. Bak
32002 ·Mr. IAP
32003
Total 32000 · Current
Account
33000
·
Retained
Earnings
Net Income
Total Equity
TOTAL LIABILITIES
& EQUITY

76,500
73,500
150,000

138,632
187,663
743,500
1,069,795
(148,752)
346,216
1,417,259
1,543,001
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Appendix 14 – DBA Program Learning Outcomes

1. Develop oral presentations to communicate effectively and without guidance,
using technologies to support the oral presentation of information where
needed to academic and professional peers. (‗Creating‘‘ category in the
revised Bloom‘s taxonomy).
2. Write effectively to communicate highly complex and diverse matters to
expert audiences. (‗Creating‘ category in the revised Bloom‘s taxonomy).
3. Apply a range of mastered skills and techniques including synthesis,
evaluation, planning and reflection, required to critically extend and redefine
professional practice and knowledge. (‗Applying‘ category in the revised
Bloom‘s taxonomy).
4. Apply advanced skills in developing innovative solutions to critical problems
using expert skills, demonstrating intellectual independence. (‗Applying‘
category in the revised Bloom‘s taxonomy).
5. Act with authority, creativity, autonomy, independence, scholarly and
professional integrity. (‗Creating‘ category in the revised Bloom‘s
taxonomy).
6. Demonstrate abilities associated with professional leadership of peer groups
and teams. (‗Applying‘ category in the revised Bloom‘s taxonomy).
7. Assess consistently and sensitively manage diverse ethical issues in highly
complex contexts and make fair judgments. (‗Evaluating‘ category in the
revised Bloom‘s taxonomy).
8. Examine the complex social and cultural contexts of leadership. (‗Analyzing‘
category in the revised Bloom‘s taxonomy).
9. Evaluate the state of research and practice in a business field and highlight
possible ways to contribute to that field. (‗Evaluating‘ category in the revised
Bloom‘s taxonomy).
10. Create new knowledge in the field, through independent research, innovative
and creative practical solutions to a challenging business problem through
conceptualizing, designing, implementing, and adapting research processes in
complex contexts. (‗Creating‘ category in the revised Bloom‘s taxonomy).

